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The Limits of Economic Power:

Section 301 and the World Trade

Organization Dispute Settlement
System
C. O'Neal Taylor*
ABSTRACT

Since World War 1I, the United States has sought trade
liberalization through the use of multilateral and unilateral
actions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
respectively. Unilateralismby the United States has involved
the forceful opening of foreign markets by the threat of
sanctions, such as blocking access to the U.S. market. Such
unilateralactions led the world trading system into the most
recent multilateral negotiations, the Uruguay Round. As a
result, the United States conceded to an effort to achieve
trade liberalization through the expansion of GATT and the
establishment of a more adjudicative settlement system
governed by the World Trade OrganizationDispute Settlement
Understanding(DSU).
This Article addresses two major aspects of these recent
First, the author analyzes the limits to
developments.
economic power exercised as unilateral sanctions. More
specifically, she examines Section 301 and its limits by
deconstructing this provision and reviewing cases in its
second decade that construe its various parts. The author
contends that the United States used Section 301,from 1985-

1995, for three major purposes-pursuingGATT violations, to
set the agendafor the Uruguay Round, and to try to cure a
persistent trade deficit with Japan.The author concludes that

unilateralism, as

exemplified

by

Section

301,

has

limitations-primarily it effectiveness and its potential to

* Professor of Law. South Texas College of Law, A.B.. 1980 Harvard-Radcliffe.
J.D. University of Georgia, LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center. The author
would like to express the gratitude for the able research help offered by Simon
Purnell and Scott Billings.
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violate GATT law--that prevent it from being a panaceafor
U.S. tradeproblems.
Second, the author examines the comprehensiveness and
effectiveness of the new multilateral dispute settlement
system under the DSU as an alternative to U.S. unilateral
activity. This Article includes extensive analysis on how the
DSU addresses and fails to address Section 301 concerns.
Furthermore, it tracks the creation of the more adjudicative
dispute settlement system and examines its consequencesfor
the United States and all international organizations. The
author concludes that the United States needs to resume
multilateralism as the primary way to pursue trade
liberalization and to use the more legitimate and equitable
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System,
established under the Uruguay Round, to address U.S. trade
problems.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................
SECTION 301 AND ITS LIMITS ...................................

A.
B.
C.

III.

Section 301 Deconstructed...........................
The United States and the Lure of
Unilateralism..............................................
A Taxonomy of Section 301 Cases
(1985-1996)................................................
1. Ensuring Compliance with
International Trade Law:
Section 301/International
Violation Cases .....................................
2. Section 301/Unreasonable Cases ..........
3. Section 301 and the Japan Problem ......

THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: ITS
PROMISES AND ITS LIMITS ........................................

A.

B.

211

213
213
218
225

225
228
238
242

Completion of the Uruguay Round:
Establishmentof the WTO and the Adoption
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding(DSU) 242
How the DSU Addresses and Falls
250
to Address Section 301 Concerns .................
1. The Dispute Settlement System of
250
the WTO ...............................................
2. The United States as a Plaintiff in the
WTO: Pursuing Its Section 301
260
Concerns ... :..........................................
a. Section 301/International Violations
and Cases and the WTO Dispute

THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC POWER AND SECTION 301

1997]

Settlement System ..........................

C.

IV.

b. Section 301/Unreasonable Cases
and the GATT Non-Violation Theory.
3. United States as a Defending Country in
a. DSU Proceeding .................................
InternationalOrganizationsand Dispute
Settlement ..................................................
1. The Creation of an Adjudicative
Dispute Settlement System ...................
2. The Consequences of a More
Adjudicative Dispute Settlement System
a.
Jurisdiction .........................
b.
Development of GATT Law:
The Creation of Precedent .....
c.
Enforcement/ Compliance .....
3. Consequences of the Adjudicative
System for the United States .................

CONCLUSION .........................................................

I.

211
260

273
292
296
296
298
298
305
308
311
314

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the United States has sought
trade liberalization by alternatively pursuing multilateralism and
unilateralism. When following the multilateral path, the United
States used its economic power to help create a body of law
governing international trade and an organization to oversee that
law, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).' While
leading the multilateral system, the United States worked on
expanding and clarifying international trade rules and ensuring
compliance by GATT countries with those rules.

The United

States worked toward expanding the law by serving as the driving
force behind a series of rounds of GATT negotiations aimed at
significantly lowering worldwide tariffs and dismantling some of
the non-tariff barriers to trade. 2 At the same time, the United
States sought to ensure compliance with international trade law
by actively using the GATT dispute settlement system. 3
The U.S. turn towards unilateralism began when the country
experienced a slippage in its position as the dominant economic
power. During this period, the United States came to believe that

1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2.
See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 9-17,
45-55 (1990).
3.

ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION

OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 295-300 (1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].
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not all of its trading partners were as committed to multilateral
trade liberalization as it was. The legislative tool developed for
self-help was Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, a statute
designed to force open other country's markets. The leverage for
opening these markets was the threat of depriving trading
partners access to the U.S. market. 4 Aggressive unilateralism
under Section 301 forced open some markets and pushed the
world trading system into the most recent set of multilateral
negotiations, the Uruguay Round. By the end of the Uruguay
Round, the United States managed to obtain its major goals of
increasing market access through the expansion of GATT law and
establishing a more adjudicative dispute settlement system
governed by the World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
5
Understanding (DSU).
The Uruguay Round and its results appear to mark the
convergence of the U.S. multilateral and unilateral paths to trade
liberalization. However, it is an uneasy convergence. The U.S.
turn to unilateralism had its costs. Many countries embraced
multilateralism, as exemplified by the World Trade Organization6
(WTO) largely to constrain and discipline the United States.
Meanwhile, the United States must reconcile its desire to
continue leading the multilateral system with its attempt to retain
maximum unilateral power. Having obtained its major trade
goals in the Uruguay Round, the United States is now faced with

operating within a new international trading regime. This Article
attempts to address and answer two questions: (1) Are there
limits (and if so, what kind of limits) to economic power when
exercised as unilateral sanctions?; and (2) Is the new multilateral
dispute settlement system under the WTO's dispute settlement

4.
See generally Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Current
Developments: Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases,
21 INT'L LAW 211, 211 (1987).
5.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multinational Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, in THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 33 I.L.M. 1244 [hereinafter
Dispute Settlement Understanding].
6.
The European Community, for example, was quite concerned about
the 1988 revisions to Section 301 that expanded and toughened U.S. response to
unfair trade practices. In a meeting held during the DSU negotiations the EC
claimed that "it was extremely serious for a country to grant itself the right to take
GATT-inconsistent measures to counter GATT-consistent measures taken by
third countries." 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2762
(Terence P. Stewart, ed. 1993) [hereinafter DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING
HISTORY].
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to U.S.

SECTION 301 AND ITS LIMITS

A. Section 301 Deconstructed

Before attempting to analyze Section 301, it is important to
examine the history and purpose of the statute. "Section 301"
takes its name from the section number of the original legislation,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.8 The original Section 301
gave the President broad authority to take retaliatory actions
against "unjustifiable" as well as "unreasonable" import
restrictions by other countries. 9 Neither term was defined in the
statute itself. The legislative history of Section 301, however,
indicates that Congress considered "unjustifiable" acts to be those
that were illegal under international law or inconsistent with
international obligations.' 0 "Unreasonable" acts were considered
to encompass import restrictions by countries that were not
necessarily illegal, but which nullified or impaired benefits under
international agreement or otherwise discriminated against or
burdened U.S. commerce."
The remainder of the legislative
history of the Trade Act of 1974 contained descriptions of the
12
actions Congress described as unreasonable.
Section 301 was designed to allow the President to take
retaliatory action against countries which did not agree to end
such unjustifiable or unreasonable practice.
Congress
contemplated the possibility that some retaliatory actions would

7.
To achieve these goals the article relies on international regime theory,
a body of international relations theory devoted to the issue of how international
regimes operate. International regime theory poses several significant questions.
Why does a state cooperate in a multilateral regime? How is an issue handled
differently by a country if it does? Is it possible to obtain compliance by countries
with regime decisions? See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International
Relations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335
(1989). No examination of the U.S. future within the world trading system can
take place without attempting answers to some, if not all, of these questions.
8.
Trade Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-02, 88 Stat. 1978,
2041-43 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-18 (1994)) [hereinafter
TTA of 19741.
9.
Id. at § 301(a)(1).
10.
S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 3-4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7186. 7301 [hereinafter 1974 Act History].
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7302.
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not be consistent with U.S. obligations under GATT.' 3 Congress,
however, also stated that GATT obligations were being "observed
more often in the breach" 14 than in reality and that the decisionmaking process of GATT frustrated the ability of the United States
to protect its rights and benefits under GATT.' 5
The entire
legislative history of Section 301 is replete with Congressional
expressions of dissatisfaction with GATT and GATT system. In its
final comment on retaliation under the statute, the Committee
report states:'
The Committee Is not urging that the United States undertake
wanton or reckless retaliatory action under Section 301 In total
disdain of applicable international agreements. However, the
Committee felt it was necessary to make it clear that the President
could act to protect U.S. economic interests whether or not such
action was consistent with the articles of an outmoded
International agreement initiated by the Executive 25 years ago
16
and never approved by the Congress.

Section 301 was amended in 1979, 1984, 1988,17 and most
recently in 1994 in the Uruguay Round implementing
legislation.' 8 . The early legislative revisions focused on the time
limits for Section 301 cases and procedures for initiation of such
cases (through private industry petition or self-initiation by the
Administration). 19 The major 1988 revisions in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act did not alter the scope of Section
301, but did create two new forms of Section 301 cases-Special
301, which required the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) to identify and initiate investigations of countries that
failed to offer adequate protection for intellectual property

13.
TTA of 1974, supra note 8, at § 301(a)(4)(a) & (b). According to the
legislative history, "The authority In this section should not be used frivolously or

without justification. The Committee feels, however, that there must be a credible
threat of retaliation whenever a foreign nation treats the commerce of the United
States unfairly.- 1974 Act History, supra note 10. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7302-03.
14.
1974 Act History, supra note 10, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7304.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 301-04, 93 Stat,
144-317 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-82 (1994)) (amending the TTA
of 1974, supra note 8); Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98
Stat. 2948, 3002 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994)) (amending the TTA of 1974,
supra note 8) [hereinafter TTA of 19841; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 0§ 1301-04, 102 Stat. 1107-1574 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411-14 (1994)) (hereinafter OTCA].
18.
Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 314, 108 Stat.
4809 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411-14 (1994 & Supp. VII 1995))
[hereinafter URAA].
19.
THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION
RETALIATION].

IN U.S.

TRADE POLICY

27 (1994) [hereinafter

RECIPROCITY AND
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rights, 20 and Super 301, which required USTR to identify 2 and
1
pursue the countries with the most significant trade barriers.
The 1988 revision of Section 301 was also significant because
it broke Section 301 cases into two categories: (1) those in which
it was mandatory for the United States to take action against a
target country which violated the terms of the statute; and (2)
those in which retaliation was discretionary. Mandatory action
was to be taken, unless a settlement was reached or the GATT
dispute settlement system ruled against the United States, in all
cases where the foreign act, policy, or practices violated an
international agreement. 2 2 If the foreign act, policy, or practice
unreasonably burdened or restricted U.S. Commerce, USTR was
not required to act by engaging in trade sanctions. Instead it was
to take "all appropriate and feasible action" to obtain elimination

of the act.23 The 1994 revision to Section 301 retained this 1988

redesign of the statute.
Each of the Congressional revisions of Section 301 has
confronted the issue of clarifying the meanings of "unjustifiable"
and "unreasonable" means. 24 Unjustifiable acts are now

considered to be those that violate international trade agreements
or othervise nullify or impair U.S. benefits under international
"Unreasonable" has been defined as covering
agreements. 25

20.
OTCA, supra note 17, at §§ 1301 & 1303. Special 301 required USTR
to annually: 1. identify countries that deny adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights; 2. identify "priority" countries that are the most
egregious intellectual property violators and that fail to undertake or make
progress concerning such negotiations with USTR; and 3. initiate accelerated
Section 301 investigations with regard to priority country practices.
21.
Id. at § 1302. Super 301 was supposed to be used by USTR for two
years to: 1. identify priority practices likely to have the most significant potential
to increase U.S. exports; and 2. identify priority countries taking into account the
number one persuasiveness of practices; see also 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 715-21
(May 25, 1989) (USTR Fact Sheets on the implementation of Super 301 and
Special 301); see generally Geza Feketekuty, U.S. Policy on 301 and Super 301, in
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 91-103 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds.,
1990). Super 301 lapsed after two years as provided in the original legislation.
President Clinton extended Super 301 by Executive Order 12901 in 1994. This
form of Section 301 was reenacted into law in the implementing legislation for the
Uruguay Round. URAA, supra note 18,at § 314(f).
For an explanation of these
22.
OTCA, supra note 17, at § 1301.

provisions, see Judith H. Bello &Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade ActA Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM 49-50 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
23.
OTCA, supranote 17, at § 1301.
24.
REcIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supranote 19, at 27-28.
25.
TTA of 1984, supra note 17, at § 304. Unjustifiable acts are defined in
§ 2411(d):
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practices that are "not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent
with U.S. legal rights," but which are "deemed to be unfair and
inequitable." 2 6 Neither the Executive nor Congress has ever
proposed a formal definition for "unreasonable" or suggested a
standard against which such a determination could be made.
This failure to give absolute meaning to the term means that
USTR's characterization of foreign government actions cannot
always be predicted.
The absence of predictability, however,
leaves USTR with the maximum amount of flexibility when it
investigates and determines whether there is a basis for U.S.
action under Section 301.
In the various revisions of the statute, Congress has provided
some guidance to USTR by offering a non-exhaustive list of
illustrative practices. 2 7 This illustrative list of "unreasonable"
acts or practices has grown with each revision of the statute,
going from the denial of intellectual property rights and
opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise (1984 Act) to
government toleration of systematic anti-competitive activities by
private firms, export targeting, and the denial of labor rights
(1988 Act).2 8 In the 1994 revisions to Section 301 following the
Uruguay Round, Congress clarified the definitions for what
constitutes unreasonable practices as they relate to intellectual
property protection and anti-competitive activities. 2 9
For
example, a country may still be found to be denying adequate
intellectual property protection even if it is in compliance 30 with
the TRIPS Agreement, 3 1 which is the new GATT Agreement
requiring all WTO members to offer certain minimum standards
for the protection of intellectual property rights. With respect to

(4)(A) An act, policy, or practice is unjustifiable if the act, policy, or
practice is in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal
rights of the United States.
(B) Acts, policies, and practices that are unjustifiable include, but are not
limited to, any act, policy, or practice described in subparagraph (A) which
denies national or most-favored-nation treatment or the right of
establishment or protection of intellectual property rights.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(d).
26.
19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A)-(B) (defining unreasonable).
27.

REcIpRociTY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 27-28.

28.
29.

Id. at 31.
URAA, supra note 18, at § 314(c)(1).

30.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE

URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, Statement of Administrative Action and
Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 1028 (1994) [hereinafter Statement of Administrative Action].
31.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,

Annex IC of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
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anti-competitive practices (antitrust issues) a foreign government
may be found to be acting unreasonably if it: (1) tolerates
systematic anti-competitive activities by state-owned enterprises
as well as private firms; (2) denies market access for U.S. services
as well as goods; or (3) restricts the sales of U.S. goods or services
to a foreign market.32 The current list of practices defined as
"unreasonable" in the 1994 amendments to Section 301 include
the following: unfair or inequitable practices; activity which
denies fair and equitable "opportunities for the establishment of
enterprise;" intellectual property rights not covered by the TRIPs
agreement; nondiscriminatory market access opportunities;
toleration of "systematic anticompetitive"
activities; export
33
targeting; and inadequate labor rights.
The cumulative effect of the Section 301 legislative revisions
has been to produce a different pathway for the two types of
Section 301 cases. As of 1994, if USTR initiates a "Section
301/International violation" case or a complaint about a GATT

violative practice, it must take the case through the WTO dispute

settlement system. 3 4
The USTR investigation in a Section
301/International violation case is supposed to proceed in parallel
with the WTO dispute settlement process with the aim of seeking
a mutually satisfactory resolution of the issues raised in the
case. 3 5 If the United States and the Section 301 target cannot
end the case at the WTO consultations stage, the United States
must request a panel and delay any determination of GATT
illegality or what an appropriate U.S. response would be until
after the conclusion of the dispute resolution process. 3 6 The
adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) by the
United States did not alter the way this category of Section 301
cases were pursued. 37 Under the 1988 Act, all international
violation claims were also supposed to be pursued through the
appropriate dispute resolution system. 3 8 The adoption of the
DSU, however, simplifies the process because it provides one
integrated dispute settlement system for all GATT-based
complaints. 39 The end result of a Section 301/International
violation case and what action the United States will take turn on
whether or not the WTO ruling is favorable. The Section 301

32.
Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 1028.
33.
19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(A)-(B).
34.
URAA, supra note 18, at § 314(c).
35.
Id. at § 314(a).
36.
Statement of Administrative Action, supranote 30, at 1018.
37.
H.R. REP. No. 103-826, pt. 1,103d Cong., 2d. Sess., reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3906-07 [hereinafter URAA Legislative History].
38.
Id.
39.
See Infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
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target is expected to follow the DSU provisions for implementation
of the panel recommendations. 40 Only if the target Section 301
country fails to implement a WTO recommendation satisfactorily
within the appropriate time4 1 will USTR be forced to decide what
action the United States should take.
The pathway for a "Section 301/Unreasonable" case is
significantly shorter. USTR determines whether to initiate the
case and then pursues the ensuing investigation and negotiations
regarding the unreasonable, practice on a unilateral basis.
Nothing in the Section 301 statute, its revisions, or the legislative
histories suggests a linkage between Section 301/Unreasonable
42
cases and the GATT or WTO dispute settlement system.
B. The United States and the Lure of Unilateralism
There is a large body of economic and legal literature on
Section 301 its GATT legality 4 3 and its effectiveness in actually
44

opening foreign markets and thus increasing U.S. exports.
Different analytical methods have been used for these studies,
including the application of game theory, 4 5 economics, case
studies, 4 6 and comparative analyses of Section 301 unflateralism
40.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 21,1.
41.
Id. at art. 21.3.
42.
Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 4308.
Finally, neither Article XXIII nor Section 301 requires the United States to use
DSU procedures when the trade representative considers that an investigation
does not involve a Uruguay Round Agreement.
43.
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. supranote 3, at 203-41.
44.
See, e.g, Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: The Limited Casefor Section 301. 23 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus.
263. 269-89 (1991-92); RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 18; ABRAM
CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, , THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) [hereinafter THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY];
PATRICK Low, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1993); GREG MASEL
& RACHEL HINES, SECTION 301:

A CATALYST FOR FREE TRADE (Economic Strategy

Inst. 1995) [hereinafter ESI study].
45.
See Sykes, supra note 44, at 269-89; John McMillan, Strategic
Bargaining and Section 301, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 203, 213 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); see generally Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory"
Retallationfor Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design
of Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 301 (1990); WILLIAM R. CLINE, "RECIPROCITY": A
NEW APPROACH TO WORLD TRADE POLICY? (1982); Richard Diamond. Changes in the
Game: Understanding the Relationship Between Section 301 and U.S. Trade
Strategies, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 351 (1990).
46.
See generally, in no ranking of time or importance, the following
examples of "case studies": Jean Heilman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open
JapaneseMarkets to ForeignFirms. 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1992); Alex
Y. Seita, The Intractable State of United States-Japan Relations, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 467 (1995); Paula Stem, Reaping the Wind and Sowing the

Whirlwind: Section 301 as a Metaphorfor Congressional Assertiveness in U.S.
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with the multilateralism of GATT negotiations and dispute
settlement. 4 7 Almost all of the literature on and all of the
analytical approaches to Section 301 provided some insight into
how the United States confronts what it considers to be the illegal
or unfair trade practices of its trading partners.
Rather than attempt to describe and critique these
approaches to Section 301, however, this Article will attempt yet
another approach. It will attempt to analyze what the United
States set out to do and what it did accomplish with the second
decade of Section 301 cases and what the experience of that time
frame tells us about how the United States should approach the
post-Uruguay Round trading system.4" The second decade of
Section 301 cases, from 1985 to the 1995, has caused the most
controversy within the world trading system. 49 U.S. actions
during this time period have been attacked as one of the largest
threats to the world trading system that developed following
World War 11.50 Consequently, it is this decade of Section 301
cases that will be examined in order to diagnose what the United

Trade Policy, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (1990); Ted L. McDorman, U.S.-Thadland Trade
Disputes: Applying Section 301 to Cigarettesand Intellectual Property, 14 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 90 (1992); Suthiphon Thaveechaiyagarn, Current Developments: The
Section 301 Cigarette Case Against Thalland-A Thai Perspective, 21 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 367 (1990); Patrick H. Hu, The China 301 on MarketAccess: A Prelude to
GATT Membership?, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 131 (1994); Qiao Dexi, A Survey of
Intellectual Property Issues In China-U.S. Trade Negotiations Under the Special 301
Provisions, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 259 (1993).
47.
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3; Abram Chayes &
Antonia H, Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993) [hereinafter On
Compliance].
48.
The second true decade of Section 301 cases (1985-1994) ends in
1994 because that is the year before the WTO Agreement, which established the
organization and gave effect to the DSU, entered into force.
The appendix to this article contains a chart which lists and describes all the
Section 301 cases of the second decade, as well as the cases filed in 1995 and
1996 since the creation of the WTO and the adoption of the Understanding on
Dispute Settlement. The chart does not purport to be a complete listing of
Section 301 cases. USTR maintains such a current list which offers the
government's views of its actions. Other scholarship by Sykes and by Bayard and
Elliott focus on Section 301 cases as of 1992 (Sykes) and 1994 (Bayard and
Elliott). The chart in the appendix was designed as an update, dealing only with
the second decade of Section 301.
A review of this chart illustrates that the United States used Section 301 to
pursue particular goals from 1985-1995 continuing to the present. Since the
shift to the new WTO system, the United States appears to have altered the types
of Section 301 cases it will pursue.
The reasons why certain cases were
undertaken from 1985-1995, why different types are now being brought, and
what kinds of cases should be brought (because they would be successful and not
undercut the multilateral system) are analyzed Infra at IIC and IIIB.
49.
JAGDISH BHAGWATI. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 54-56 (1992).
50.
See generally Biswajit Dhar. The Decline of Free Trade and U.S. Trade
Policy Today, 26 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1992, at 133, 139.
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States was trying to achieve through unilateralism and whether
utilizing economic power in this fashion actually satisfied U.S.
goals.
A review of U.S. unilateralism under Section 301 from 1985
to the creation of the WTO in 1995 reveals the United States
using its economic power in an attempt to hold on to its position
as the world's leading trading nation. In the early years of the
world trading system, immediately after World War II, the United
States clearly had such hegemonic power, and it used that power
to establish and support the international organization devoted to
trade, GATT, and the development of international trade law. By
the mid-1970s, when it first enacted Section 301, the United
States began to view the world trading system as one which
created rather than solved U.S. trade problems. 5 1 By the mid1980s, this dissatisfaction with multilateralism reached new
heights, and the United States began to make aggressive use of
52
the economic weapon it had created decades earlier.
During the second decade of Section 301, the United States
followed three different goals in bringing Section 301 cases. None
of these goals were pursued in preference to or apart from the
others; the United States followed each goal more or less
simultaneously in the belief that bringing all three types of
Section 301 cases would sustain U.S. hegemony. First, the
United States sought to ensure the compliance by its trading

partners with international trade rules.5 3

Second, the United

States attempted to "set the agenda" for the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations so that the negotiations would encompass and4
5
the agreements would reflect areas of particular U.S. interest.
Third, the United States attempted to cure, or at lest lessen, its
overall trade deficit.5 5 To reach each goal, the United States used
different forms of Section 301 actions in slightly different ways.

51.

1974 Act History, supra note 10, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7301-04.

52.
I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 124-26
[hereinafter AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS].

(2nd ed.

1992)

53.
"The U.S. deployment of [Section 301] against violators of GATT
obligations reflects a unilateral political decision (1) that existing levels of
compliance were not acceptable and (2) to pay the costs of additional
enforcement." On Compliance, supra note 47, at 203.
54.

See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. supra note 3. at 199-233.

55.

The largest impact on the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s actually came

from a sharp appreciation of the dollar. See generally, C. FRED BERGSTEN,
AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1988); see also Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive
Untlaterallsm An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM 6-10 (Jagdish Bhagwati

& Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990). Nevertheless, there was a pattern of increasing
Imports and recessions in 1979-80 and 1982 which heavily impacted some key
U.S. manufacturing sectors such as autos and steel.
RECIPROCITY AND
RETALIATION. supra note 19, at 14. Congress came to see unfair foreign trade
practices as the source of U.S. difficulties. Id. Japan was widely regarded as the
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From its enactment in 1974 to the present, Section 301 has
been employed in 110 cases. 56 During the first decade of Section
301 (1978-1984), the United States brought 47 cases, but failed
to bring many of them to a conclusion. 5 7 Several long standing
trade disputes pursued under Section 301 were not resolved until
its second decade. 58 More than half of the Section 301 cases up
until 1995 were filed, pursued, and concluded in the second
decade. In addition, during the first year of the second decade,
1985, that the United States began making aggressive use of the
statute.5 9 Since then, Section 301 has become the preeminent
U.S. trade statute in the eyes of U.S. trading partners as well as
This period has witnessed both a
their largest worry.6 0

quickening in the pace of Section 301 filings and an increase in

the actions actually taken against other countries under the
statute. The reasons for this stepped up use of Section 301 were

main perpetrator of unfair trade practices and large trade deficits. Although the
U.S. trade deficit actually dropped significantly over the late 1980s the United
States was not satisfied. Japanese exports to the United States were almost three
times as large as imports from the United States in the mid-1980s. C. FRED
BERGSTEN & MARcUs NOLAND, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?
ECONOMIC CONFLICT 33 (1993).

UNITED STATES-JAPAN

56.
See Sykes, supra note 44, at 318-24 for a listing of the first 47 Section
301 cases: see Appendix A at the end of this article for a listing of the Section 301
cases from 1985 to the present. All statistics about the use of Section 301 will be
drawn from this chart. Other scholarship on Section 301 may lead to different
numbers as the time frames of all literature on Section 301 have not been the
same.
57.
In the first five years of Section 301 (1975-79) 21 complaints were filed
but the President issued a determination in only one. Fourteen cases were still
outstanding in 1979. RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 27. Despite
the legislative changes to Section 301, many cases remained unresolved in the
next five years (1979-85). As of 1984, the President had taken action in only
three cases. AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS, supra note 52, at 126. Section 301 was
actually perceived as a dead end for U.S. industry petitioners seeking action to
open closed foreign markets. See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
UnilateralAction to Open ForeignMarkets: The Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises,
22 INT'L LAw. 1197, 1197 (1988) [hereinafter UnilateralAction].
58.
UnilateralAction, supra note 57, at 1198-99.
59.
Id.; see also AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS, supra note 52, at 126.
60.
The use of Section 301 created a great deal of anxiety throughout the
Uruguay Round negotiations. In June, 1989, the GATT held a special General
Council meeting during which it considered many delegate complaints about the
Super 301 provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
GATT Focus, No. 63, June 1989, at 7. The GATT Secretariat also issued a report
on U.S. trade policy as part of its trade policy review mechanism in which it noted
that U.S. trading partners viewed its retaliatory action under Section 301 "as a
lack of commitment on the part of the United States to multilateral rules and
procedures." GATT Doc. 1468 (Dec. 14, 1989), reprinted in 2 WORLD TRADE
MATERIALS 124, 137 (1990). U.S. trading partners insisted upon the inclusion of a
provision in the Dispute Settlement Understanding aimed at limiting U.S. use of
unilateral power. See text infra at pp. 64-65, 87-88 for a discussion of Article

XXIII of the DSU.
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rooted in U.S. concerns over lost hegemony in the world trading
system. The 1980s had seen a sharp increase in U.S. trade
deficits with major trading partners. 6 1 The United States had
also been seeking to address some of its long held concerns about
the legal deficiencies of the world trading system and its dispute
settlement process by pushing for a new round of multilateral
negotiations. When the United States was rebuffed regarding this
effort in the early 1980s, the unilateral approach to trade
dissatisfactions began to appear more satisfactory.6 2 In fact, the
United States took action in the form of imposing sanctions in
several cases filed in 1985, and emboldened by its success in
these cases, 6 3 saw little reason to curtail its use. Instead, the
United States continued to file Section 301 cases, particularly
against Japan, with which it had its largest trade deficit,6 4 and
against a host of developing countries which did not allow the
United States access to their service markets or protect the

intellectual property rights of foreigners. 65 One of the reasons the
United States considered itself justified in using unilateral
economic power to coerce "appropriate" trade behavior from other
countries was because the multilateral system was not addressing
66
its concerns.
A review of the second decade of Section 301, however,
reveals that the United States not only brought more cases and
retaliated more frequently, but also that the focus of the statute
had shifted. From 1974 to 1984, the United States used Section
301 primarily to press its complaints about GATT violations
committed by its GATT trading partners. Of the forty-seven
Section 301 actions filed, thirty-five (seventy-seven percent)

RECIPROCITYAND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 12-19.
62.
The United States tried to launch a new round of GATT multilateral
trade negotiations in 1982 but was frustrated in its efforts to get new rules on
services, investment and intellectual property by the European Community. See
ALAN OXLEY, THE CHALLENGE OF FREE TRADE (1990); Robert E. Hudec, Thinking
About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil. in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM
113, 130 (Jagdlsh Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) [hereinafter Hudec,
Good and Evil].
63.
See UnilateralAction, supra note 57, at 1199-1200.
61.

64.

RECIPROCITYAND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 53.

65.
See Appendix A at end of this Article for a description of all Section
301 cases aimed at intellectual property rights. See Infra note 108, for a listing of
those Section 301 cases.

66.

According to then Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Williams, U.S.

trade policy was "very much a market-opening trade policy ....Our preference
for doing that [opening markets] is multilateral. We take second place to no
country in our support of GATT. But GATT doesn't do the job in a lot of areas."
Clyde Farnsworth. Washington's Hard Line on Trade. N.Y. TIMES, May 2. 1990, at
4.
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involved claims of a GATT violation. 7 Only twelve cases (twentythree percent) involved U.S. claims that a trading partner was
engaged in some unreasonable, although not necessarily GATT68
illegal, practices that hurt the United States.
The statistical breakdown of cases filed after 1985 illustrates
a different pattern. Of the fifty-four Section 301 cases filed from
1985 to 1995, only nineteen were based solely on claims of a
GATT violation.6 9 Seven cases were based on a combination of
GATT-violation and unreasonable practices.7 0
The remaining
twenty-eight Section 301 cases filed during this period have been
based solely on claims that a trading partner was acting

unreasonably. 7 1 As the type of Section 301 cases shifted, so too

did its targets. Over half of the pre-1985 Section 301 cases were
filed against developed countries, most of them against the
European Community, Japan, and Canada. 7 2
In the second

generation of Section 301 cases, almost sixty-percent of them

73
were filed against developing countries.

67.
See Sykes. supra note 44, at 318-24 for his listing of the first
generation of Section 301 cases (1975-85) and the type of claim involved in each
case.
68.
Id.
69.
See Appendix A following this Article for a detailed description of
Section 301 cases from 1985 to 1996 and the type of claim involved in each case.
What follows is a listing of all the cases involving a GATT claim during this period.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
See Sykes, supra note 44, at 318-24 for his listing of the early Section
301 cases.
73.
The developing country targets were:
China

306-86

[56 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (initiation); 57 Fed.
Reg. 3084 (termination)]

301-88

[57 Fed. Reg. 47,889 (initiation); 56 Fed.

301-92

[59 Fed. Reg. 35,558 (initiation); 60 Fed.

Reg. 51943 (termination)]
Reg. 12,582 (termination)]

Taiwan

301-56

[51 Fed. Reg. 28,219 (initiation); 51 Fed.
Reg. 37,527 (termination)]

301-89

[57 Fed. Reg. 23,605 (initiation); 57 Fed.
Reg. 25,091 (termination)]

Thailand

301-72
301-82

[54 Fed. Reg. 23,724 (initiation); 55 Fed.
Reg. 49,724 (termination)]
[56 Fed. Reg. 292 (initiation); 56 Fed. Reg.
67,114 (termination)]

Thailand

301-72

[54 Fed. Reg. 23,724 (initiation); 55 Fed.
Reg. 49,724 (termination)]

301-82

[56 Fed. Reg. 292 (initiation); 56 Fed. Reg.
67,114 (termination)]

India

301-59

[52 Fed. Reg. 6412 (initiation); 53 Fed.

_

Reg. 21,757 (termination)]
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The shift in the use of Section 301 to the bringing of more
unreasonable practice cases against developing countries
reflected a shift in U.S. trade goals. Although anxious about
other countries' violations of GATT obligations and the ability of
the system to deter such conduct, the United States was even
more concerned about areas of U.S. trade advantage left
completely outside the GATT. During the 1980s and early 1990s,
one of the major interests of the United States was obtaining
multilateral discipline over trade in services and over the

301-77
301-78
301-85
Brazil

301-49

[54 Fed. Reg. 26,136 (initiation);
Reg. 25,765 (termination)]
[54 Fed. Reg. 26,135 (initiation):
Reg. 25,766 (termination)]
56 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (initiation);
Reg. 9763 (termination)]
[50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (initiation);

55 Fed.
55 Fed.
57 Fed.
54 Fed.

Reg. 43,880 (termination)]

301-61

[52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (initiation): 55 Fed.
Reg. 27,324 (termination)]

301-73

[54 Fed. Reg. 26,135 (initiation); 55 Fed.
Reg. 22,876 (termination)]

301-91
Korea

301-51
301-52

[58 Fed. Reg. 31788 (initiation); 59 Fed.
Reg. 10.224 (termination)]
[50 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (initiation); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,443 (termination)]
[50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (initiation); 51 Fed.
Reg. 29,445 (termination)]

301-64
301-65
301-67
Argentina

301-68

Indonesia

301-90

[53 Fed. Reg. 4926 (initiation);
reg. 20,406 (termination)]
[53 Fed. Reg. 10,996 (initiation);
Reg. 20,376 (termination)]
[53 Fed. Reg. 22,607 (initiation);
Reg. 4099 (termination)]
[53 Fed. Reg. 37,668 (initiation):
Reg. 18,693 (termination)]
[57 Fed. Reg. 46,609 (initiation);
Reg. 610

53 Fed.
55 Fed.
54 Fed.
55 Fed.
58 Fed.

(termination)]

See Appendix A following this Article. The developed country targets have still
been hit but less frequently. With regard to the European Union, the United
States has filed 29 cases against it since it began using Section 301. More U.S.
Barriersto Trade with the EU Arose In the PastYear, EU Report Says, 13 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1244 (July 31, 1996). In the second decade of Section 301 cases the
vast majority of cases against the EU have involved claims of a GATT violation.
See Appendix A for a description of the case against the EU-301-54, 301, 60,
301-62, 301-63, 301-70, 301-71, 301-81, 301-83, 301-94, 301-100, 301-101.
With regard to Canada, most all of the cases in the second decade of Section 301
actions have involved GATT claims. See Appendix A for a description of the cases
against Canada-301-55, 301-58, 301-80, 301-87, 301-98, 301-102. For a
discussion of the U.S. use of Section 301 against Japan see text Infra at 30-34
and accompanying notes.
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protection of intellectual property. 74 Sixteen of the twenty-seven
Section 301 cases brought under the unreasonable theory were
aimed at limitations developing countries placed on trade in
services and protection of intellectual property rights. 7 5 The
United States aggressively pursued such cases for two reasons:
(1) to obtain bilateral trade liberalization agreements with the
target country; and (2) to force these areas onto the agenda for
the Uruguay Round negotiations.
C. A Taxonomy of Section 301 Cases (1985-1996)

1. Ensuring Compliance with International Trade Law: Section
301/International Violation Cases
From its inception, the United States has employed Section
301 as a device for confronting trade partners which failed to
follow their GATT obligations. 76 GATT provided any Contracting
Party with the right to seek dispute settlement if it believed that
another party was violating the terms of GATT, and thereby
77

depriving it of the benefits it expected from the agreement.

Section 301 was, therefore, designed in part to allow the President
to take action if he found that a trading partner was violating its
international trading obligations, and thereby harming the United
Thus, Section 301/International violation cases are
States.
consistent with U.S. obligations under GATT. The United States
has every right to enact a statute that allows it to investigate and
determine whether or not its trading partners are following GATT

74.

See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.

75.

See supra note 73 for a listing of these cases.

Kenneth W. Abbott, Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of
76.
Section 301, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE
420-21 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,

1996) [hereinafter

Defensive Unfairness].
77.

If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to

it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired

or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded
as the result of (a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation,
the contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of
the matter, make written representations or proposals to the other
contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.

Any

contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to
the representations or proposals made to it.

GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A64, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-69.
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law. 78 GATT was of the view that any U.S. determination of a
GATT violation should rest on a finding by a GATT dispute
settlement panel that there was an infringement. In the first
decade of Section 301, the United States routinely went to the
to pursue its Section
GATT dispute settlement system in order
79
301/International violation complaints.
The results for U.S. economic interests were mixed. In some
cases the GATT panel reports prompted the Section 301 target to
withdraw or modify the offending practice. 8 0 In other cases, the
United States encountered problems reaching its goals because of
the limitations of the GATT dispute settlement system. The GATT
system allowed a defending party to a dispute the potential power
to block the establishment of a panel, the adoption of any report
the panel might issue, and ultimately the implementation of any
panel report. 8 ' As a result, the United States failed to achieve
8 2
what it considered to be appropriate relief in many instances.
U.S. frustration over the limitations of the GATT system

ultimately led it to take unilateral action on several Section
301/International violation cases beginning in the 1980s. In half
of the Section 301/International violation cases in which GATT
panels were established from 1985 to 1995, the United States
took some form of unilateral action by declaring the target
country practice to be GATT-illegal, threatening to retaliate for the
violation, or actually taking retaliatory action. The United States
took retaliatory action in six cases that the GATT panel
considered to involve GATT violations. 8 3 In those six cases, and
in three others in which the GATT dispute settlement system

78.

As Abbott points out:

[C]laims based on violations of international commitments are highly
Under general international law, violations of agreements
legitimate....
or general legal standards give affected states the right to take responsive
actions, under the agreement itself or by way of reprisal even when those
actions would be unlawful in the absence of the violation.
Defensive Unfairness. supra note 76, at 421-22. "Traditional international legal
doctrine seems to confirm their [unilateral sanctions] utility. The right of
retaliation is built into the law of treaties." THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 44,
at 88.
79.
See Sykes, supra note 44, at 318-24 for a listing of the cases in which
the United States sought a GATT panel.
L. LEE TUTHILL ET AL., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, REVIEW OF TH1E
80.,
EFFEcTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER GATT AND THE TOKYO ROUND

AGREEMENTS 15-18, 167-81, Pub. No. 1793 (1995) [hereinafter ITC 1985 REPORT],
81..
Id. at 18-19, 167-81.
Id. at 18-20.
82.
83.
REcIPROcnIY AND RETALIATION. supra note 19, at 69.
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"broke down"8 4 and was unable to adopt a report favorable to the
United States, retaliation was in keeping with GATT rules. The
United States, however, also took retaliation against countries
under

the Section

301/International

violation

theory

in

the

absence of any GATT dispute settlement procedures.8 5 Such
unauthorized retaliation is GATT-illegal, but the Section 301
targets in those cases never took the United States to the GATT
panel over the issue. Almost all countries accepted the view that
such self-help by nations is permissible in international law when
the international organization that is supposed to police violations
cannot do so.8 6 The GATT dispute settlement system was widely
viewed as increasingly ineffectual.
The use of self-help in such cases by the United States
undoubtedly spurred the targets of U.S. retaliation to seriously
consider reforming the GATT dispute settlement system.8 7 The
United States had always been a proponent of a more legalistic
and adjudicative dispute settlement system,8 8 even when its own
behavior in accepting unfavorable GATT reports was less than
creditable. 8 9 The economic power represented by U.S. retaliation

84.
Id. at 70. According to Hudec, U.S. retaliation in three cases which
had actually started in the first decade of Section 301-subsidized EC wheat flour
(301-06) paste exports (301-25) and the EC tariff preferences on citrus (301-11) were instances of Justified retaliation since the EC blocked the GATT panel
process (in 301-11 and 301-25) or the GATT panel was unable to reach a decision
(301-06). Hudec. Good and Evil, supra note 62, at 121.
85.
REcIpRocITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 70.
86.
The "self-help" theory was posited by Hudec and has been accepted by
the United States to justify Section 301 actions. According to Hudec:
The obligation not to retaliate without GATT authority presumes that
GATT will be able to rule on the disputed legal claim, and later, on the
request to retaliate. If GATT is, in fact, unable to rule, the complainant
may be free to resort to 'self-help' in some circumstances.
Hudec, Good and Evil, supra note 62, at 121.

87.

U.S. trading partners were so concerned about U.S. unilateralism that

they became much more interested in reforming the GATT system. Former
Director General of the GATT Arthur Dunkel is reported to have said that "[Tihe
best thing that the United States did for the GATT was to start down the 301 and
Super 301 road, thus unifying an outraged and alarmed world behind the trading
regime." Jagdish Bhagwati, The Diminished GiantSyndrome. 72 FOREIGN AFF. (No.
1) Spring 1993, at 22, 25.
88.
Robert E. Hudec, The Judiclalizationof GATT Dispute Settlement, in IN
WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12-19
(Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Stegar eds., 1992) [hereinafter Hudec,
JudicialLzaton]; Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute
Settlement Moving Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 38, 41, 67-75
(1990).
89.
The United States was actually tied with the European Community in
blocking activities - the establishment of panels and the adoption of reports.
Hudec, Judlcialzation, supra note 88, at 33. In addition, "the United States also
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was such that other trading partners were willing to pursue
dispute settlement reform to constrain the United States.
Aggressive unilateralism by the United States therefore greatly
contributed both to the dispute settlement reform undertaken in

the Uruguay Round negotiations and to the actual contents of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding. 90

2. Section 301/Unreasonable Cases
Section 301(b) allows the United States to pursue another
country, even if it is not violating the GATT or any other trade
agreement, as long as the foreign practice is unreasonable and
burdens or restrains U.S. commerce. The crux of a Section
301/Unreasonable case is that the United States unilaterally
determines whether a foreign practice is "unfair," and then takes
unilateral action by threatening, or following through with,
retaliation against a government which refuses to curb the
practice. 9 1 Section 301 was originally designed to allow the
bringing of unreasonable cases, but such cases did not make up
the bulk of early U.S. action under the Section 301 statute.
During the second decade of Section 301, however, the United
States began to intensify its use of Section 301(b). The most
notable use made of Section 301/Unreasonable cases was their
deployment to force the issues of intellectual
property rights and
92
trade in services onto the GATT agenda.
The U.S. experience in pursuing increased protection for
intellectual property through its use of Section 301/Unreasonable
cases offers a good illustration of what the United States hoped to
achieve and what it actually accomplished. In the 1980s, the
United States government began to view the protection of
intellectual property rights as an international trade problem.
This new perception resulted from the pressure of U.S.
industries 93 to link the two issues. Three factors pushed U.S.

retaliated under Section 301 without GATT authorization. In the 1980s the
United States responded negatively to fully half (9 of 18) of the valid complaints
thought against it." RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 72.
90.
See text Infra pp. 64-65, 87-88 and accompanying notes on Article
XXIII of the DSU.
91.
See RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 19.
92.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
93.
U.S. industries were joined by an industrialized nation coalition of
intellectual property owners from the European Community and Japan in
pushing for action on the intellectual property rights problem. The Intellectual
Property Committee (IPC), a group of 13 U.S. companies, has been joined by the
UNICE, a European union of industrial employers confederations, and the
Keidanren, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, in pushing for the
inclusion of intellectual property rights in the agenda of the Uruguay Round. See,

THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC POWER AND SECTION 301

1997]

229

industry to seek assistance from the government:
(1) the
increased role of intellectual property-based products in U.S.
international trade; (2) the growing levels of piracy of intellectual
property rights (IPR) as a result of the creation of new
technologies for copying products; and (3) the growth in research
and development costs. 9 4 The U.S. government began to respond
to industry complaints by taking legislative action in 1984. 9 5 The
98th Congress passed the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 which
included several provisions to address the intellectual property
problem, the most important of which made the infringement of
intellectual property rights a cause of action under Section 301.96
During this period, the United States sought changes in
worldwide intellectual property protection through bilateral
negotiations and use of the provisions of the 1984 Act. 9 7 The
legislative action and bilateral negotiations approach, however,

e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE, KEIDANREN, UNICE, BASIC FRAMEWORK OF

GATT

PROVISIONS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

STATEMENT OF VIEWS OF EUROPEAN,

JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES BUSINESS COMMUNITIES (1988).

The U.S. members of

the IPC include Bristol-Myers, E.I. DuPont, FMC Corp., General Electric, General
Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, Pfizer,
Rockwell Intemational. and Warner Communications. Id. at 5.
94.

See

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS:

GLOBAL CONSENSUS,

GLOBAL

CONFLICT? 3-5 (Michael Gadbaw & Timothy Richards eds., 1988) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CONSENSUS].
95.
32 PAT.. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 473 (Aug. 28, 1986)
(according to Emory Simon, former director for intellectual property at USTR,
there was a merger of trade and intellectual property in 1984).
96.
TTA of 1984, supra note 17, at § 304(f)(2).
This provision was
ultimately the one used by the United States as the basis for its 1988 action
against Brazil for its failure to offer process and product protection for
pharmaceuticals. In another provision of the 1984 Act, USTR was authorized to
prepare a report for Congress on the foreign trade barriers affecting intellectual
property rights. Id. § 303(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1)(A)(i) as amended in OTCA,
supra note 17. The report to be produced by USTR, the National Trade Estimate
Report, was supposed to examine the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the
intellectual property laws of foreign nations. USTR continues to produce the
National Trade Estimate Report annually. Information in the report is used to
assist USTR in choosing targets for action under Section 301. See OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE. NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE

BARRIERS (1992).
Through the Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984,
Congress added intellectual property protection as one of the eligibility
requirements for developing countries seeking duty-free treatment for their
products in the U.S. market. TTA of 1984, supra note 17, § 505, 19 U.S.C. §
2464(c(3)(B)(ii). In 1989, Thailand was refused its request for additional GSP
treatment as a result of its inadequate copyright protection. 37 PAT., TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 279 (1989).

97.
The United States successfully negotiated with some countries over
various intellectual property rights - Singapore (copyrights), Korea and Taiwan
(extension of patent laws to cover pharmaceuticals). See GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
supranote 94, at 272-377.
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had only limited success in addressing U.S. concerns about IPR
98
protection.

While Congress was taking legislative action, the Executive
Branch was pursuing the idea of greater protection for intellectual
property rights through multilateral trade negotiations. 9 9
In
1984, during the 40th Session of GATT, the United States called
for a meeting of senior officials to explore the possibility of
launching a new round. By late 1985, the GATT had established
a Preparatory Committee to determine the objectives and subject
matter for multilateral trade negotiations which were to begin in
September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. 0 0
The United
States pushed strongly for the inclusion of trade-related aspects
of IPRs in the Uruguay Round, threatening to turn to bilateral
and regional arrangements by means of Section 301, if IPRs were

not taken into consideration. 1 0°

The U.S. pressure ultimately

resulted in a Ministerial Declaration for the Uruguay Round
which included trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights as one of the areas to be negotiated.
The United States was so insistent about the need for an
intellectual property agreement under GATT because a great deal
of U.S. trade was no longer covered by the GATT rules.
Industrialized countries, like the United States, had shifted away
from traditional trade sectors into areas where they have a greater
comparative
advantage-particularly
in
high
technology

98.
See Robert W. Kastenmeler & David Beier, International Trade and
Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks and Reality. 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285,
289, 290 & 290 n.12 (1989).
99.
The United States had actually begun working on a multilateral
agreement concerning some aspects of intellectual property--counterfeit goodsin the Tokyo Round. During the Tokyo Round, U.S. negotiators worked on a draft
anti-counterfeiting code and reached agreement in principle with EC negotiators.
Although the Tokyo Round did not produce an agreement. the United States and
European Community continued to negotiate. In the year preceding the Uruguay
Round, the question of counterfeit goods was considered a major issue for the
new round. By the time the Uruguay Round was launched, however, the United
States was more interested in intellectual property protection for patents,
copyrights, trademarks and newer forms of intellectual property such as mask
works. GATT Focus No. 48, July/Aug. 1987, at 3. GATT, GATT ACTIVITIES 1988,
at 49 (1989) [hereinafter GATT ACTIVITIES 19881.
100. Decision of 28 November 1985 on Establishment of the Preparatory
Committee, in 32 BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (BISD) 10 (1986).
101.
See A. Jane Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade
in Services In the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations.23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57.
84-85 (1987). In addition to seeking a mandate to negotiate concerning traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights, the United States managed to get

trade in services and trade-related investment measures included In the Uruguay
Round. Id. at 85.
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products-and that are "intellectual property intensive. '' 10 2 The
0 3
system of IPR protection, with its low substantive standards'
and lax enforcement, was regarded as creating in the mid-1980s a
transfer of wealth from the industrialized countries to the
developing countries.' 0 4 The United States was one of the few

countries to attempt to quantify the costs which can be attributed
to the system of IPR protection. This analysis of costs came in a
1987 report by the International Trade Commission (ITC) request
by USTR.
The most influential and heavily quoted figure in the 1987
ITC report was the estimate of $43 to $61 billion in worldwide

losses to U.S. industries from piracy or counterfeiting of IPRs.

0 5

Most of the estimated losses were attributed to countries which
are considered to be developing or newly-industrialized
countries.' 0 6 Believing that their failure to protect the intellectual

102.
David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights:
The Issues in GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 895 (1989); see also HELENA
STALSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN TRADE 41-44
(1987); ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: ISSUES AND

CONTROVERSIES 36-44 (1987).
103.
There were two basic types of IPR protection deficiencies according to
the United States: "inadequacies in the protection provisions for certain types of
intellectual property (regime deficiencies), and general enforcement inadequacies."
U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM., Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the
Effect on U.S. Industry and Trade, USITC Pub. No. 2065, Inv. No. 332-245 at 1-6
[hereinafter ITCIIPR Report]. The regime deficiencies noted by the ITC Report
consist of. 1. a lack of statutory protection for certain types of intellectual
property rights (copyrights, mask works, patents for pharmaceuticals); 2. severely
limited terms of protection (patents, copyrights, trade secrets); 3. compulsory
licensing laws (patents, trademarks); and 4. broad exceptions to IPR protection
(all types of IPRs except mask works). Id. at 1-6, 1-7, 1-8.
104.
The industrialized countries not only lose market shares from the
piracy of products which should be sold in foreign markets but also in their
internal competitiveness. The owners of IPRs in industrialized countries will lose
the Incentive to invest in research and development unless they reap the financial
benefits. See Michael Reiterer, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in THE
NEw WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 199 (OECD ed., 1994).

105. The ITC was requested to prepare a study of the "distortions in U.S.
worldwide trade associated with deficiencies in the protection provided by foreign
countries to U.S. intellectual property rights." Letter from Clayton Yeutter, United

States Trade Representative, to ITC Chairman, Susan Liebeler (Jan. 12, 1987),
reprinted In ITC/IPR Report. supra note 103, at A-2. The study was requested to
help with the Administration's development of U.S. negotiating objectives and
strategies in the Uruguay Round. Id.
106. The ITC derived the estimated range of aggregate losses by
extrapolating the data it had received for 1986 aggregate worldwide losses to the
736 companies which responded to an ITC questionnaire. ITC/IPR Report, supra
note 103, at 1-1, H-3 (In Appendix H, the ITC explains the assumptions it made
concerning responding and not responding companies.).
The main violators cited in the ITC Report were Brazil, China, Hong Kong,
Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Japan, Nigeria and India. Id. at 4-15-4-18. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and the Pharmaceutical
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property rights of industrialized countries lowered the costs of
technology and innovation,' 0 7 developing countries saw no need
to improve or alter their intellectual property rights systems.
The United States responded to the developing countries' lack
of interest by threatening retaliation against countries with
"inadequate" intellectual property protection, I.e., protection that
did not rise to U.S. levels. Ultimately, the United States brought

eleven Section 301/Unreasonable

cases between

1985 and

1995108 and put many other countries on "priority watch" and
"watch" lists as potential targets under Special 301 cases.1 0 9 The

Manufacturing Association (PMA) actively petitioned USTR to follow through with
Section 301 cases against countries violating U.S. Intellectual property rights.
For example, the IIPA has always suggested countries to be placed on the Priority,
Priority Watch and Watch lists. The IIPA in one of its earlier reports had
estimated that the 1991 piracy of U.S. copyrighted materials - hooks, computer
programs, movies and records - in those three countries cost U.S. producers
$616 million. IIPA and PMA filed most of the other Section 301 petitions Initiating
the cases against Taiwan, Thailand, India and China.
107. See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property In International Trade:
Opportunitiesand Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 75556 (1989); GLOBAL CONSENSUS. supra note 94, at 2-3.
108. Brazil's Informatics Policy. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,608 (USTR 1985)
(initiation); 54 Fed. Reg. 43,880 (USTR 1989) (termination); Korean Laws for the
Protection of IPR, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (USTR 1985) (initiation); 51 Fed. Reg.
29,445 (USTR 1986) (termination); Brazil's Patent Protection of Pharmaceuticals,
52 Fed. Reg. 28,223 (USTR 1987) (initiation); 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324 (USTR 1990)
(revocation of retaliation); Argentina's Failure to Provide Protection for
Pharmaceuticals, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,668 (USTR 1988) (initiation); 55 Fed. Reg.
18,693, 18,694-95 (USTR 1990) (termination); Thailand Patient Protection. 56
Fed. Reg. 11,815 (initiation); Thailand's Copyright Enforcement, 56 Fed. Reg. 292
(USTR 1991) (initiation); 56 Fed. Reg. 67,114 (USTR 1991) (termination):
Intellectual Property Practices of India, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (USTR 1991)
(initiation); Intellectual Property Laws and Practices of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,878
(USTR 1991) (initiation); 57 Fed. Reg. 3084 (USTR 1992) (termination); Intellectual
Property Acts, Policies and Practices of Taiwan, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,605 (USTR 1992)
(initiation); 57 Fed. Reg. 25,091 (USTR 1992) (termination); Intellectual Property
Laws and Practices of Brazil, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,788 (USTR 1993) (initiation); 59
Fed. Reg. 10,224 (USTR 1994) (termination); Identification of China as a Priority
Foreign Country, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,558 (USTR 1994) (initiation); 60 Fed. Reg.
12,582 (USTR 1995) (termination).
109. The review process for Special 301 cases begins when USTR completes

the National Trade Estimates report and Identifies countries that have denied
adequate intellectual property protection. After the NTE report Is complete USTR
issues the Special 301 list. The countries on the first Watch List included
Argentina, Egypt, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. See 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 715-21 (May 31, 1989) (USTR Fact
Sheets on the implementation of Super 301 and Special 301 list all of the
countries that the United States views as IPR violators and their inadequate
practices). USTR established an "action plan" for each country on its lists. For
each country the negotiating plan or objectives is different - for one country more
effective enforcement, for another passing a patent law. 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
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approach taken by USTR in the Section 301 cases involving IPRs
and the later Special 301 cases was to threaten 1 1 action against

a target country unless it took suitable action, usually in the form
of new or improved legislation. All of the Section 301 cases
devoted to obtaining better protection for intellectual property
rights appeared to be successful at the time USTR agreed to

remove threats of retaliation."' In reality, using Section 301 to
improve intellectual property protection worldwide proved
somewhat illusory.
Although each Section 301 target country made promises to

enact new intellectual property legislation and some did so, there

was often little concomitant increase in actual protection.

The

United States achieved success at the de jure level of obtaining
new laws.' 12 However, at the de facto level of improving actual
patent and copyright protection in the target countries, Section
301 proved unsatisfactory. Every Section 301 target country
encountered significant political pressure domestically to resist
U.S. demands. As a result, some of the promised legislation took
years to appear, and even when it did, it was not enforced. 1 1 3 The

85 (Jan. 17, 1990) (Interview with U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills). Special
301 reviews have been undertaken every year since 1989.
110.
As the changes have pointed out, it is important to distinguish
between a threat strategy and a retaliation strategy. In a threat strategy USTR is
still working on a negotiated solution. "What is a satisfactory negotiated outcome
remains ultimately up to USTR, who is responsible to the president. Instead of a
punishment for a violation, the threat is a forceful move in a continuing
bargaining process." THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 44, at 94.
111.
The standard reason the United States terminated Section
301 /Unreasonable cases based on intellectual property rights was that the target
country agreed to pass new legislation. See Appendix A for a listing of the
promises in the following cases: 301-61 (55 Fed. Reg. 27,324); 301-68 (55 Fed.
Reg. 18,693), 301-85; 301-86 (57 Fed. Reg. 3084); and 301-89 (57 Fed. Reg.
25,091).
112. Taiwan passed seven laws to protect trade secrets and other forms of
Intellectual property in response to the Special 301 cases against it. Thailand
and Brazil also enacted new legislation. ESI study. supra note 44, at 62; Michael
P. Ryan. Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement
Agreements: USTR's Section 301 Experience in the Paciflc Basin, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L.
799, 823-24 (1991); Myles Getman, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A
ComparativeStudy in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173,
190-91, 198-99 (1995).
113.
Brazil, for example, got the United States to lift retaliatory sanctions in
1990 by promising to offer protection for pharmaceutical products and processes
"when it was politically possible." USTR Hills, Trip to Brazil, PressesGovernment to
Continue Opening Economy, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 855, 856 (June 13, 1990).
Brazil introduced amendments to its intellectual property legislation in 1994 only
after it had been hit with a second 301 case. USTR Announces Termination of
Brazil Special 301 Investigation. 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 344 (Mar. 2, 1994). A
similar delaying pattern was exhibited by Thailand when it was approached under
Section 301. Despite its enactment of new legislation in 1992, the United States
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ultimate proof of Section 301's limitations came from how the
United States responded to this problem. Two of the eleven
Section 301 actions actually brought were second generation
cases--Section 301 cases launched at previous targets-because

new or improved
the countries had failed to enforce their
14

intellectual property protection legislation.1
The United States continued to press Section 301 cases
despite this lack of tangible success (or because the lack was not
apparent for some time) even after intellectual property rights
were put on the agenda for the Uruguay Round negotiations.
During the early years of the TRIPs negotiations, the United
States, Europe, and Japan were unable to persuade developing
countries that GATT was the proper forum for negotiations on this
issue.1 1 5 During the Uruguay Round Mid-Term Review held in
1988, the TRIPs negotiating group was one of the negotiating
groups unable to develop a framework text that would serve as
the basis for future negotiations. It would take another three
years before there was a draft TRIPs Agreement. During this
time, U.S. industry pushed an increasingly protectionist Congress
to enact Special 301. Special 301 was designed to require USTR
to identify each year the most egregious violators of intellectual
property rights and begin accelerated negotiations. 1 16 The United
States began use of Special 301 in 1989 and continued to use the
process throughout the Uruguay Round as a way of keeping up
the pressure to reach a TRIPs Agreement. By the end of the
Uruguay Round, the U.S. effort was rewarded with a
comprehensive agreement which largely adopted U.S. standards
as the standards for intellectual property protection.1 1 7 Over the
course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it became clear that
the developing countries ultimately accepted a U.S.-style TRIPs
Agreement as a method for limiting Section 301 threats and

found its efforts inadequate. 57 Fed. Reg. 9762, 9763 (1992). The United States
delayed retaliatory action against Thailand due to government instability but later
in 1993 still found Thailand failing to adequately enforce its 1992 legislation.
Finally the United States lifted its pressure on Thailand when it received yet
another pledge to improve regulations implementing its patent laws and to
provide "pipeline protection" for pharmaceuticals. 57 Fed. Reg. 40,090 (1993).
114. See Appendix A following this Article. The "generation 2" cases on
inadequate intellectual property rights enforcement involved Brazil (301-91; 58
Fed. Reg. 31,788) and China (301-92; 60 Fed. Reg. 12,582). Although the United
States has not yet fied a "second generation" case against Argentina, it remains
unhappy with the proposed patent legislation offered by that country.
115. See generally GATT ACTIVITIES 1988, supra note 99, at 49-51.
116. See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301": Its
Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (198990).
117. See generally Lars-Henrik Knutrud, TRIPs In the Uruguay Round, In THE
NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 193-95 (OECD 1994).
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sanctions. This does not mean that the United States has
abandoned the Special 301 review process. The United States
continues to conduct a Special 301 review each year to identify
countries that are failing to meet TRIPs obligations or otherwise
11 8
failing to protect adequately intellectual property rights.'
The U.S. experience with Special 301 suggests that a strategy
developed around coercing negotiations under threats of
retaliatory trade sanctions is more effective for obtaining
multilateral negotiations and agreements than for producing
concrete enforcement results. In order to obtain acceptable levels
of worldwide enforcement for IPRs through unilateralism, the
United States would probably have had to commit to years of
bringing many second generation Section 301 actions. Instead,
the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement and the WTO dispute
settlement system means that most1 19 U.S. efforts to supervise
this issue will take place in the multilateral arena. Under the
TRIPs Agreement standards, WTO Member States have obligations
regarding enforcement of intellectual property standards.' 20 The
United States has already begun to pursue WTO countries that
are not following TRIPs obligations. In 1996, the United States
12 1
filed three Section 301 cases based on TRIPs claims.

Nevertheless, the United States still faces a long period of WTO
litigation regarding defacto protection of IPRs as some developing

118.
USTR has issued eight Special 301 lists since it was first enacted.
the last two years (1995 and 1996) USTR has taken the following actions:
1.
2.

3.

In

identified 37 countries as denying adequate intellectual
property protection in 1995 and 34 in 1996;
placed eight countries on the priority watch list in 1995 and in
1996. China was also identified in 1996 as a "priority foreign
country" (a country with the most egregious practices that has
not made progress in negotiating about them with the United
States); and
carefully reviewed TRIPs Agreement implementation in 1995
and began bringing cases to the WTO dispute settlement
system in 1996.

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROBLEM (1996); Identification of
Countries That Deny Adequate Protection, or Market Access for Intellectual
Property Rights Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,969
(1996).
119. The United States did pass implementing legislation that left open the
prospect of bringing Section 301 cases on intellectual property rights even if a
country was in compliance with TRIPs obligations. URAA Legislative History,
supra note 37, at 3908.
120. TRIPs Agreement. supranote 31, at arts. 41-61.
121.
See Appendix A for a description of these three cases: 301-103
(Portugal); 301-104 (Pakistan); 301-106 (India).
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countries have inevitable trouble adjusting to the new
international regime.
Section 301/Unreasonable cases pose an additional problem
that goes beyond their inability to guarantee concrete results. If
the United States takes retaliatory action under Section 301
based on such a case, it must often violate GATT obligations to do
so. This potential for illegal activity occurs if the United States
imposes sanctions against the other country that require the
raising of GATT bound tariffs. If when responding to a reluctant
Section 301 target, the United States raises bound tariffs
selectively against only that country, it is committing a clear
violation of Article II and of the Article I Most Favored Nation
(MFN) rule. 12 2 The United States has acted this way in Section
301 cases. In the Brazilian Pharmaceuticals,Section 301-61, for
example, the United States took retaliations of just this type
against Brazil when it refused to extend patent protection to
pharmaceuticals. 123 All of the products chosen for retaliatory
tariffs were contained in the U.S. GATT Schedule of Concessions
(the listing of U.S. Article II commitments). 124 In response to the
sanctions, Brazil requested and ultimately obtained, following
U.S. delaying tactics, the establishment of a GATT panel on the
use of Section 301.125 The United States kept the GATT panel
from ever reaching the merits of the case-for which it had no real
GATT-recognized defense-by arguing over the terms of reference
for the panel. 12 6 Ultimately, the threat of an unfavorable GATT
panel report was lifted when Brazil settled the dispute with the
United States by promising to enact patent legislation. 127 By
avoiding a panel report in the Brazilian case, the United States

122. See Infra note 391 and accompanying text concerning bound tariffs.
123. 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 26. 1988) (Tariffs were Imposed at
100% ad valorem for $39 million worth of Brazilian non-Benzenoid drugs, paper
products, and consumer electronics.).
124. The products chosen for the retaliatory sanctions call had bound U.S.
tariffs ranging from 0 to 5%. See GATT ACTIVITIES 1988, supra note 99, at 90.
125.

6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 238 (Feb. 22. 1989). In his statement to the

GATT Council when the United States withdrew its objection to the formulation of
a panel to investigate the dispute, U.S. GATT Ambassador Samuels stated:
What's at issue here is an imbalance in right and obligations that affords
Brazil an opportunity in the GATI to address a trade dispute affecting
Brazilian exporters and denies the United States the right to address a
practice by Brazil affecting the same amount of U.S. trade.
Samuels also stated that "the international trading system will not have been
served by placing the GATT in the position of potentially condoning the theft of
intellectual property." Id.; see also 3 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 179 (Aug.
1989).
126. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supranote 3, at 571.
127. Id. at 228-31.
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kept a crucial issue out of the hands of the multilateral
organization: whether unilateral trade sanctions can ever be
employed against areas that are not covered by GATT without
violating some GATT obligation. If the United States continues to
use Section 301/Unreasonable cases for issues not covered by
GATT rules-as the Uruguay Round implementing legislation and
the Auto and Auto Parts case against Japan 1 28 suggest-then it
may become the subject of a WTO dispute settlement panel.
Japan filed such a complaint in 1995 when the United States
threatened sanctions in an auto parts dispute. 129 The Japanese
complaint never reached a panel because the United States and
Japan settled the dispute. 130 It is not clear whether the Japanese

case against the U.S. threat of sanctions would have resulted in a

WTO panel report against Section 301. The United States did not
actually impose sanctions in the Auto and Auto Parts case as it did
13 1
Whether the United States
in the Brazil Pharmaceuticalscase.

can avoid WTO review of Section 301 indefinitely, however, seems

doubtful.

Given its belief that Section 301/Unreasonable cases

are not limited because they address issues outside the GATT
rules, the United States will probably not use restraint in
threatening what could be GATT-illegal sanctions. Whether the
United States would again impose such sanctions and risk a WTO
dispute is less clear.

See Appendix A following this Article for a description of the two recent
128.
cases against Japan.
Japan filed the case in the WTO on the same day that the United
129.
States threatened the sanctions. Andrew Pollack, Japan Plans to Appeal to New
Trade Group, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at D4.
130. Japan, U.S. Report on Auto Accord, Say Dispute is Now Removed from
WTO. 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1176 (July 12, 1995).
131.
The gravamen of Japan's complaint in the Auto and Auto Parts case
would have had to rely on the argument that a threat of sanctions-a unilateral
determination by the United States-was a violation of Article XXIII.1 of the DSU.
The United States has already indicated that it does not believe Article XXIII
applies to Section 301 cases not based on Uruguay Round Agreements. See
supra note 42 and accompanying text. Although he strongly objects to U.S. policy
regarding Section 301 and Japan, Professor Bhagwati stated that:
[tihe assertion that no action illegal under the WTO actually took place,
because the threat of punitive sanctions was not actually translated into
their imposition on 28 June, is strictly correct. But this is a technicality;
and the assertion that the United States would in fact go ahead and

undertake such illegal action unless its demands were met is certainly an
indication of the U.S. willingness to flout WTO rules to its advantage.
Jagdlsh Bhagwati, The U.S.-Japan Car Dispute: A Monumental Mistake, 72 INT'L
AFFAIRS 261, 277 (1996).
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3. Section 301 and the Japan Problem
The final use that the United States has made of Section 301
from 1985 to the present has been an attempt to cure or at least
curb the large U.S. trade deficit with certain countries.' 3 2 The
primary target of Section 301 cases under the Super 301 category
has been Japan. A large part of U.S. frustration with Japan
comes from the belief that the Japanese economy, including the
Japanese way of conducting business, does not act like that of
other industrialized states and that it is much more closed to
trade as a result. 133 Rather than pursue the strategy it used
against developing countries of bringing Section 301 cases to
push U.S. concerns into the GATT/WTO, the United States has

treated Japan differently. The United States has tended to bring
Section 301 cases with a goal of achieving bilateral agreements
with Japan. Why Japan is treated differently both with respect to
the filing and the resolution of Section 301 cases remains an open
question. One view is that the "multidimensional and structural
nature of Japanese trade obstacles" 13 4 make Japan unlikely to

132.
RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 33.
The Clinton
Administration has disavowed the use of bilateral negotiations with Japan on
structural impediments to trade as a way of curing the U.S.-Japan trade
imbalance. "ITlhe bilateral imbalance between the U.S. and Japan is not what the
talks seek to remedy. Rather, they are designed to address Japan's multilateral
current-account surplus and structural barriers to Japan's markets, both of
which matter very much to Japan's trading partners." Laura D. Tyson, Japan's
Trade Surplus Matters, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1. 1994, at A14 (Ms. Tyson was the Chair
of the President's Council of Economic Advisors.).
133.
RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 38-43; see also I. M,
DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICs 297 (3d ed. 1995). Destler states:
In industry after industry, Japanese firms are American firms' toughest
rivals. The enormous impact of Japan on the world trading order, the
combination of formidable competitiveness on exports and embedded
resistance to imports, has drained the patience of team after team of U.S.
trade negotiators. It has also led some veteran trade practitioners to
conclude ... that the United States should respond to this challenge by
pursuing a split-level or two-track trade policy: managed trade or tit-fortat reciprocity with the Japanese, and multilateral liberalism with
everyone else.
Id. at 297.
134.
RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 33. There is the
question of whether some U.S. concerns about Japan are trade barriers that the
WTO could deal with. Professor Jackson, for example, describes some of these

issues as "problems which arise due to the economic structure of the Importing
country" and offers such illustrations as government allocation of credit,
government industrial policy and some forms of administrative guidance.
According to Jackson these problems "are almost totally untouched by the GATT
system" and raise "some of the most difficult questions of how far should the
international system go in asking nations to change their economic and social
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respond to demands to develop new multilateral rules on issues of
U.S. concern. Another view is that Japan is too powerful an
economy to threaten into the GATT/WTO or into strict compliance
with U.S. views. Nevertheless, the United States has pursued
Section 301 cases against Japan, threatened retaliation in many
13 6
The Reagan
cases, 135 and actually imposed retaliation once.
Administration agreed to the creation of Super 301 in 1988 and
the targeting of Japan in order to avoid even more protectionist
137
Although Super
legislation that had been passed in the House.
301 authority to pursue negotiations and retaliate was purely
discretionary and designed to expire in two years, 138 it was met
with a great deal of hostility by a world trading system that had
already seen an increase in normal Section 301 filings and
threats.
In the first round of Super 301 cases pursued by the Bush
Administration, the United States identified six practices in three
countries-Japan, Brazil, and India. Of the six practices cited as
instances deserving of U.S. investigations, three involved Japan
in
procurement
government
exclusionary
alleged
for
of
erection
alleged
the
and
satellites
and
supercomputers
13 9
United
The
products.
technical barriers to trade in forest

States ended each Section 301 case with a settlement negotiated

140
Despite the negotiated
under a threat of retaliatory sanctions.
settlements, there were later disputes between the two over how
to implement the agreements. 14 1 As the Super 301 cases were
progressing, USTR announced that it would pursue a separate
14 2
to address issues such
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII)
as Japan's heavily regulated distribution system and relatively
weak antitrust system. The SII was undertaken outside the
While some issues, like the distribution
Super 301 cases.

structures." JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1208 (3d

ed. 1995).
135. Id.
136. See Appendix A following the article for the cases against Japan. The
United States retaliated against Japan in 301-48, the semiconductor case, when
it failed to follow through with the agreement it had negotiated to end the dispute.
137. RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 36.
138. See supra note 21.
RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19. at 39. All Super 301
139.
cases filed have been self-initiated by USTR. Although USTR has this authority
for other Section 301 cases it usually takes cases based on petitions submitted by
domestic industries.
140. See Appendix A following the article for the results of Section 301-74
(55 Fed. Reg. 25,761); 301-75 (55 Fed. Reg. 25,764); and 301-76 (55 Fed. Reg.
25,763).
Id.
141.
142. Announcement of Structural Impediments Initiative, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Sept. 1989, at 78.
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problem, appeared largely resolved in the 1989-90 year of
negotiation, others, like the antitrust issue, were never completely
addressed to U.S. satisfaction. 1 43
After resisting efforts by
Congress to reenact Super 301 early in his administration,
President Clinton ultimately renewed a softened version of the
statute 44 by Executive Order in 1994,145 following the collapse of
yet another set of protracted negotiations over various structural
impediments to trade with Japan. 1 4 6
Both the distribution
system issue and the lack of effective antitrust laws issue were
raised again in the two most recent Section 301/Unreasonable
cases filed against Japan involving auto parts 14 7 and
photographic ffim. 148 The United States resolved the Auto Parts
case with a negotiated settlement only after threatening to hit
Japan with a 100% tariff increase on luxury automobiles. 1 4 9 As
in past negotiated settlements, the United States failed to receive
commitments it claimed to desire' 5 0 for a particular share of the
Japanese market. Instead, the United States received significant
pledges of liberalization as part of a settlement which requires the

143.

RECIPROCiTY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 41.
144. Id. at 44.
145.
Clinton Renews Super 301 Measure; ProvisionSeeks Market Opening, 11
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 367 (Mar. 9, 1994) (stating that the renewed Super 301
was different from the 1988 version because it contained an "early warning
system" designed to allow negotiations with a country before it was labeled as an
unfair trader. The Executive Order also made use of Super 301 discretionary by
the President.).
146. Id.
147.
See Appendix A following this Article for a description of the Auto Parts
dispute (301-93; 60 Fed. Reg. 35,253). The United States raised three claims in
the Auto Parts case. First, the United States argued that Japanese bureaucracy
kept U.S. auto parts out of the Japanese market. Second, the United States
contended that Japan tolerated the kleretsu, the interlocking business
relationship of Japanese firms and thus contributed to the limiting of U.S. sales.
Third, the United States argued that the Japanese government allowed the
formation of an auto dealership network which limited U.S. sales. USTR Fact
Sheet on the U.S.-Japan Auto and Auto Parts Agreement, Released June 28, 1995,
12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) (July 5. 1995).
148.
301-99; 60 Fed. Reg. 35,447; see also Andrew Pollack, Japan'sTack on
Trade: No More 1-on-1, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1996, at DI.
149.
U.S. Threatens Duties on Luxury Cars Worth $5.9 Billion in Japan 301
Dispute. 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 848 (May 17, 1995). For a full description of
the Auto and Auto Parts Section 301 case and the negotiated settlement, see
Eleanor Roberts Lewis & David J. Weiler, Will the Rubber Grip the Road? An
Analysis of the U.S.-Japan Automotive Agreement, 27 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 631
(1996).
150.
When it first began pushing for a resolution to the problem in the Auto
Parts case, the United States was seeking promises that Japan would hit certain
import targets,. Le., that the United States would be guaranteed a certain share of
the Japanese market. The final agreement does not contain such guarantees
because Japan refused to consider them in any form. Bhagwati, supra note 131,
at 262, 276.

THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC POWER AND SECTION 301

19971

241

151
United States and Japan to review the agreement bi-annually.
As with all of the other Section 301 cases with Japan, therefore,
the United States ended up adopting agreements that require it to

closely monitor implementation over many years.1 5 2 It is too early
to determine whether the Auto Parts case will be viewed as an
economic success,1 5 3 although the two countries have begun the
first review. 1 5 4 The Japanese government initially refused to

The Administration Weaves the "World Network of Commerce," 14 INT'L
151.
TRADE REP. (BNA) 132 (Jan. 22, 1997) ("A seminannual report on the status of the
auto parts aspect of the deal is due in March or April, while an annual report on
the entire accord is due in the fall, possibly in October, industry said."); U.S.,
JapanFormalizeAuto Agreement, Release Text of Pact Concluded in June, 12 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1426 (Aug. 23, 1995); Mark Felsenthal, U.S., JapanSet to Meet
In September to Begin Review of Auto Agreement, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1337
(1996) ("Although the Japanese government specified that it was not agreeing to
the use of quantitative indicators announced by the United States to determine
whether the deal was working, the deal committed the two sides to reviews of the
automotive trade twice a year.").
152. Lewis & Weiler, supranote 149, at 657-85. In other major Section 301
cases against Japan the United States also resolved the case by adopting
negotiated agreements. Examples of these cases include:
I.

2.

301-48 Semiconductors- The case was initially resolved by an
agreement that was to last for five years, although the United States
threatened sanctions at least once claiming that Japan was not
The United States and Japan just
following the agreement.
completed negotiations in August 1996 that would extend the
semiconductor agreement until July 31, 1999. See Appendix A for a
description of the case.
301-69 Construction Services- The United States and Japan
reached two agreements under which Japan would open up more
public works construction projects to bidding by U.S. firms. The
United States has expressed dissatisfaction with the experience of
U.S. firms in 1994 and 1995.

Mark Felsenthal, U.S. Firms Urged to "Demonstrate Merits" in Bids on Japan
ConstructionContracts, 13 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA) 1119 (July 10, 1996).
Some scholars abhor the use of Section 301 against Japan because these
cases turn into attempts at managed trade in the affected industry sectors. See
Bhagwati, supra note 132; see also RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1162
(1996) ("[Tihe greatest potential evil is that sustained use of Section 301 becomes
managed trade in the industries championed by the USTR."); Bart S. Fisher &
Ralph G. Steinhardt, III, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protectionfor U.S.
Exporters of Goods, Services and Capital, 14 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 569, 570 (1982)
(Fisher and Steinhardt argue against seeking such specific reciprocity through
Section 301 because It in effect repeals the law of comparative advantage and
confirms the worst fears of U.S. trading partners.).
153. Kantor Defends Administration'sPolicy on Japan Trade Pact, Cites High
Exports, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 382 (Mar. 6, 1996) (stating that according to
the Clinton Administration exports of U.S. automobiles and parts to Japan rose
See Lewis & Weiler, supra note 149, for a
approximately 36% in 1995).
discussion about why the agreement is a success.
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negotiate with the United States in the PhotographicFilm, Section
301-99 case. 15 5

Ultimately, rather than take action unilaterally,

the United States initially sought consultations with Japan at the

WTO. A panel has now been formed to review some of the GATT
6

15
issues raised by the film case.
The U.S. Section 301 experience with Japan suggests that
unilateralism within constrained limits can work against a major
trading partner. With Japan, the United States has been willing
to retaliate only once. Instead, it has chosen to settle cases and
face long commitments to monitoring agreements.
Given the
nature of the trade dispute and the complexity of the problem at
which Section 301 was aimed, however, unflateralism against
Japan failed to produce quick solutions or a cure for the
persistent trade imbalance.

IHI.

THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: ITS PROMISES AND ITS
LIMITS

A. Completion of the Uruguay Round: Establishmentof the WTO
and the Adoption of the Dispute Settlement Understanding(DSU)

One of the major accomplishments of the Uruguay Round
was the completion of negotiations to establish a World Trade

Organization (WTO).

Before the adoption of the agreement
5

establishing the WTO,1
under

7

GATT had been

the rights and obligations of countries
overseen

by an

Interim

Operating

154. Japan Announces EU Parts Purchases Worth $5 Billion on Eve of Talks
with U.S., 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)1418 (Sept. 11, 1996).
155.
JapaneseRefusal to Negotiate on Film, Chips Causes Concern, 13 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 165 (Jan. 31, 1996) (stating Japan will not negotiate with the
United States on this issue because of the use of Section 301 and threatened
sanctions).
156. Pollack, supra note 148 ([Olne reason the Clinton Administration
ultimately decided to take the Kodak case to the trade group was as a vote of
confidence for the world trade rules."); Mark Felsenthal, WTO Panel Decision in
Film Case Likely By May 1997, U.S. Official Says, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1337
(Aug. 21, 1996). The WTO panel has been formed to address the U.S. claims that
Japan's laws and regulations affecting the distribution and sale of Imported
consumer photographic film and paper are treated less favorably than Japanese
products-an Article III National Treatment Violation. See Infra note 319.
157. MarrakeshAgreement Establlshing the World Trade Organization,Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; The FinalAct Is
reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (GATT Secretariat, Geneva 1994) [hereinafter The FinalAct].
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Committee.' 5 8 Until the WTO came into existence in 1995, there
was no membership organization, like other U.N. organizations,
overseeing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The
Havana Charter, which would have created such an
organization-the International Trade Organization' 5 9-never
came into force. President Truman did not submit the Havana
Charter to the U.S. Senate for ratification as treaty in 1950,160
which virtually guaranteed that the membership organization
would not be established. Nevertheless, the agreement on tariffs
and trade that contained the commercial portions of the Havana
Charter-GATT-had been put into effect in 1947 by the United
States and the other major trading countries. 16 1 The Contracting
Parties (the countries which had acceded to GATT) operated under
the terms of GATT and began the first of a series of negotiating
rounds devoted to the lowering of tariffs. 162 An Interim Operating
Committee, aided by a Secretariat, was established to oversee and

158. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had been drafted
in 1947 to cover the principal commercial obligations the Contracting Parties were
to undertake regarding the lowering of tariffs, the abolition of trade quotas and
It was drafted pending the
the limitation of discriminatory trade rules.
The International Trade
establishment of a membership organization -

Organization (ITO). Analysis of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, DEP'T
ST., Pub. No. 3938. Commercial Policy Series 93 (1946). When the ITO was not
adopted the terms of the GATT were operated by the United Nations Interim
Commission for the ITO.
159. Following negotiations with the British in 1945 and 1946 the United
States announced and elaborated on plans for the establishment of an
International Trade Organization. The United States conceived of the ITO as an
organ of the United Nations. The ITO was to have a permanent Secretariat and an
expert staff. The organization was then to be open to all countries accepting its

charter. Suggested Charterfor an InternationalTrade Organizationof the United
Nations, DEPT ST., Pub. No. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 (1946).

160. Although Truman had expected to submit the Charter to Congress, it
became clear in 1950 that there was not enough support for the creation of an
ITO. Instead, President Truman adopted the GATT as an executive agreement.
The President's claimed authority to do this came from the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (1996)); see KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 14 (1970); ITC 1985 REPORT, supra

note 80, at 49-50.
161. The United States accepted the GATT by signing the Protocol of
Provisional Application. At the time of that provision, the United States and other
signatories agreed to apply Parts I and III of the GATT (arts. I. II and arts. XXIV et
seq.) and to apply Part II (arts. III-XXIII) "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with
existing legislation." GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A12-A17, A66-A75, A18-A40,
55 U.N.T.S. at 196-204. 268-84, 204-66. See John H. Jackson, The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L.
REv. 249, 253-54 (1967) for a discussion of how the United States implemented
its GATT obligations through the Protocol of Provisional Application.
162. See ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 49-50.
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coordinate GATT functions. 163 From 1947 until the creation of

the WTO, the Contracting Parties operated GATT with this
informal

structure

and

considered

themselves

contractually

164
bound to follow the obligations set forth in GATT.
The WTO is organized such that the General Council,
composed of Member States of the organization, has three main
functions:
(1) oversight of the substantive agreements and
Member State compliance with the agreements in GATT; 16 5 (2)
dispute resolution between the Member States; and (3) review of
the trade policies of the Member States for their compliance with
GATT rules. 16 6 Therefore, one of the major functions to be
performed by the newly established WTO is the settlement of
disputes. The General Council fulfills this second function of
dispute resolution by establishing itself as a Dispute Settlement

163.

U.N. INTERIM COMM'N FOR THE INT'L TRADE ORG., THE ATTACK ON TRADE

BARRIERS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE FROM JANUARY 1948 TO AUGUST 1949, 28 (1949): ITC 1985
REPORT. supra note 80, at 50.

164. ITC 1985 REPORT, supranote 80, at 27.
165. The WTO Agreement makes the organization responsible for providing
"the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its
Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal instruments
included in the Annexes to this Agreement." WTO Agreement, supra note 157, at
art. II1}(. The Agreements attached to the WTO Agreement in Annexes 1-3 are the
Multilateral Trade Agreements and bind all member States of the WTO, as do the
revisions of the GATT 1994 now denominated as the GATT 1994. Id. at art. 11(2) &
(4). In addition to these agreements, the WTO has oversight of four additional
agreements that are signed and accepted by only some of the WTO member
States, the Plurflateral Trade Agreements. Id. at art. 11(3).
According to Article III of the WTO Agreement, the WTO Is supposed to
"facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the
objectives, of [the WTOI Agreement," the multilateral Agreements, the GATT 1994
and the framework for the Plurilateral Agreements. Id. at art. Ill(l). The WTO Is
also supposed to provide a forum for negotiations among member States and "a
framework for the implementation of the results of such negotiations. as may be
decided by the Ministerial Conference." Id. at art. Il (2).
In order to perform its oversight function, the General Council of the WTO
breaks down into a Council for Trade in Goods, which oversees the functioning of
the Multilateral Trade Agreements; a Council for Trade in Services, which

oversees the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and a Council for
TRIPs, which oversee the functioning of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights. Id. at art. IV(5).
166. Id. at art. IV (4).
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Body (DSB). 167 The DSB operates168under the terms of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU).
From the time of the adoption of the Ministerial Declaration
opening the Uruguay Round negotiations, what to do about GATT
dispute settlement was a major issue. 16 9 During the negotiations,
the most complete proposals for reforming the dispute
settlement 170 came from the developed countries that had been
the heaviest users of the GATT dispute settlement system: the
United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan. 17 1 The U.S.
delegation to the negotiating group focused on the need to repair
the flaws of the GATT system. 172 According to the United States,
the problems with the GATT system were the following: (1) the
blocking of panel reports by the losing party to the disputes, and
(2) the lengthiness of the GATT proceedings. 173 These concerns
about the GATT system prompted the United States to place the
establishment of a better dispute settlement system at the
forefront of its goals for the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. 17 4 The DSU, adopted at the end of the Uruguay

167.

See Id. at art. IV(3) stating that:

The General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the
responsibilities of the Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The Dispute Settlement Body may have its

own Chairman and shall establish such rules of procedure as it deems
necessary for the fulfillment [sic] of those responsibilities.
168. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 1.2.
169. Ministerlal Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT
B.I.S.D. (33rd Supp.) at 19, 25 (1987):
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and
strengthen the rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement process,
while recognizing the contribution that would be made by more effective
and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. Negotiations shall include
the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing and monitoring
of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted
recommendations.
170. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6. at 2727-29.
171. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 295-300.
According to Hudec, of the 207 GATT panel cases completed by 1993, the United
States or the EC had been involved in 190.
172. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2727-28.
173. Id. at 2730-35.
174. In 1985, the Senate Finance Committee requested by the International
Trade Commission (ITC) was to identify the institutional and functional obstacles
to the proper functioning of the GATT's dispute settlement system. The ITC noted
in Its thorough study of the GATT system from its inception that:
Three main problems with the GATT resolution process have been
claimed: the time required to complete a case is too long; there are too
many opportunities for the "defendant" country to obstruct the process;
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Round, met the major U.S. concerns by including provisions that
175
covered the adoption and implementation of panel reports,
timeliness,17 6 77and strengthened
remedies for
prevailing
complainants. 1
The DSU attached to the WTO Agreement creates a dispute
settlement process consisting of three phases: (1) consultation,
(2) a panel process, and (3) a process for compliance and
surveillance. 17 8 The DSU represents an evolution of the GATT
dispute settlement system. In many ways, the DSU maintains
the basic structure of the GATT system developed under Article
XXIII of GATT, 1947.179 The DSU retains the same subject matter
jurisdiction or scope as Article XXIII.18 0 The DSU also keeps two
of the phases of the GATT dispute settlement system as developed
in the years between 1947 and 1993-a conciliation/negotiation
phase and a third party dispute resolution phase (the panel
process). 18 1 It is in the compliance and surveillance area that the

and the complainant party is often unable to ensure implementation of
GATT decisions, once reached.
ITC 1985 REPORT, supranote 80, at 4. (
175.
Dispute Settlement Understanding. supra note 5, at art. 16.4.
176. Id. at arts. 12.9 & 20.
177. Id. at art. 21.1.
A losing Member State is to implement the
recommendations of the panel (as adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB)). If such implementation does not occur, the complaining party can seek
compensation or the suspension of concessions. Id. at art. 22.
178. A WTO dispute begins with a request by a complaining country for
consultations regarding an offending trade practice. Id. at art. 3. If the dispute is
not settled by the parties then it moves on to a panel process. Id. at arts. 2 & 12.
The DSU provides complete guidelines on how the panel process begins, the
composition of the panel, the terms of reference for the panel and even an annex
containing working procedures for panels. See Id. at arts. 6. 7. 8 & app. 3. Once
a panel report favoring the complainant is adopted the DSU also has extensive
procedures for enforcement. The losing party is allowed an appeal on legal
issues. Id. at art. 17. Otherwise, the losing party Is given clear instructions on
what it must do to comply with the panel or Appellate Body report. See Id. at
arts. 21 & 22.
179.
See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2675720 for a thorough discussion of the development of the GATT dispute settlement
system.
180. The DSU expressly adopts the GATT practice developed to deal with
disputes under Article XXIII of the GATT 1947.
Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 26. The Uruguay Round negotiators did
conduct some negotiations about the scope of Article XXIII. For a complete
discussion of this issue, see Infra p. 73 and accompanying notes.
181.
The early GATT dispute settlement system featured mediation like
negotiations but, over time the GATT developed the practice of submitting matters
to panels of experts. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL SYSTEM 77 (1987); see also DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING
HISTORY, supra note 6. at 2675-720. The Contracting Parties generally conducted
the conciliation or consultation phase of GATT disputes through bilateral
negotiations, although in the 1980's decade additional procedures had been
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DSU shows a marked departure from the GATT method for
resolving disputes. 1 8 2 To achieve the goal of obtaining greater
compliance, all of the Contracting Parties had to recognize that
the operative feature
of GATT decision-making was the culprit of
18 3
the GATT system.
18 4
The GATT system always operated by positive consensus.
Effectively, this meant that if any Contracting Party objected to a
GATT decision when the General Council met to adopt decisions

adopted by the GATT parties for the facilitation of such negotiations by the GATT
Secretariat. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990) [hereinafter 1989
Improvements]. The third-party dispute resolution phase of the GATT system had
developed the practice of establishing panels who heard and issued reports on
cases presented by the Contracting Parties involved in the dispute. Several
different understandings on how both phases of the GATT system were supposed
to operate had been developed by the Contracting Parties. The first major
explication of the GATT dispute settlement system arose from framework
See
negotiations on dispute settlement held during the Tokyo Round.
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210, 215 (1980)
[hereinafter 1979 Understanding]. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 2686-95, for a short history of those negotiations.
Any additional codification of the GATT system, along with several changes,
As the result of
aimed at improving the system's speed and efficiency.

negotiations held following the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round the
Contracting Parties developed. 1989 Improvements, supra note 181, at 61-62.
The Contracting Parties adopted this Understanding following the mid-term
review of the Uruguay Round negotiations and agreed to apply its new procedures
to all disputes beginning in 1989. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 2754. For a description of the "improvements" to the GATT
system that came from each of these Understandings, see Michael K. Young,
Dispute Resolution In the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomatic, 29
INT'L LAw. 389, 397-98 (1995). Despite the procedural improvements to the panel
process adopted by these Understandings, the GATT system retained limitations
that kept it from being perceived as a success by some Contracting Parties.
These limitations, and the attempts to address them, led to the creative part of
the DSU-the provisions aimed at securing compliance by Member States of the
WTO with panel reports.
182. The weakest aspects of the GATT system were enforcement (the
General Council could authorize retaliations but had done so only once in the
GATT history) and the non-existent surveillance of panel reports. A large part of
the DSU focuses on the implementation of panel reports and how the DSU will act
to ensure this implementation. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5,
arts. 11-13, 15-19.
183. The United States had already decided that the consensus process was
responsible for the ineffectiveness of the GATT system. As long as a party losing a
GATT case could refuse to accept the decision of the panel, there was no
guarantee of compliance. ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80.
184. The DSU provides a definition of consensus: "The DSB shall be
deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its
consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the decision
Dispute Settlement
is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision."
Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 2.4 n. 1.
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on the meaning of the GATT Agreement or panel reports generated
by the dispute settlement system, the GATT General Council
could not take action. 185 A Contracting Party seeking to delay or
avoid a case brought under the dispute settlement system could
block or delay the process at any or all of the three following
points: (1) the establishment of a panel, (2) the adoption of the
terms of reference for a panel, and (3) the adoption of the panel
report by the General Council. 18 6 During the years preceding the
Uruguay Round negotiations and during the negotiations from
1986 to 1993, there had been an increase in each of these
activities. 18 7 Despite the inevitable slowing down and loss of
credibility incurred by each new breakdown of the GATT system,
the early negotiations aimed at reforming the process faltered over
the issue of abandoning the traditional idea of consensus. 18
Apart from the United States, most countries wanted to allow
consensus to continue to govern whether a panel report would be
adopted and whether or not the General Council would authorize
retaliation against a non-complying defendant. 8 9 Eventually, the
views of most negotiators shifted toward the view of the United

185.
For example, in a GATT session in 1981 the Chairman of the General
Council stated that "the Council normally proceed[s] on the basis of consensus,"

According to his description, consensus meant that not delegation to the GATT
maintained its objections to a text or attempted to prevent its adoption.
(C/M/146 at 20).
186.
See generally Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism:
Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding,J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995,
at 5, 30. According to Komuro:
[P]arties to the dispute are customarily endowed with the right to
participate in the Council's decision-making process and may, therefore,
block the adoption of the panel reports by consensus. In other words, the
consensus rule, in conjunction with the right of the parties to the dispute
to attend the Council, conferred a veto power on disputing parties and
considerably delayed the procedures.
Id. at 30.
A party to a GATT dispute did not formally have to object to block the
establishment of a panel or the adoption of the terms of reference, but if It failed
to cooperate fully, the matter could drag on for months and thus stymie thirdparty resolution of the dispute through the panel process.
See ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 111 n. 11, for a description of such an
action by the United States in the Brazilian Pharmaceutical Case. See Hudec,
Judicallzation, supra note 88, at 24-25. Hudec notes that the United States
'managed
to drag out Brazil's complaint about U.S. retaliation over
pharmaceutical patents so that, almost two years after the complaint, the panel
still had not yet had its first substantive meeting." Id. at 25.
187.
See generally ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at
234-70 (describing the dispute settlement mechanisms after the Uruguay Round).
188.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6. at 2732-42.
189.
Id. At the end of the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round (in 1988)
the Contracting Parties reaffirmed the use of a consensus.
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States regarding the abandonment of positive consensus for the
dispute settlement system, 190 but only after the United States had
made aggressive use of Section 301.191
The DSU addresses the problem of recalcitrant defendants by
reversing the consensus requirement. Under the DSU, all panels
are established and panel reports adopted unless there is a
consensus against adoption. 19 2 In effect, the negotiators at the
Uruguay Round agreed to the automatic establishment of panels
and the automatic adoption of reports. 193 The DSU added
another level of review to the dispute settlement system to
counterbalance any ill effects of such a drastic departure from
normal procedures. If a panel decision is "bad"-containing poor
or non-existent legal reasoning, 1 94 the DSU provides the parties
to the dispute with the right to appeal the panel's legal
The Appellate Body decision is then also
findings. 195
automatically adopted
by the DSB, unless there is a consensus
96
against adoption. 1

These structural alterations to the dispute settlement system
mark a shift away from a diplomatic dispute settlement system
towards the adjudicative one the United States has always
sought. 197 As the GATT Agreement expanded to cover new areas
of trade (such as trade in services and agricultural trade) and
trade-related disciplines (like the agreements on trade-related
intellectual property rights and trade-related investment

190.
Young, supra note 181, at 390; Miquel Montafih I Mora, A GATT with
Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics In the Resolution of InternationalTrade Disputes, 31
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 142-46 (1993) [hereinafter GATT with Teeth].
191.
ROBERT E. HUDEC, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND: A RESULTS ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180, 186
(1990) [hereinafter HUDEC, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT].

192.
Dispute Settlement Understanding. supra note 5, at arts. 12 & 16.
193. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No.
21, GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement. Internationalization or Elimination of
Section 301, 26 INT'L LAW. 795, 797 (1992).
194. See Hudec, Judiclalization,supra note 88, at 12-19 for a description of
various early GATT cases that the parties considered to be legally in error, or at
least unpersuasively argued.
195. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 16.
196. Id.
197. Almost every GATT scholar has noted the change of the dispute
settlement system towards an adjudicative model. See William J. Davey, The
WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, in 1 HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 13-77 (Pierre Pescatore et al., eds. 1995) [hereinafter Davey].
Davey devotes an entire section of his review of the WTO system with an analysis
of why adjudicative system is superior to a diplomatic/negotiation system. Davey
contends that an adjudicative system both discourages rule violations by
countries and results in greater compliance with the rules. See also GATT with
Teeth, supra note 190, at 142-46.
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measures), the WTO acted to enforce these obligations against
Member States within the WTO system itself.198
B. How the DSU Addresses and Fails to Address Section 301
Concerns
One of the crucial issues confronted by the negotiators of the
DSU was how the new obligations it imposes would relate to U.S.
unilateral power. Would the creation and operation of a WTO
dispute settlement system deprive the United States of its right to
use its unilateral power? If not, how much would adherence to
the WTO rules limit U.S. options for dealing with the unfair trade
actions of its trading partners? At the end of the Uruguay Round,
most of the countries believed that the new WTO dispute
settlement system would effectively end U.S. unilateral activity
under Section 301. According to the United States, however, the
new WTO dispute settlement system and the DSU do not require
the elimination of all unilateral action by means of Section 301.
In order to understand why the U.S. interpretation of the DSU

and its obligations differ from that of other nations, it is
important to understand both how the DSU operates and how it
relates to Section 301.
1. The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is an integrated
one. With limited and specified exceptions, 19 9 the DSU provisions
apply to all disputes arising under the agreements in GATT

198. As long as the GATT system operated by consensus there was the
possibility that there would be no compliance by a losing State. This inability to
guarantee compliance meant that a country could justify using self-help
measures to obtain the relief it sought. The United States used this argument to
justify taking retaliatory action against the EC after it blocked some GATT panel
reports. The United States, thus, went outside the GATT system. The change to a
negative consensus in the DSU leaves the losing party without the right to avoid
the process. The DSU also deprives the complaining party of the right to take
action unilaterally in any case that belongs within the scope of GATT Article XXIII.
According to Davey, the DSU put a more "judicial like system in place. That
occurred because the EC and others decided that a more adjudicative system
would be desirable as a means of limiting the U.S. tendency to take unilateral
trade action on the ground that the GATT system was inadequate." Davey, supra
note 197. at 77.

199. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at app. 2. Appendix
2 contains a list of the special or additional rules that exist for some of the
agreements. In other words, for certain of the GATT agreements there are
different rules contained in the text of that agreement.
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1994,200 disputes about a Member State's rights and obligations
under the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, 2 0 I and
disputes about the operation of the dispute settlement system
itself.20 2 The operation of the panel system and the issuance of
panel reports, however, do not create GATT law. According to
GATT, only Member States of the WTO sitting as the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) can definitively interpret the legal meaning
of GATT provisions. 20 3 Moreover, a panel report adopted by the
DSB decides only the case before the DSB, and therefore, lacks
20 4
any precedential value for future WTO trade disputes.
The WTO dispute settlement process is triggered when a
Member State complains that a benefit it expected under a GATT
Agreement has been "nullified or impaired" by: (1) the failure of

another Member State to carry out its obligations under the

GATT, (2) the application by another Member State of any
measure whether or not it conflicts with the GATT, or (3) the
existence of any other situation. 20 5
The old GATT dispute

settlement system produced panel reports based only on the first

200. Id. at app. 1. Appendix 1 lists all of the agreements that are subject to
the DSU process. All of the Multilateral Trade Agreements are covered. The
Plurilateral Agreements are covered only if the member States that are parties to
them agree to use the DSU process.
201.
Id. at art. 1 & app. 1.
202. Id.
203.
"Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the
DSB to make a decision, it shall do so by consensus." Id. at art. 2.4.
204. According to leading GATT scholar John H. Jackson:
It should ... be understood that the international legal system does not
embrace the common law jurisprudence that prevails in the United States
which calls for courts to operate under a stricter "precedent" or "stare
decisis" rule. Most nations in the world do not have stare decisis as part
of their legal systems, and the international law also does not. This means
that technically a GATT panel report is not strict precedent, although there
is certainly some tendency for subsequent GATT panels to follow what
they deem to be the "wisdom" of prior panel reports. Nevertheless, a GATT
panel has the option not to follow a previous panel report, as has occurred
in several cases. In addition, although an adopted panel report will
generally provide an international law obligation for the participants in the
dispute to follow the report, the GATT Contracting Parties acting in a
Council or the Ministerial Conference, can make interpretive rulings or
other resolutions which would depart from that GATT panel ruling, or even
establish a waiver to relieve a particular obligation.
Testimony by John H. Jackson Before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee Hearing,
March 23, 1994 on the Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation, reprinted in 6
World Trade & Arb. Materials 125, 132-33 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter Jackson
Testimony].

205.

GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A40-A41, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-68.
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two theories-violation of a GATT
obligation and non-violation
20 6
nullification or impairment cases.
The dispute would begin under the DSU process with a
consultation phase.
A complaining Member State is first
supposed to request consultation about another Member State's
GATT breach (or non-breach which causes harm) with that
country2 0 7 and notify the DSB about its request. 20
The
defending Member State is required to enter into such
consultation with the goal of reaching "a mutually satisfactory
solution."20 9 Failure of the consultation (or the failure of the
defending Member States' participation in the process) allows the
complaining party to request the establishment of a panel. 2 10 In
addition to the consultation phase, the DSU provides for the
procedures of good offices, conciliation, and mediation to 2be
11
offered to willing parties by the Director General of the WTO.

The request for and use of such negotiation-based settlement

techniques can take place any time during the operation of the
dispute settlement process. Considered together, these initial
provisions of the DSU strongly suggest that the WTO encourages
Member States to settle their disputes.
The parties to
consultation or mediation are required not to disclose any
information about the proceeding; therefore, any position taken
by one party in a settlement with 2one
trading partner cannot be
12
used against it by another country.
If the parties cannot negotiate a settlement to their trade
dispute, the panel process then becomes available to them. Once
a complaining party requests a panel, 2 13 it will be established

206.

ANALYTICAL INDEX: A GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 629-787 (GATT

1995) [hereinafter GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX]. The GATT Analytical Index is a
compilation of short descriptions of all of the GATT decisions and panel report
decisions that have been issued regarding each major legal obligation codified in
the GATT 1947 agreement. See also Davey, supra note 197, at 71.
207. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art 4.3.
208. Id. at art. 4.4. The complaining party must notify the Dispute
Settlement Body, the relevant Council (Goods, Services or TRIPs) and any other
Committee related to the Agreement that is the subject of the dispute.
209. Id. at art. 4.3.
210. Id. at art. 4.7.
211.
Id. at art. 5. The GATT contracting parties have made use of the
conciliation process in the past and obtained the good offices of the Director
General. See HUDEC, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 191, at 201. The office
appointed by the Director General can aid the parties by Issuing a report If
necessary. Although the conciliation system has been successful when chosen by
the parties it was not successful when the GATT attempted to impose such a
process. See EDMUND McGovERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION § 2.32-.33
(1995) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION].

212.
213.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at arts. 4.6 & 5.2.
Id. at art. 6.1.
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unless there is a highly unlikely consensus against
establishment.2 1 4 The dispute resolution model the WTO panel
system most closely resembles is that of international commercial
arbitration. The DSU, however, makes it clear that the panel
process is not completely ad hoc, as are some private
international arbitrations. The WTO panel process itself is tightly
controlled and overseen by the WTO (acting through the DSB), as
is the enforcement stage of a dispute. Consequently, it is the DSB
rather than the Member State parties to the dispute that controls
the life of the dispute once the system is triggered. 2 15 The parties
can wrest control of the process designed to move directly from
review to recommendation to enforcement, 2 16 only if they
negotiate a GATT-consistent settlement and withdraw the case
2 17
from the system.
A panel in the WTO system normally consists of three
panelists who must be "well-qualified governmental and/or nongovernmental individuals."21 8 None of the panelists can be from
any Member State that is a party or third-party to the dispute
unless the parties agree otherwise. 2 19 The WTO Secretariat
assists in the selection process of the panelists by maintaining a
list of well-qualified
panelists 2 20 and by nominating panelists for a
21
2

particular panel.
The ultimate goal of the panel system is to produce a final
report for the DSB which resolves the dispute between the two

214.
215.

Id.
The DSB must be notified of a dispute and of the request for a panel.

Id. at art. 12. The DSB also oversees the establishment of a panel in a particular

dispute. Id. at art. 8. Once the panel process is underway the DSB oversees it
and must be asked for any extension of time the panel finds necessary to
complete its task. Id. at art. 12.9. Once the final report is done by the panel it Is
circulated to the DSB, which places the report on its agenda and then takes
comments until it takes action to adopt the report. Id. at art. 16. Finally, it is the
DSB which pursues the issue of implementation of the panel or Appellate Body
panel report. The DSB must be notified of a losing party's plan to implement. Id.
at art. 21.3. The DSB also becomes involved in assisting the parties over conflicts
regarding how implementation should proceed. Id. at arts. 21.3 & 21.4. Finally
after implementation the DSB conducts surveillance of the implementation to
make sure the panel report has been dealt with by the losing party. Id. at art.
21.6.
216. See generally Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the
WTO Dispute Settlement System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 131, 144-46 (1995).
217.
Dispute Settlement Understanding. supra note 5, at art. 3.7.
218. Id. at art. 8.1.
219. Id. atart. 8.3.
220. Id. at art. 8.4.
221. Id. The parties to the dispute are supposed to agree to a panel, but if
such agreement is not achieved within a timely fashion the WTO Director-General
has authority to appoint a panel. Id. at art. 8.7.
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parties. 2 22 In order to facilitate this goal, the DSU establishes
working procedures 2 23 for the panels, dictates standard terms of

reference, 2 2 4 and requires the panels to accept both written

submissions and oral arguments on the factual and legal issues
22 5
presented by the dispute.
At any time during the panel process, the panelists may, if so
requested, give the Member States an opportunity to reach a
mutually satisfactory negotiated settlement. 2 26
If such a
settlement is not reached, the final report is submitted to the
DSB. 2 2 7 Although the parties can protest the panel decision and

222. Id. at art. 8.7.
223.
Id. at app. 3. Appendix 3 on working procedures describes how the
process actually operates in a case-when the parties are supposed to submit
materials and arguments and the order in which the panel takes and considers
submissions. The Annex also provides an estimated time frame for each action to
be taken by the panel.
224.
Id. at art. 7. The standard terms of reference are as follows:
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the
dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of the
panel:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name
of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the
dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party)
in document.., and to make such findings as will assist
the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the
rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).
Id. at art. 7.1.
225. Id. at art. 12.6. After the parties have presented all of their arguments
the panel must prepare and circulate to them only a written interim report which

contains both the panel's findings of fact and its legal findings and conclusions.
Id. at art. 15. The interim report procedures were modeled after those adopted in
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, art. 19. 27 I.L.M. 281.
According to Hudec the interim report process adds immeasurably to the clarity
and responsiveness of the panel reports:
Having worked on both GATT and FTA panels, I would strongly support
adding the FTA [of interim reports]. In my one experience with the FTA
procedures, I reveal no secrets when I say that the rehearing led to a
number of clarifying changes once it became clear how the parties were
interpreting certain statements in the report. I can imagine that such a
procedure would also be very helpful in removing unnecessary irritants, in
strengthening the reasoning, and even in correcting wrong conclusions.
Hudec, Judiclaltzation, supra note 88, at 27. Parties are allowed to review the
report and meet with the panel regarding the interim report. Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 15.1. If no such review is requested the
interim report becomes the final report. Id. at art. 15.2. If review and additional
arguments are held after the interim review, the final report must reflect the
panel's consideration of the issues considered during that review.
226.
Dispute Settlement Understanding supra note 5, at art. 11.
227. Id. at arts. 12.7, 16.4, & 17.14.
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express their views during the DSB consideration of the report, 228
the final panel report will be adopted unless there is a consensus
against adoption. 2 29 Either party can stop the adoption of the
panel report only by notifying the DSB of its intention to appeal
the decision.

230

Any appeals of final reports will be considered by a threemember panel of a seven member Appellate Body.2 3 1 Thus,
although the DSB adds a level of appellate review to the panel
process, it does not establish an appellate court. The entire
Appellate Body will never sit on any given dispute. The Appellate
Body panel in any particular dispute is empowered to review only
the issues of law raised by the panel report and the panel's legal

228.
229.

Id. at art. 16.2.
Id. at art. 16.4.

230.

Id.

231.

The establishment of the Appellate Body was a completely new

innovation for the GATT dispute settlement system. During the Uruguay Round
negotiations on the DSU, most delegations favored the creation of an appellate
process despite the fact that it would create an overall delay. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2767. Major proposals for such a body
were tabled by the EC, the United States, Canada and Mexico. Id. at 2767-68.
None of the delegations initially agreed on exactly the proper mission for such an
appellate body. The EC thought such review should be available if any party
thought a panel decision was "erroneous or incomplete." GATT Secretariat,
Statement by the Spokesman of the European Community at the meeting of 5-6
April, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/39 (Apr. 5, 1990) at 2. The U.S. delegation wanted
appellate review for "extraordinary cases where a panel report contains legal
interpretations that are questions formally by one of the parties."
GATT
Secretariat, Communicationfrom the United States, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/40 (Apr.
6, 1990) at 5. The Canadian government described the appellate review as
providing a method for correcting "fundamentally flawed decisions."
GATT
Secretariat,
Dispute
Settlement,
Communication
from
Canada,
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/41 (June 14, 1990) at 3.
In the 1990 Draft Final Act for the Uruguay Round tabled by then DirectorGeneral Dunkel, there was a provision for an appellate body of seven members
"three of whom shall serve on any one case." GATT Secretariat, Draft FinalAct
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev. 1 (Dec. 3, 1990) at 296. The Draft Act provision on the
Appellate Body was ultimately adopted in the DSU.
The creation of the Appellate Body sparked one of the first and most
contentious political battles in the first year of the WTO. The EU held up the
appointment of the seven member groups by the Director-General Ruggiero
arguing that Europe should be entitled to have two representatives on the
Appellate Body. The United States refused to agree to such a position and so no
consensus was reached, nor a decision made, until the EU backed off of its
original argument. The dispute held up appointment of the Appellate Body until
October 1995. The nationality breakdown of the Appellate Body membership has
a membership representing each of the major trading nations (EU, Japan and
United States), three developing countries (Egypt, the Philippines and Uruguay)
and one mid-size developed country (New Zealand). WTO Focus, Dec. 1995 at 2.
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conclusions.2 3 2 The Appellate Body panel can uphold, modify, or

reverse the panel report it reviews, 2 3 3 but it lacks the power to
remand a dispute back to the panel. Whatever course the
Appellate Body panel report takes, it will automatically be adopted
23 4
unless there is a consensus against adoption.
Original or Appellate Body panel reports are required to make
different types of recommendations for resolving a dispute based
on the nature of the case before them. If the dispute presents a
claim of a violation of a GATT obligation under one of the GATT
agreements the panel report must recommend that the offending
party bring its legislative measure or practice into conformity with
the agreement that is the subject of the dispute. 2 35 Such a
recommendation will require, in most cases, that the Member
State substantially modify or eliminate the measure In

232. The limited standard of review for the Appellate Body ended up
satisfying the United States. During the negotiations the U.S. proposal had
argued for appellate review focused only on specific legal questions rather than
the entire dispute-which would have involved the Appellate Body reviewing and
potentially re-weighing the factual issues in the dispute. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6. at 2768.

233.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 17.14. See

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 211, at 2.23-13 for an argument that

the inability to remand a case could pose difficulties for the Appellate Body and
the parties to the dispute. McGovern argues that if the original panel uses the
wrong legal framework and leaves several factual issues unresolved the Appellate
Body panel will lack the basis for a good decision. Id.
234. Dispute Settlement Understanding,supra note 5, at art. 16.
235. Id. at arts. 3.4 and 22.1. But see John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures: A Preliminary Appraisal, in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
CHALLENGES AHEAD 155, 160-61 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996):

Government officials, including some in the United States who
testified before Congress during 1994, said that all a report requires Is
compensation and that it does not create a legal obligation to perform.
There are strong arguments that this Is wrong. Unfortunately, the
negotiators for the DSU did not quite nail that down explicitly. However,
at least one of the negotiators said the DSU negotiators thought they had
it nailed-they discussed it for hours-and the language was intended to
mean that there was a legal obligation to perform. It turns out not to be
quite that clear.
The DSU has at least 12 clauses that are relevant, and all these add
up to quite a strong propensity toward legal obligation. In addition, and
perhaps most interesting, there is a clause (Article 22:8) that says that
even if there is compensation, the matter remains on the agenda of the
dispute settlement body until compliance occurs. The idea Is that
compensation is only a temporary measure, a fall-back, that must be
understood in the context of the other clauses. These include a clause
that expresses a distinct preference for brining measures into consistency

and an interesting clause in a separate procedure that governs
nonviolation cases.
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question. 23 6 The panel hearing the dispute is allowed to suggest
ways in which 23 7the Member State can implement its
recommendations.
If the dispute is a non-violation nullification or impairment
case, then the panel report cannot impose an obligation upon the
Member State to withdraw the measure. 2 38 Instead of requiring
withdrawal of the measure, the offending party is supposed to
reach a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" with the complaining
party.2 39

Such a mutually satisfactory adjustment can be

reached between the parties with the assistance of an arbitration
provided by the
panel2 40 and can consist of compensation
241
offending party to the complaining party.
The DSU authorizes the "lesser remedy"2 42 of compensation
in GATT-violation cases only as a temporary measure pending the
proper course of action, the withdrawal of the GATT-illegal
236.

GATT 1994 contains many different types of legal obligations. Some of

the obligations relate directly to how a country governs trade-by passing
legislation aimed at goods as they cross the border. A country's tariff schedule,
its customs classification system (which allows it to know what tariff to charge a
particular good), and its laws about charging additional taxes at the border (for
inspectors or to penalize unfair trade actions like subsidies or dumping) are all
obviously covered by GATT obligations. Many less obvious measures a country
might pass, however, can also create the basis for a GATT-violation claim. One of
the core GATT concepts is that of National Treatment. GATT, supra note 1, 61
Stat. at A18-A19, 55 U.N.T.S. 204-48. National Treatment concept requires that
Member States not discriminate against imports in favor of domestic goods.
Article III specifies that such discrimination could come from any "laws,
regulations and requirement affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchases, transportation, distribution or use." Id. Obviously the National
Treatment obligation covers any government regulation regarding domestic
commercial policy. The breadth of Article III means that many different types of
legislation, including legislation for such worthwhile goals as the protection of the

health and safety of the population or the environment, could, if designed to
discriminate or having discriminatory effects, provide the basis for a GATTviolation case. In many cases the defending country may have serious domestic
political concerns about complying with a GATT panel which suggests the removal
of such a measure. This is one of the reasons parties to a dispute are given a
reasonable time to comply.
237. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 12.7.
238. Id. at art. 26.
239. Id.
240. Id.
Id.
241.
242. There are dangers associated with the concept of compensation which
make it a lesser remedy than withdrawal of the offending measure. If a country
compensates it is providing the receiving country with additional market access in
some other area of trade to makeup for the equivalent measure of harm caused
by the offending practice or act. The act of compensation can therefore distort the
normal terms of trade that might be operating in the area where compensation is
provided. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2769,
for an expression of such views by one of the GATT Contracting Parties during
negotiations on the remedies provisions in the DSU.
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measure. 243 If the offending party fails to withdraw the measure
or compensate the complaining party, then the DSB must
authorize the suspension of concessions (trade retaliation) by the
complaining party against the offending country. 24 4

Even if this

"last resort" remedy of suspending concessions is authorized, It Is

only temporary in nature. Retaliation is authorized only until the
offending measure is removed, the nullification or impairment
of
24 5
benefits is solved, or the parties to the dispute settle the case.
The DSU requires the DSB to conduct active surveillance of
whether, and in what manner, the offending party complies with
the panel's recommendations.
A Member State is given a
"reasonable" time to implement the recommendations of the panel
report before it must compensate or face a suspension of
concessions. 24 6 The offending party is entitled to an arbitral
panel on the issue of what would constitutes a "reasonable" time
under the circumstances of the case. 2 47 If the suspension of
concessions stage is reached in a dispute, the complaining party
is required to retaliate only within the GATT world. It should first
seek to suspend concessions in the same sector of trade in which
a violation was found. 24 8 If such a response is not "practicable or
effective," 2 49 then the complaining party can turn to other sectors
of trade in the same GATT agreement, or in sufficiently serious

243.
244.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 22.1.
Id. at art. 22.2.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at art. 21.3.
at art. 22.2.
at art. 21.3.
The DSU defines "sector" as:

(I)
with respect to goods, all goods;
(ii) with respect to services, a principal sector as identified in the current
"Services Sectoral Classification List" which identifies such sectors;
(iii) with respect to trade-related intellectual property rights, each of the
categories of intellectual property rights covered in Section 1. or Section 2,
or Section 3, or Section 4, or Section 5, or Section 6, or Section 7 of Part II,
or the obligations under Part III, or Part IV of the Agreement on TRIPs;
Id. at art. 22.4(f).
249. Id. at art. 22. The DSU does not define what "practices or effective"
means. While such a definition gap is logical-the terms have meaning largely
within the circumstances surrounding a particular trade dispute-it does pose a
problem for the WTO system. A country could argue that same sector retaliation
is neither practicable nor effective because it realizes that it could do more
economic harm to its trading partner by engaging cross sectoral or even crossagreement retaliation. The DSB will have to make the first decision of this issue.
If the defending party struck by such retaliation remains unappeased, however,
there is possibility of its turning to the WTO for a panel about whether the form of
retaliation chosen was proper.
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circumstances, to another GATT agreement altogether.2 5 ° In the
worst case scenario-where the nullification or impairment of
benefits is severe and the offending party refuses to withdraw the
offending measure or compensate, the DSU authorizes cross
retaliation. For example, a country that was having its benefits
under the Agriculture Agreement nullified or impaired by illegal
subsidies could retaliate under the TRIPs Agreement by
withdrawing protection for intellectual property rights held by
foreigners.
The complaining country in a WTO dispute is not allowed to

determine the amount or extent of retaliation by itself.

Any

retaliation must be proportional-equivalent to the level of
nullification or impairment-and can be objected to by the
offending country. 25 ' Thus, the level of retaliation can become
the subject of an arbitral decision. 2 52 The DSB surveillance done
to ensure equitable retaliation, however, should not obscure the
WTO goal of coercing the offending country into compliance with
its GATT obligations. To the extent it is possible to truly enforce a
decision against a country, 2 5 3 the DSU is drafted to achieve that
goal in most cases.

250. Id. at art. 22.3(a). The DSU does offer definitions for "sector," and for
"agreement." See supra note 248 for the definition of "sector." "Agreement"
means:
(i) with respect to goods, the agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO
Agreement, taken as a whole as well as the Plurilateral Trade Agreements
in so far as the relevant parties to the dispute are parties to these

agreements;
(ii) with respect to services, the GATS;
(iii) with respect to intellectual property rights, the Agreement on TRIPs.

Id. at art. 22.3(g).
251.

Id. at art. 22.4. The rationale behind proportional retaliation is to limit

the harm to the WTO system. The overall goal of the WTO rules is to liberalize
trade. Retaliation is the least preferred form of punishment precisely because it
undercuts rather than furthers the goal of the system.
252. Id. at arts. 22.6 & 22.7. The arbitrator (which can be an individual or
group) is authorized to determine: 1. whether or not the retaliation is
proportional; and 2. whether or not the party proposing to suspend concessions is
properly retaliating in the same sector, different sector of the same agreement or a
different agreement. The arbitral decision about the amount and form of
retaliation is final and binding. Id.
253. It is a truism of international law that it lacks enforceability. Law has
power over sovereign states only if they accept it.
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2. The United States as a Plaintiff in the WTO: Pursuing Its
Section 301 Concerns
The United States can use the WTO dispute settlement
system for some, if not all, of its Section 301 concerns.
Complaints in the WTO system are based upon either a GATT

violation or on the theory of a non-violation nullification or
impairment.
The two types of Section 301 claims are those
involving a violation of an international agreement or an
unreasonable practice that burdens or restrains U.S. commerce.
Both types of Section 301 actions could theoretically be channeled
through the WTO dispute settlement process. Nevertheless, the
differences in the legal theories between the claims cognizable in
the WTO system and those recognized under Section 301 suggests
that not all Section 301 cases will necessarily go through the
WTO system.
a. Section 301/International Violations and Cases and the WTO
Dispute Settlement System
If a WTO trading partner violates an obligation spelled out in
one of the GATT agreements, the United States can trigger the
WTO dispute resolution process by asking for consultations, and
later if necessary, the establishment of a panel. A GATT-violation
case under Article XXIII, Section l(a) satisfies one of the
requirements for a Section 301 case-that an action by the other
25 4
country constitute a violation of an international agreement.
Section 301/International violation cases are GATT-violation
cases, and therefore, are proper subjects for a WTO dispute. The
reforms of the old GATT dispute settlement system incorporated
in the DSU have addressed both the substantive and procedural
problems the United States faced regarding Section 301 GATT
violation cases.
i. Substantive Changes for Section 301 Wrought by the WTO and
the DSU
The recent additions to GATT greatly expanded the possible

universe of GATT-violation cases that the United States could

254. There is not a complete overlap between the two definitions. A Section
301 case could be triggered by violation of other international agreements as well.
Of the Section 301 cases that have been filed since the statute's first enactment
in 1974, however, only one involved a violation of international agreements other
than the GATT. Sykes, supra note 44, at 321 (dispute over the U.S./Argentina
Hides Agreement).
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pursue under Section 301.255 The United States was successful
in meeting its negotiating objectives for the Uruguay Round.
Those objectives included, among other things, increased market
access for manufactured goods and agricultural products, the
reduction of unfair trading practices including trade-distorting
subsidies, and the extension of GATT disciplines to trade in
services and the protection of intellectual property rights.2 5 6 The

Uruguay Round negotiations ended by producing the largest
expansion of GATT since its initial entry into force. "GATT" now
contains the WTO Agreement, the modified GATT of 1947 (GATT,

1994), and many other agreements including those on
Agriculture, Textiles and Clothing, Subsidies, Anti-dumping,
Safeguards, Trade-Related Investment Measures, Trade-Related
Intellectual Property (TRIPs), and the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (OATS). 25 7 Some of the GATT agreements, like the
Subsidies

improvements

and

upon

Anti-Dumping

and

Agreements,2 5 8

clarifications

of legal

contain

obligations

255. The first two years of operation of the WTO DSU system have seen a
wide variety of cases filed covering a wide range of the Uruguay Round
agreements. Frances Williams. Antagonists Queuefor WTO Judgment. FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1996, at 6 ("Another factor encouraging WTO complaints has been the
organisation's more comprehensive remit. New or clearer rules on agriculture.
food safety, textiles, intellectual property and services have already produced a
number of complaints that could not have been handled by GATT.").
256. See 2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE: URUGUAY FINAL ACT SHOULD PRODUCE OVERALL U.S. ECONOMIC GAINS 910. 18-24, 29-41, 88-104, 108-18 (July, 1994) [hereinafter GAO Report]; U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Pub. No. 2769, THE YEAR IN TRADE 1993:

OPERATION OF THE

TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 1-137 (1994) [hereinafter ITC 1994 Report); JEFFREY
J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BUURMAN, THE URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 9-39
(1994) [hereinafter URUGUAY ROUND ASSESSMENT].
257. There are actually 21 agreements that comprise the GATT. The major
agreements are called the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods and
include:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994;
Agreement on

Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary

Measures; Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994; Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of GATT 1994; Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection; Agreement on
Rules of Origin; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; and Agreement on Safeguards. The
other major agreements are the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs); and
Agreement on Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Finally, there are
four Plurilateral Agreements: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft; Agreement on
Government Procurement; International Dairy Agreement and International
Bovine Meat Agreement. WTO Agreement, supra note 157, at List of Annexes.
258. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A of
WTO Agreement. Agreement on Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Anti-dumping), Annex 1A of WTO Agreement. See GAO Report, supra note
256, at 51-83.
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originally adopted in the Tokyo Round. 2 59 But the Uruguay
Round also extended GATT rules to areas of trade in goods, like
agriculture and textiles, which had over time evaded the
disciplines imposed on other sectors of trade. 2 60 Finally, the
Uruguay Round introduced two new areas to WTO supervisiontrade in services and the protection of trade-related intellectual
property rights, and thus, created 2the
first international trade law
61
obligations governing these areas.
This vast expansion of GATT legal rules means that many
more bases exist for Section 301/International violation cases. In
addition, WTO's capture of intellectual property rights protection
and trade in services through the TRIPs and GATS Agreements
means that most of the cases the United States pursued in the
1980s as Section 301/Unreasonable cases are now actionable as
GATT-violation
cases.
Almost all of the
Section
301/Unreasonable cases brought from 1985 to the present have
involved claims that a trading partner was not allowing
reasonable market access to U.S. service providers or providing
inadequate intellectual property protection. 2 6 2 Having brought

259.
The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations was conducted from 1974 to
1979. During those negotiations the Contracting Parties drafted nine different
Codes on non-tariff barriers to trade:
Technical Barriers to Trade, Import
Licensing, Customs
Valuations,
Subsidies,
Antidumping.
Government
Procurement, Civil Aircraft, International Dairy and Bovine Meat. Unable to
procure an agreement by the Contracting Parties to include these Codes on nontariff barriers in the text of the GATT, the Contracting Parties agreed that the
Codes would be GATT-related only. As a result at the end of the Tokyo Round
there was no obligation by a Contracting Party to accept the legal obligations In
any particular code. For a description of the Tokyo Round Codes, see John H.
Jackson et al., Law and World Economic Independence, In IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO
ROUND 1377 (John H. Jackson et al. eds., 1984). During the Uruguay Round
negotiations the Contracting Parties agreed to revise almost all of the codes and to
include them within the basic GATT obligations. See GAO Report. supra note
256, at 51-83.

Of all the Tokyo Round Codes only four were left "outside" the GATT at the
end of the Uruguay Round. These four agreements on Trade in Civil Aircraft,
Government Procurement, International Dairy and Bovine Meat, are referred to in
the WTO Agreement as Plurilateral Agreements. The Plurilateral Agreements bind
only the Member States that have accepted them. WTO Agreement, supra note
157, at art. 2.4. By contrast, all of the other Codes were made integral parts of
the WTO Agreement and became binding on all Member States of the WTO. Id. at
art. 2.2.
260.
URUGUAY ROUND ASSESSMENT, supra note 256, at 43-59.
261.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15. 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 157, Annex 1B [hereinafter GATS]; Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 157, Annex 1C.
262. See Appendix A following this Article; Sykes, supra note 44. at 318-24.
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most of the issues raised 26 3 in these two areas into the GATT, the
United States is no longer forced to pursue these trade goals by
taking unilateral action. The United States has already filed three
GATT-violation cases based on violations of the TRIPs

Agreement. 2 6 4
Not all the cases involving either trade in

services or

intellectual property rights under the GATT or in other GATT
agreements, however, are actionable immediately in the WTO
system. The United States currently cannot act as a WTO plaintiff
on all GATT-violation cases against all WTO trading partners

because of the way in which GATT agreements were conceived.
All of the GATT agreements embrace the concept that different
levels of economic development among WTO membership
disallows completely equivalent treatment of all WTO Member
States. 265 According to the WTO Agreement, the membership of
the organization breaks down into three categories of
development:
developed, developing, and least-developed
economies. 26 6 As a result, GATT historically, and also now the

263. The Section 301 and Special 301 cases the United States pursued
prior to the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement were against countries that lacked a
legal framework to enforce such basic intellectual property rights as patents and
copyright. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF FOREIGN COUNTRY PRACTICES,

GAO/GGD-94-168FS (July, 1994).
264.
In April 1996, shortly after it issued the Special 301 list, USTR selfinitiated two Special 301 cases against Portugal 301-103; 61 Fed. Reg. 19,970
and Pakistan, 301-104; 61 Fed. Reg. 19,971 (1996). In the case against Portugal
the United states claimed that Portugal had failed to provide for protection for
patents existing on January 1, 1996 and thereafter. Portugal was supposed to
have such protections in place within one year of the entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 31, at art. 70. In the case against
Pakistan, the United States argued that Pakistan had failed to provide for a "mail
box" that would allow for the filing of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
patents while the country was going through its transition period. Id. See text
infra at pp. 58-59 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the transition
period.
The United States formally asked for consultations in each case
(Portugal- WT/DS 37, and Pakistan WT/DS 36). Portugal and the United States
settled WT/DS 37 in October 1996.
The United States also requested
establishment of a WTO Panel in the Pakistan case on July 16, 1996, but one still
had not been established as of February 1997. In July, USTR also self-initiated a
case against India (301-106) for the same reasons it filed against Pakistan. 61
Fed. Reg. 35,857. The United States simultaneously requested consultations with
India under Article 4 of the DSU (WT/DS 50).
265. The rationale for the different treatment is based on the fact that to
comply with many GATT rules a country must either expend funds or forego
certain sources of revenue it would otherwise be able to obtain. If a country has a
developed economy it is expected to be capable of fully performing all of its GATT
obligations. For a country with a developing or least-developed economy GATT

obligations are more costly and onerous.
266. The WTO Agreements also give additional assistance to any country
"which is in the process of transformation from a centrally-planned economy into
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WTO, accord developing and least-developed countries somewhat
different treatment. 267 For many years, GATT struggled with
whether the different treatment should amount to substantial
exemptions from the GATT rules. 2 68 This approach was followed
in the Tokyo Round and resulted in nine different GATT codes
being adopted that not all GATT Contracting Partners were
obligated to sign or participate in. 2 6 9 By the time of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, however, the developed countries rejected
this large scale exemption approach. 2 70 As a result, the Uruguay
Round produced agreements in which the same rules applied to
all countries. Developing and least developed economies were
given some assistance in adjusting to the new legal regime.
The implementation of the different status-different treatment
concept, as interpreted by the Uruguay Round, resulted in the

adoption of a series of provisions which deal solely with the

special needs and concerns of developing and least-developed
countries. Most of the GATT agreements, for example, contain
phase-in provisions that grant such countries longer time periods
in which to comply with the GATT rules established In the
agreement. 2 7 1 The phase-in provisions mean that a developing or

a market free-enterprise economy." See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 31, at art.
65.3.
267. See WTO Agreement. supra note 157, at art. X.2:
The least-developed countries recognized as such by the United Nations
will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the
extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade
needs or their administrative and institution capabilities.
268. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 275-81
(1993).
269. Id.
270. An illustration is what happened during the TRIPs negotiations. The
negotiators agreed to the same standards for all countries and then phase-in
periods for those obligations. See Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, In 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2283 (Terence P.
Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter GATT NEGOTIATING HISTORY/TRIPs]. Other options
proposed included: 1. a single cut-off date by which countries acceding to the
TRIPs agreement would ensure their conformity with the provisions of the
agreement by that cut-off date; 2. different base-line cut-off dates for countries
with different stages of economic development; 3. individual country schedules;
4. time-bound exceptions or lower-level obligations; and 5. different transitional
periods for different sub-sets of the final agreement.
GATT Secretariat,
TransitionalArrangements In a TRIPs Agreement Communicationfrom a Number of
Participants,MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/69 (Mar. 30, 1990).
271.
The phase-in requirements for the TRIPs Agreement are in Article 65.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 31. at art. 65. Other agreements with phase-in
periods include the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, WTO Agreement, supra note 157, Annex IA, art. 10; Agreement on
Agriculture, WTO Agreement, supra note 157, Annex 1A, art. 15; Agreement on

Technical Barriers to Trade, WTO Agreement, supra note 157, Annex 1A, art. 12:

19971

THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC POWER AND SECTION 301

265

least-developed country cannot be pursued under Section 301 for
failing to meet a GATT obligation under any agreement until the
phase-in period has passed for that country.
The different status-different treatment concept is also fully
reflected in the GATS and TRIPs Agreements for which the United
States negotiated so strenuously. In the area of trade in services,
not all WTO Member States were required to liberalize access to
the service market in all of the thirteen sectors of services covered
by the Framework Agreement established by GATS. 2 7 2 GATS also
allows Member States to file short term exemptions from the
major GATT obligation, the Most Favored Nation rule, with regard
to some of the undertakings they make on the service sectors they
do agree to liberalize. 2 73 With regard to intellectual property, the
developing and least-developed countries take on the same
substantive obligations under TRIPs as other Member States to
protect certain forms of intellectual property and to enforce that
protection. Both, however, receive longer time periods in which to
meet those obligations.2 7 4 The developed WTO Member States

were required by the TRIPs Agreement to bring their intellectual
property systems into compliance with the agreement within one
year after the WTO was established, i.e., by the end of 1996.275
By contrast, developing countries have five years to meet TRIPs
obligations, and least-developing countries have eleven years to
do SO. 2 7 6
In addition to the general phase-in periods, the
developing and least-developed countries get an additional period
of five years to extend patent protection to products that their
27 7
domestic intellectual property system considered unpatentable.
Even if a developing (or least-developed) country is failing to
protect intellectual property adequately, it cannot be reached by
the WTO dispute settlement system as long as the relevant phasein period runs. There remains the possibility of bringing a
Section 301/Unreasonable case in such a situation,
but there are
278
limitations to the use of that theory as well.

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A of WTO
Agreement, supranote 157, Annex 1A, arts. 27, 29.
272. See GAO Report, supra note 256, at 111-19.
273. GATS, supra note 262, at art. II.
274. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 31, at art. 65.
275. Id. at art. 65.1.
276. Id. at arts. 65.2 & 66. A country that is in transition from a centrallyplanned economy to a market economy receives the same phase-in period as a
developing country as long as it is "undertaking structural reform of its
intellectual property system and facing special problems in the preparation and
implementation of intellectual property laws and regulations." Id.
277. Id. at 65.4.
278. The implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round expressly
includes intellectual property problems as those which the United States may
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Procedural Changes for Section 301 Cases Wrought by the

WTO and DSU
The DSU also resolved the three major problems the United
(1) lack of
States faced in bringing GATT- violation cases:
timeliness, (2) ability to forestall the system (through the blocking
With regard to
actions), and (3) lack of implementation.
timeliness, the DSU ends the phenomenon under the GATT
system of having cases drag on for years 2 7 9 by placing limits on
how long each phase of a WTO dispute can last. The time period
for U.S. action under Section 301 is directly linked to the
completion of the WTO process. 28 0 If the United States is a
successful WTO plaintiff, it will be entitled to relief as soon as the
end of a reasonable time for implementation has passed following
the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body panel report. Under the
DSU process, if the United States pursues a violation case,
obtains a panel, and-prevails, it will receive the final panel report
recommendations by the end of nine months.2 8 ' The DSB then

has an additional two months in which to review and adopt the
panel report. 2 82 If the defending party accepts the panel report
and takes immediate steps to withdraw the offending measure,
the United States could receive relief before the end of a year.
The question of whether a particular WTO case and
corresponding Section 301 action could be resolved this quickly,
however, depends on the complexity of the case before the WTO
panel and the difficulty the defending country has in complying
A defending party is allowed some
with the panel report.
"reasonable time" to comply with a panel report if it is

choose to pursue under the Section 301 /Unreasonable theory. URAA, supra note
18, § 314(c)(1). According to this provision, USTR may determine that a country
is denying adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights
although it is in compliance with the TRIPs Agreement. See Statement of
Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 4315.
The United States could pursue these problems as unreasonable cases but it
would face the same problems it had in previous cases based on intellectual
property rights. It is much easier to negotiate a legislative change than to ensure
that the target country enforces the new legislation. See Infra text accompanying
notes 40-42 for a full discussion of this issue.
279. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 157-61.
The revisions to the
280. URAA, supra note 18, §§ 314(d), 341(a).
timetables for the investigation and determination stages of a Section 301 case
were made "to allow DSU dispute settlement proceedings to be completed before
trade sanctions may be Imposed." Statement of Administration Action, supra note
30, at 4315.

281.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 12.9. The

DSU actually sets six months as the normal time for the actual operation of the
panel process, with an additional three months to be made available if the panel
cannot meet the normal requirement. Id. at art. 12.8.
282. Id. at art. 16.4.
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impracticable for it to take immediate action. 28 3 The maximum
amount of time allowed for such implementation is fifteen months

from the issuance of the panel report.284 Thus, if the panel report
in a case is timely and implementation is immediate, there would
be positive results in less than nine months. If the panel report is
more complex and the maximum amount of time is taken by a
defending party to comply, a case could take two years. 28 5 The
time period for a WTO dispute would also be affected by a
defending country's decision to appeal the panel report. Any
review by the Appellate Body must be complete within three
months. 28 6 If the DSB adopts the Appellate Body report in a
timely fashion (within one additional month) and the defending
country takes immediate action to comply, the time period for an
appealed case would be fourteen to fifteen months. 2 8 7 The worst
delay in compliance with an Appellate Body report by a defending
country would extend a case to thirty months.
The DSU time periods compare favorably with the operation
of the GATT system.
The average time for obtaining the
implementation of a panel report (not the issuance of the report
itself) was two years. 288 That length of time would be required in
the WTO system only in two cases:
(1) where the defending
country was allowed the maximum amount of time to implement
a panel report or (2) where the country appealed the panel report
and then was allowed the maximum time to implement the
report. 2 8 9
In most WTO disputes, such time would not be
290
required.
The DSU system also eliminates the possibility a valid
complaint by a Member State will go unaddressed. Unless the
parties settle the case, the DSU process requires the panel and
Appellate Body to produce report(s), the DSB to adopt the
report(s), and the losing country to implement any report findings

or face some form of trade coercion.

The ability of defending

countries to avoid panel reports by blocking them was singled out
by the United States as the major problem with the GATT

283.
Id. at art. 21.3.
284. Id. at art. 21.3(c).
285. See Id. at arts. 20 & 21.3.
286.
Id. at art. 17.5.
287. Id. atarts. 17.14& 20.
288. ITC 1985 REPORT, supranote 80, at 18.
289.
See Dispute Settlement Understanding. supra note 5. at arts. 21.3(c),
17.14 & 20.
290. The defending country would act immediately or reach a mutually
agreed upon time with the complaining country (that normally would be shorter
than two years) or receive a fairly short period of time to comply even if the
"reasonable time" determination went to binding arbitration. Id. at arts. 17 & 21.
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This blocking activity-in which the United States

participated as well-- 292 intensified during the 1980s, making the
93
GATT system seem less and less effective.2294
The DSU does not
allow blocking or even delaying the parties.
The final limitation of the GATT system was its lack of a
surveillance mechanism. 2 95 The losing party was not required to
report about whether, or in what manner it implemented a panel
report, thus leaving policing of implementation to the complaining
country. By contrast, the DSU requires the DSB to remain
involved in disputes throughout the implementation process by
29 6
defending country.
The complaining party can expect the defending party to
notify the DSB of the actions it plans to implement either
immediately or within a reasonable time.2 9 7 If the complaining
party believes the implementation measures of the defending
country are inadequate or GATT-inconsistent, it can refer the
matter of implementation back to a panel (normally the original
panel) for review. 2 98 In addition, the DSB or other Member States
are also empowered to raise the issue of whether the report is
being fully implemented. 2 9 9 The DSB is also authorized to review
the course of implementation within six months after the
reasonable time for implementation has been established.3 0 0 The
DSB surveillance of the implementation will keep such a WTO
dispute on its agenda, and thus subject to comment or discussion
by all WTO Member States until the issue is resolved. 3 0 '
A

291.

See ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 4, 193-94 see also GATT

NEGOTIATING HISTORY/TRIPS, supra note 270, at 2732-36.
292. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3. at 279; see also
Hudec. Judiclallzatlon,supra note 88, at 32.
293. See Hudec, Judlclalization. supra note 88, at 25-26. The blocking of
panel reports normally did not spell the end of compliance in the GATT system.
In most cases the blocking country ultimately took some action to respond to the
panel report. Nevertheless, the ability to block and occasional use of that power
did significantly delay implementation of some GATT panel reports. See GATT
NEGOTIATING HIsTORY/TRIPs, supra note 270, at 2733. Consequently the
complaining. country in the GATT system received relief much later than it
desired.
294. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at arts. 16. 17 & 20.
295. ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 195.
296. The defending party has only a limited number of options: either
acceptance and implementation of the report, or appeal and implementation if the
Appellate Body affirms the panel or acceptance of some trade action from the
complaining party. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at arts. 1617 & 21-22.
297. Id. at art. 21.3.
298. Id. at art. 21.5.
299. Id. at art. 21.6.
300. Id.
301. Id.

19971

THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC POWER AND SECTION 301

269

complaining party is thus assured that the course of its GATTviolation case and the solution to its trade problem will be
3 °2
followed by the WTO until the organization has been satisfied.

iii. Overall Consequences for Section 301/International Violation
Cases
The United State has followed its pledge to pursue all GATTbased claims through the WTO dispute settlement system (See
Figure B). In the first two years of the WTO, the United States
has filed not only 22 GATT violations, but also two non-violation
claims. 3 03 The DSU is, however, not a complete panacea for all
the problems with GATT dispute settlement pointed out by the

302. The DSU not only eliminates most of the limitations of the GATT
system it also retains at least one aspect of that system which did assist plaintiffs.
The complaining party in a GATT-violation case only has to present evidence
about how a measure infringes a GATT obligation. Id. at art. 3.8. According to
this provision:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under
a covered agreement. the action is considered primafacle to constitute a
case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a
presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other
Member parties to that covered agreement, and is such cases, it shall be
up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut
the charge.
Id.
If such an infringement is shown, the DSU states that it is presumed that the
breach has an adverse impact on the complaining party. The complaining party
is, therefore, free from the burden of proving harm. Assuming the validity of the
complaint in a case the defending party can only prevail by rebutting the charge
of breach or justifying the breach by invoking one of the limited exceptions in
GATT Article XX. GATT. supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A60-A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 26264. Article XX provides the general exceptions to the GATT obligations. It allows
Member States the right to derogate from GATT obligations in order to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to conserve exhaustible natural
resources.
303. See, World Trade Organization (WTO), Overview of the State-of-play of
WTO Disputes (Feb. 11, 1997) (on fie with author) [hereinafter WTO Cases]. A
"claim" means a separate cause of action filed by the United States rather than
the number of different countries involved in the U.S. complaints. Two nonviolation claims are additional claims made in two of the 17 U.S. filings. Several
of the U.S. claims have been resolved by settlements. In other cases the United
States has gone to a panel (for example, the case fied by the United States, the
EU and Canada against Japan regarding its taxes on alcoholic beverages.
(WT/DS10), the banana case against the EU (WT/DS 27), the beef hormone case
(WT/DS 26), and the Canadian periodical case (WT/DS 31). The United States
prevailed in the dispute with Japan (WT/DS 10) at the panel and the Appellate
Body stages of review, but Japan has not yet implemented the panel's
recommendations. See infra note 312. The WTO panel on the U.S.-Canada case
(WT/DS 31) has to date issued an interim (not yet final) report favoring the United
States. See Canada Weighs Response to Ruling by WTO Against Magazine Tax
Policy, 14 INT'LTRADE REP. 105 (Jan. 22, 1997).
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United States. If WTO panels follow all the procedural guidelines
and report back in a timely fashion, they could still issue faulty
legal decisions. To some extent, any dispute settlement process Is
only as good as the state of the law it construes. 30 4 This means
that the United States needs to exercise great care regarding its
WTO litigation. If the United States chooses to pursue a claim
regarding a GATT obligation that is vague or ambiguous or
deliberately left undefined by GATT negotiations,3 0 5 as many of
the more complex GATT concepts tend to be, then the WTO
dispute settlement process could produce mixed results.
The United States has an additional reason to bring only its
strongest GATT cases. The WTO system was designed to be an
exclusive forum for remedying a Member State's complaints about
another WTO member. The DSU provides in Article XXIII that
Member States should only resolve violation and non-violation
nullification cases through the WTO dispute settlement
process. 30 6 As applied to the United States, the Article XXIII
304. ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 192. According to the ITC Report
one of the most common complaints about the GATT dispute settlement system
was that "tihere were many vague, possibly inconsistent or overlapping
provisions in the GATT. and many crucial terms are not defined." Id.
305. See generally Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in THE NEW WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS 135, 137 (OECD 1994).
306. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 23.1. Article
XXIII reads:
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other
nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements,
they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this
Understanding.

2. In such cases, Members shall:
a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation
has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired
or that the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such
determination consistent with the findings contained in the
panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an
arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine
the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to
implement the recommendations and rulings; and
c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine
the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations
and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those
procedures before suspending concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements in response to
the failure of the Member concerned to implement the
recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period
of time.
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provision means that no GATT violation or non-violation
nullification case be pursued under Section 301 unless USTR
bases its legal determination of wrongdoing by a trading partner
on a WTO panel report. To comply, the United States did not
have to alter completely its previous practice under Section 301.
In all pre-Uruguay Round Section 301 cases based on a GATTviolation, the United States did submit its claim to the GATT
system under Article XXIII or to one of the dispute settlement
mechanisms set up by the Tokyo Round Agreements 30 7 and went
through the panel process on each case that was not settled.
Consequently, the United States never made unilateral legal
determinations of GATT violations in its Section 301 cases.
The United States, however, did take unilateral actions under
Section 301 in response to GATT-violation cases. The United
States used sanctions when the GATT system proved incapable of
securing compliance by a country with a panel report favorable to
the United States. 30 8 The United States, without GATT oversight,
thus chose the time period for what it would accept as
appropriate action by the other country and also determined the
"proper" amount of retaliatory sanctions to level if that country
failed to take the appropriate action.
Article XXIII of the DSU makes not only unilateral

determinations but also such unilateral responses GATT-illegal.
Article XXIII requires a Member State to follow only DSU
procedures for determining whether an offending country is
complying in a timely manner 30 9 and what an appropriate level of
sanctions would be if an offending country fails to comply.3 10 The
effect of these provisions will be to constrain U.S. responses in
Section 301/International violation cases. The United States will
not be able to determine unilaterally that another country is
taking too long to implement a panel report. The DSU has3 1a1
process for determining what constitutes a reasonable time.
Although the United States can participate in negotiating and
arbitration on this issue it must, at it already demonstrated in
WTO litigation, ultimately accept what the DSB defines as timely
Similarly, the United States can no longer
compliance. 3 12

307. See generally ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 63-85.
308.
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw, supra note 3, at 297.
309.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 23.2(b).
310. Id. at art. 23.2(c).
311.
Id. at art. 21.3.
312. The United States has chosen to pursue an arbitration over what
constitutes a "reasonable time" in its first victory at the WTO. In January 1997,
the DSB appointed an arbitrator to act as a mediator between Japan and the
Untied States over Japan's implementation of the July 1996 Appellant Body panel
ruling against its liquor tax policy. The other countries litigating WT/DS 10 with
the United States (the E.U. and Canada) settled with Japan following the
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exercise its own judgment on the manner in which it will retaliate
3 13
or on how severe any retaliation should be.
There is one other possible outcome to a Section
301/International violation case brought under the WTO system.
The United States could argue that another Member State was
violating GATT, but the panel decide against it. Should the
United States fail to prevail as a plaintiff at the panel level, the
only available option for it would be to seek review of the
unfavorable report by the Appellate Body. If the Appellate Body
panel found a legal error in the panel report, it would reverse the
decision and then recommend the offending country withdraw the
measure in question. If on the other hand, the Appellate Body
panel affirmed the panel report, the United States would be left
without any WTO-sanctioned response to the other country's
trade practice. At this point, the United States would have to
decide whether to accept the WTO ruling and take no action or
proceed to take unilateral steps against its opponent.
Any unilateral action by the United States in that case would
violate Article XXIII of the DSU. By taking such action, the
United States would expose itself to a WTO case being filed
against it by the Section 301 target country. Nothing about the
DSU, however, can actually stop the United States from taking
such unilateral action. Yet, unlike past deployments of Section
301, such unilateral actions would incur the certain price of a
WTO dispute settlement action. If the United States could not or
would not resolve such a case, it would then face WTO-authorized

retaliation. While not all Section 301 target countries could Inflict
harm if allowed such sanctions, other developed country trading
partners could.

Appellate Body report but talks between the United States. The United States
does not regard Japan's proposal-to cut its taxes by 2001-to be a "reasonable
time" and Japan have not reached a settlement on the timing of Japan's
implementation
Uruguay Official Appointed to Mediate Liquor Taxes Dispute
Between U.S., Japan, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 122 (Jan. 22, 1997). A decision by the
mediator was expected by mid-February 1997. WTO Decision on JapaneseLiquor
Taxes Due February14, BNA TRADE DAILY (Jan. 20, 1997).
313. The DSU provides a scheme for determining how a complaining party
can use the suspension of its GATT concessions as the final response for an
offending country's failure to comply. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra
note 5, at arts. 22.2 & 22.3. Any retaliation must be authorized by the DSB. Id,
at art. 22.6. The offending country is even entitled to an arbitral review of the
issue if the retaliation does not follow the principles established in Article 22. Id.
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b. Section 301/Unreasonable Cases and the GATT Non-Violation

Theory
Section 301 claims can also be based upon the trading
practices of other countries that the United States identifies as
unreasonable practices. The non-violation nullification theory
allows a claim where a country has engaged in practices that,
while not GATT-violative, have in fact nullified U.S. benefits under
GATT. As applied by the United States, there has been no overlap
between Section 301/Unreasonable cases and the non-violation
nullification cases under the WTO system. Instead, the United
States made frequent 3 14 and controversial 3 15 use of Section
301/Unreasonable cases just prior to and throughout the
Uruguay Round negotiations and always acted unilaterally when
it did. During the first two years of the WTO, the United States
has continued to file Section 301/Unreasonable cases. For
example, the United States filed two such cases against Japan in
1995.316 The first case involved claims that Japan placed unfair
restrictions on access to its market for automobiles and auto
parts. 3 17 That case was settled by the two countries after the
United State threatened to use sanctions. The other case involves
U.S. claims that Japan maintains3 18 unfair barriers to the
distribution of U.S. photographic film.
This most recent Section 301/Unreasonable case may prove
worthy of close examination because it marks a shift in U.S.
action under Section 301. In the Film case, Japan refused to
negotiate under Section 301 with the United States. While doing
so, Japan took the position that the complaint being pursued by
the United States should have been resolved by the two private

314.

See Appendix A following this Article for a listing of the Section

301/Unreasonable cases.
See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI. WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 51-57
315.
(1991) for a discussion of the rationale for U.S. use of Section 301 to "extract
unilateral, that is, unrequited trade concessions from others." Id. at 51. The
major motive for U.S. action Bhagwati identifies is the "naked use of power to
extract trading gains from weaker powers." Id. at 53. See also the views of the
GATT Secretariat as late as 1994 in its report on U.S. Trade Policy conducted as
part of the GATT Trade Policy Review Mechanism, GATT Doc. 1614 (Feb. 17,
1994) at 40-41. According to the Secretariat, "Many Contracting Parties have
expressed concern about unilateralism in U.S. trade policy, as embodied in the
'Section 301' family of laws. They point to what they consider the contradictions
inherent in laws aimed at opening markets based on threats to close the U.S.
market." Id. at 40.
316. See Appendix A for a description of the two most recent Section 301
cases involving Japan.
317. 60 Fed. Reg. 35,253 (1995) (termination of investigation); see supra
note 147 for a discussion of the claims in 301-93.
318. 60 Fed. Reg. 25,253 (1995).
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companies, Fuji Film and Kodak Film, involved in the dispute.
The United State refrained from threatening sanctions under

Section 301, but argued that Japan is directly involved because of
several of its laws. Ultimately, the United States filed a complaint
with the WTO. Although the USTR determination in the Film case
states that the Japanese practices were unreasonable,3 19 the two
WTO complaints filed by the United States actually contain three
major claims: (1) violation of Article III National Treatment, (2)
violation of Article XVI of the GATS Agreement, and (3) a nonviolation nullification or impairment claim. 3 20 The U.S. course of
action in the Film case is striking because the United States
refrained an unreasonable case into one which now involved not
only claims of GATT violations, but also a non-violation claim. If
the United States pursues this non-violation claim before the
panel that has been established on one of the Japan claims then
that case will mark the first time that the United States has
pursued a Section 301/Unreasonable case through the
multilateral dispute settlement system.
All of the targets of Section 301/Unreasonable cases have
viewed the exercise as one in which the United State unilaterally
defines the unfair trading practice and then demands trade
concessions to rectify the alleged sin. 32 1 The United States takes
the view that it should be allowed to pursue additional legal rules
that would satisfy U.S. decreed levels of adequacy even in areas
where no multilateral agreement has yet been reached. Section
301/Unreasonable cases have traditionally been aimed at
reaching bilateral agreements or forcing the issue into the WTO
for multilateral consideration. These goals could only be achieved

by conducting extensive negotiations with the Section 301 target
country. The ability to use the credible threat of sanctions was

319. 61 Fed. Reg. 30,929-30 (1996) (termination of investigation).
320. Telephone Interview with Joanna McIntosh, USTR Counsel (Sept. 3,
1996) (describing the Film case claim). The United States has broken these three
claims into two cases before the WTO. In WT/DS 44 the United States has
requested a panel to review its claims that Japan's laws, regulations and
requirements affecting the distribution and sale of consumer photographic film
and paper violate GATT Art. 111:4 (National Treatment) and Art. X. A WTO panel
has been established for this case. See supra note 156. In WT/DS 45 which
remains in the consultation stage (the United States having delayed its panel
request) the United States has argued that Japan's measure affecting distribution
services (not only with regard to film and paper) through the Large-Scale Retail
Store Law violates GATS Articles III (transparency) XVI (market access). In both of
these WTO cases the United States Is also arguing that Japan's measures nullify
or impair U.S. benefits (a non-violation claim). WTO Cases, supra note 303; see
also U.S. Moves on Japan Film Case; Seeks One WTO Panel, Delays Second, BNA
TRADE DAILY (Sept. 23, 1996). There has been to date no interim or final report
issued on the case which has gone to the panel (WT/DS 44).
321. REcIPROcITY AND RETALIATION, supranote 19, at 19.
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always viewed as necessary support for this U.S. negotiation
strategy.
The United States has never pursued an unreasonable case
through the GATT dispute settlement system because of the
incredible scope of this provision of Section 301. Throughout the
life of the statute, Section 301 has been amended to add to an
illustrative list of trade policies, or from the U.S. perspective,
legislative shortcomings, of foreign governments that can keep
U.S. exporters out of the foreign market. The current Section
301, for example, cites the denial of "opportunities for the
A
establishment of an enterprise" as unreasonable. 3 22
government would be engaged in such activity if it had any
restrictive investment legislation that limited the rights of foreign
companies to set up, own, and operate businesses producing
goods or services. Another "unreasonable" activity under the
terms of the statute consists of government tolerance of
"systematic anti-competitive activities by enterprises." 323 A foreign
government would therefore be acting unreasonably if it had no
antitrust law, a weak antitrust law, or an adequate antitrust law
which it fails to enforce.3 24 Since Congress has never adopted

322.
323.

19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(b)(i)(I).
Id. § 241 l(d)(3)(b)(i)(IV).

324.

The United States is well aware of the differences between U.S.

standards and other countries'-notably Japan-understanding of competition
principles. See GAO Report, supra note 256, at 180-81.
Another policy area linked by several parties to the Uruguay Round late in
the negotiations was competition policy. Outlining U.S. concerns the
President identified antitrust and other competition policies as one of the
issue that need to be explored after the completion of the Uruguay Round.
A central concern is that foreign business practices may be anticompetitive, even inconsistent with U.S. antitrust laws, and may place
U.S. firms at a disadvantage in overseas markets. Administration officials
have publicly mentioned trade associations in Japan and the linked
relationships between companies there as being problematic. As we
pointed out in our August 1993 report on foreign business practices,
different historical experiences and government/business relations have
led to different perspective on matters such as competition policy. The
United States fears that such differences can further lead to competitive
advantages for countries that have less stringent competition or antitrust
policies and regimes.
Id.
As part of its decision-making process in bringing such a Section 301 case,
the United States arranges to have expertise from the Antitrust division of the
Department of Justice to review and consider such cases. According to the DOJ's
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines:
Of particular interest to antitrust enforcement is Section 301
(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV), which includes among the "unreasonable" practices of

foreign governments that might justify a proceeding the "toleration by a

foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises

276

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 30:209

definition of "unreasonable" that would provide a legislative
standard against which to judge any particular foreign legislation,
the President, acting through USTR, has been left to determine on
a case-by-case basis which government practices are
unreasonable enough to trigger the U.S. demand for negotiations
to end them.
A review of recent Section 301/Unreasonable cases and U.S.
government statements, 325 however, does reveal three different
categories of practices that have been designated as
"unreasonable," or which could be in the future. Some of the
unreasonable claims might be characterized as non-violation
claims under the GATT while others probably could not. 3 26 The
or among enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of
restricting . . . access of United States goods or services to a foreign

market." The Department participates in the interagency committee that
makes recommendations to the President on what actions, If any, should
be taken.
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM'N,

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 10 (Apr. 1995).

325. See Statement of Administrative Action. supra note 30, at 1035-36;
GAO Report, supra note 256, at 41.
While substantially broader than the GATT, the UR agreements
would not address all trade practices that may be considered as unfair by
the United States. U.S. trading partners would still have considerable
latitude to restrict U.S. exports without violating WTO obligations. The UR
agreements contain only limited obligations in several areas newly brought
into or expanded under its disciplines. For example, WTO member
countries would still have leeway to limit access to domestic markets in
such areas as agriculture, certain services and investment; there are areas
of intellectual property protection (e.g., details of the patent examination
system) that are not addressed by the TRIPs agreement. In addition, the
UR agreements do not address several significant world trade Issues, such
as anti-competitive practices, that may unfairly restrict U.S. exports.
In response to these concerns administration trade officials said that
under the UR agreements, the United States would maintain its current
ability under GAIT to unilaterally address non-violation trade Issues.
Id. at 41-42.
326. See text Infra at pp. 77-78.
There is some reason why countries have been hesitant to expand GATT
jurisdiction over some or all of the following types of claims-it will be difficult to
adapt the GATT rules to deal with some of these issues. See Michael Hart, What's
Next-Negotiating Rules for a Global Economy, In NEW DIMENSIONS OF MARKET ACCESS
IN A GLOBALISING WORLD ECONOMY 221, 235 (OECD 1995) [hereinafter Hart].
More difficult issues are raised by the substantive principles that
underpin GATT rules: national treatment and MFN treatment. These are
concepts that lend themselves well to rules about exchanges of goods and
have proven reasonably applicable to investment and services, but may
not be wholly suitable to the development of substantive rules about nontrade issues. In effect, rules governing such issues as labour standards,
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first category of unreasonable claims is composed of any traderelated practice that, although not covered by GATT, is regarded
by the world trading community as likely to affect any other
country's efforts to trade more freely. Before the Uruguay Round,
the United States considered other governments' limitations on

U.S. service providers or their failure to offer protection to certain
forms of intellectual property to fall into this category, although

not all countries agreed. 327 Trade-related practices that would
currently satisfy this definition and have been left completely or

partially outside GATT include the lack of adequate antitrust
enforcement, 3 2 8 discriminatory government procurement, and
3 29
limitations placed upon foreign direct investment.
The second category of past and future "unreasonable cases"
includes any aspect of government commercial policy not yet
completely accepted by the world trading system as linked to
trade. An illustration of this category includes the argument that
the provision of labor rights should be recognized as affecting
trade. Under this argument, an offending government, by failing
to provide adequate rights to its workers, gains unfair advantage
in the trading system. 3 30 Other developed countries, some within
the EU, also accept the U.S. position on this issue. 3 3 1 However,
neither the United States nor the EU has to date been able to

environmental protection or competition policy will require establishing
process standards, i.e. setting rules not about products and their
consumption but about the way products and investment are made.
Id. at 235.
327.
GATT NEGOTIATING HISTORY/TRIPs, supra note 270, at 2253-56.
328.
See WTO's FirstYear: "An EncouragingStart," WTO Focus, Dec. 1995,
at 17 [hereinafter WTO 1st Year].
A number of recent trade disputes have highlighted the question of
the market access implications of competition policy, especially as it
applies to certain distribution arrangements. These examples raise the
question of whether the WTO should only deal with competition policyrelated issues in an ad hoc manner in the context of specific trade policy
questions, or whether an overall examination of the links between trade
and competition should be initiated with a view to developing a coherent
multilateral vision of how trade policy and competition policy can be
mutually supportive.
Id.
329. GAO Report, supranote 256, at 41-42.
330. See WTO 1st Year, supra note 328, at 17. Arguments in favor of
linking the trading system to internationally recognized labor standards stress
that non-enforcement of such standards allegedly results in an "unfair"
competitive advantage, or in violation of universal human rights, and that if
political and popular concerns on these issues are not addressed substantively
there will be increased pressure for unilateral trade measures to deal with the
situation. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1179 (1996).
331.
WTO lst Year, supranote 328, at 17.
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persuade the WTO membership to recognize this issue as a topic
3 32
for a future round of multilateral trade negotiations.
The third category of potential "unreasonable" cases includes

any trade-limiting structural practice within a country that Is not
actually dictated by a government. Such structural practices
usually arise from the way business is conducted in the country's
domestic market. 33 3 If the normal way of doing business for
example, how the distribution of goods is handled or whether
business operates only if bribes are paid-limits access by foreign
companies-then a structural barrier to trade exists. The United
States has isolated a raft of such issues with Japan and pursued
them parallel to Section 301 as part of the Structural
Impediments Initiative. The Japanese Auto and Auto Parts case
also involved claims of structural barriers to trade. 33 4
Until the Film case, the United States had always pursued
these more difficult to prove cases as Section 301/Unreasonable
cases without considering the views of GATT or WTO. The
adoption of the DSU may have forced a change in this approach

332.

Id.; GAO Report, supra note 256. at 180.

In the last weeks of negotiations the United States and other nations
raised concerns about how some non-trade issues should be reconciled
with trade policies in the new global economic environment. In public
statements and initiatives, U.S. administration and Congressional leaders
pressed for consideration of labor rights policies in international trade law
in the new WTO and in U.S. law.
Id.
During the WTO's first ministerial meeting since the formation of the
organization (December 9-13, 1996) the United States was unable to get the other
WTO countries to launch a work program on trade and core labor standards.
Gary G. Yerky, U.S. Failsto Win Backingfor Plan to Study Trade/Labor Standards
Link, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 1939 (Dec. 18, 1996). The Singapore Ministerial
Declaration merely reaffirmed the WTO Member States' obligation to observe
Internationally recognized labor standards. See Singapore MinisterialDeclaration,

13 INT'L TRADE REP. 1979 (Dec. 18, 1996).
There is not even agreement within the EU on the issue-the United Kingdom
was against the U.S. proposal. See Developing Countries Block U.S. Plan to Include
Labor Issue in Work Agenda, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. 1925 (Dec. 11, 1996)
("Developing nations-along with some developed countries including the United
Kingdom-have argued that the lack of high labor standards in some countries
could become a pretext for the imposition of trade sanctions by other countries,
particularly in the developed world.").
Despite rejection of its proposal, the United States claimed that the Singapore
Ministerial Declaration was a necessary first step and that the United States
would continue to work for the creation of a labor standards working party at the
WTO. See Administration Will Continue to Pressfor Creation of Labor Group at
WTO, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 14 (Jan. 1, 1997).
333.
334.

See REcIPRociTY AND RETALIATION, supra note 19, at 40-41.
See supra at note 147 for a description of these claims.
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evidenced by the measures the United States has taken in the
3 35
Film case.
i. Section 301/Unreasonable Cases and the Theory of NonViolation Nullification
has never taken a Section
The
United States
301/Unreasonable case to the GATT dispute settlement system
although GATT Article XXIII would have theoretically applied to
such cases. The DSU was not drafted to alter or in any way
expand the scope of GATT cases under Article XXIII. The DSU
provision of
negotiators considered alterations to the non-violation
3 37
Article XXIII, 33 6 but in the end left it as it

was.

335.
The second WTO case (WT/DS 45) to come out of the Section 301 Film
investigation involves an attack on Japan's Large-Scale Retail Stores Law.
According to some scholars:
it [the law] makes it extremely difficult to establish large stores as
governmental approval is required and the process of approval employs a
screening committee of local merchants. Since the latter are likely to be
adversely affected by the competition of a large retail store, they are likely
to approach the application with hostility. The result is that most retailers

are small. This in turn produces a negative impact on foreign suppliers of
consumer goods, since small stores tend to have limited inventories,
handling only Japanese brands.
Daniel J. Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita, Antitrust or Competition Laws Viewed In a
Trading Context Harmony or Dissonance, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 269, 302 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec
eds., 1996); see also Nancy Dunne & Patti Waldmeir, World Trade: U.S. Takes FujiKodak Battle to WTO: Announcement Signals Shift in Washington's Trade Strategy,
FIN. TIMES, June 14. 1996, at 3. Such a case, however, may be difficult to prove.
There has been some speculation that at least this part of the United States
claim against Japan in the Film case is weak. The United States has decided to
ask for two panels to review the case. The National Treatment claim would be
reviewed by the first panel. The United States has delayed its request for a
second panel on the GATS issue regarding market access, while it aims to
broaden the scope of the investigation to include the regulations governing small
and midsize retailers as -well as large retailers. Emily Nelson, Presentationof Data
in Kodak's Case Against Japan and Fuji Delayed by U.S., WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
1996, at B4 (Statement of Acting USTR Charlene Barshefsky).
336. The DSU negotiators reviewed this issue of the scope of the nonviolation provision because so many new GATT obligations were being considered
by other Uruguay Round negotiating groups that they believed the dispute
settlement procedures for non-violation cases would become more relevant.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 6, at 2771.
337. The DSU negotiators considered the following provision for inclusion in
the DSU. It would have altered the scope of the non-violation provision.
where a party has
The procedures in this Understanding shall apply ...
recourse to dispute settlement based upon Article XXIII: 1 (b) alleging that
the introduction or intensification of a measure not in conflict with the
General Agreement, and which could not reasonably have been foreseen,
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The non-violation theory of Article XXIII, Section 1(b) allows a
WTO Member State to argue that benefits it expected under the
GATT are being nullified or impaired as a result of "the
application [by a Member State] of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement." According to the
provision, there are three elements to a non-violation nullification
case: (1) the showing of a benefit, (2) the proof of nullification or
impairment of that benefit, and (3) the proof that a non-GATT
violative measure caused the nullification or impairment. The
3 38
potential breadth of Article XXIII, section l(b) is staggering.
According to the language of the provision, any measure a
country undertakes could form the basis of a WTO dispute
settlement case if it nullifies or impairs GATT benefits for another
country. By accepting a literal reading, the GATT Contracting
Parties would have been countenancing an extremely intrusive
review of their domestic commercial policies. The conducting of
such reviews by an international organization would have been
considered intrusive and offensive to sovereignty precisely
because the countries involved had not undertaken any
international obligations with respect to domestic commercial
policies. GATT, therefore, responded by limiting the non-violation
nullification theory when it was argued before dispute settlement
3 39
panels.
The vast majority of all cases under the GATT system were

GATT-violation cases. 3 40

To date, only nine non-violation cases

frustrates a [legitimate expectation of a benefit accruing to the party under
market access concessions or other commitment under the General
Agreement] [REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF A BENEFIT ACCRUING TO
THE PARTY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY UNDER THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT], upsetting the conditions of competition [and] [OR] having
an [ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL] adverse effect on trade.
Id. at 2791.
The contemplated revisions are represented by the phrases in brackets. As
the bracketed language indicates the negotiators were interested in clearly
spelling out the limits to the non-violation theory.
Ultimately the negotiators were unable to agree to a revision and the Article
XXIII: 1 (b) provision was left untouched. Id. The EC negotiator had earlier stated
that the non-violation procedures should not be touched because the legal
concepts involved in such cases (good faith and reasonable or legitimate
expectations) were clearly developed in other areas and therefore did not need to
be addressed in the DSU negotiations. Id. at 2771-72.
338.
The breadth of the non-violation theory was recognized by the GATT
negotiators and there was debate over whether to grant the organization such
power. ROBERT E. HUDEC. THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
37-47 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUDEC, GATT LEGAL SYSTEM].
339.
HUDEC, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 191, at 196; see also Defensive
Unfairness, supra note 76, at 423.
340.
See generally ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at
417. 585 (reviewing 207 GATT cases filed between 1948 and 1989).
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have been argued, and in only some of these has the theory been
accepted. 3 4 1 The extremely limited jurisprudence of non-violation
nullification cases does not allow for a complete analysis of what
an appropriate claim would be. One point, however, clearly
emerges from a review of the non-violation cases and nullification
cases that have been considered to date. In interpreting Article
XXIII, section l(b), the GATT Contracting3 Parties
were comfortable
42
only with a limited reading of the theory.

The first element of a non-violation claim, the benefit, was
successfully argued only when a party could show that it failed to
receive the benefits it expected from a tariff concession. 3 43

The

binding of tariff concessions made to trading partners is one of
the core GATT obligations set forth in Article 11. 3 4 4 The loss of the
benefit from a tariff concession would mean that although one
WTO country negotiated in exchange for the covering of another
country's tariffs, it did not actually realize the benefits it
expected-increased access to the other market. Instead, some
measure taken by the other country kept the complaining country
from the competitive relationship it expected from its tariff
concession. The language of Article XXIII, section l(b) does not
place any limitation on the type of benefit that a Member State
must claim. For example, a country could argue that the effect of
the GATT rules should be to allow it potential increased market
access to any WTO country, since almost all GATT obligations are
applied on an MFN basis. One GATT panel did find a nonviolation claim not based on a tariff concession and argued that
the provision itself was not limited, 34 5 but that panel report was
3 46
never adopted.

341.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 206, at 657-68; see also Armin von
Bogdandy, The Non-Violation Procedure of Article XXIII :2, GATT - Its Operative
Rationale. J. WORLD TRADE L., Aug. 1992, at 97-99; Ronald A Brand, Competing
Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution In the Oilseeds Case and the Draft
Understanding on Dispute Settlement, J. WORLD TRADE L., Dec. 1993, at 120-25

(1993).
342.
343.

GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 206, at 657-63.
Id. at 660-61; Kumura, supra note 186, at 67-68; EEC-Payments and

Subsidies Paid to Processors of Oilseeds and Related Animal Feed Proteins.
L/6631, adopted on Nov. 20, 1990, 37 S/228, 261, para. 5.20 ("The panel noted
that these provisions, as conceived by the drafters and applied by the Contracting
Parties serve mainly to protect the balance of trade concessions.").
344.
GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A14-A17, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200-04.
345. A GATT panel did find a non-violation nullification in a case which did
not involve a tariff concession. EC-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products
for Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, L/5776, Feb. 7, 1985. The
panel report states:
[T]he panel considered that although complaints brought previously under
Article XXIII:1 (b) had related to benefits arising from Article II, it believed
that this did not signify that Article XXIII:1 (b) was limited only to those
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The second element, nullification or impairment of the
benefit, has also been narrowly construed. The GATT 1947 and
the WTO/DSU place the burden on the complaining party to
establish this element.3 4 7 To prevail, a country has had to show

that the

measure of the offending

country frustrated its

reasonable expectations 348 or had adverse effects upon it. In the
leading non-violation case on the frustration of reasonable
expectations, the GATT panel accepted an argument by Chile that

a tariff concession it negotiated had been nullified by changes
Australia made after tariff concessions to its policy of subsidizing
two competitive fertilizer products.3 49 The removal of the subsidy
for the form of fertilizer Chile hoped to sell, accompanied by the
continuance of the subsidy on the other product, meant that
Chile's product was far more expensive. Even though Chile had
negotiated a tariff binding at the duty-free level (0 percent), the
change meant that it could not sell into the Australian market. In
other words, the action Australia took frustrated Chile's
reasonable expectations of increased access to the Australian
market that it had at the time it negotiated tariff concessions with
Australia. The requirement of "reasonable expectations" does
suggest that the affected country must have relied on actions or
representations by the other country when it negotiated tariff
concessions-that it could not have foreseen the actions which

benefits. The drafting history of Article XXIII confirmed that this article.
including paragraph 1(b) thereof, protected any benefit under the General
Agreement... . . This would include then the benefits accruing to the
United States under Article 1:1 [MFN] which applied to bound and
unbound tariff items alike.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 206, at 662 (quoting from the panel report at
paragraph 486).
The panel report went on to argue that it could find a nullification or
impairment under these circumstances because the purpose of Article l(b) was to
maintain the proper balance of rights and obligations between the parties.
The panel noted that the basic purpose of Article XXIII: I (b) was to provide for
offsetting or compensatory adjustments in situations in which the balance of
rights and obligations of the contracting parties had been disturbed. One of the
fundamental benefits accruing to the contracting parties under the General
Agreement, therefore, was the right to adjustment In situations in which the
balance of their rights and obligations had been upset to their disadvantage. Id,
346.
The panel report was not adopted because the EC. which was the
losing party, blocked its adoption. In the discussion of the panel report the EC
representative stated that "this provision had been applied only to cases in which
tariff bindings were at stake; it would be a dangerous precedent to extend its
application to situations in which no such commitments had been infringed." Id.
347. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 26.1(a).
348.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX. supra note 206, at 657-60.
349. The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, GATT/CP 4/39,
adopted on Apr. 3, 1950, 11/188, 193-4.
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cost it benefits. 35 ° If a WTO member country has acted in such a
way, it has deprived the other country of its reasonable
expectations of the competitive position of its products in the
35
relevant market. 1
These restrictive interpretations of Article XXIII, section 1(b)
argue against the use of the non-violation nullification theory in
its present form for most, if not all, Section 301/Unreasonable
cases. For example, with regard to the first category of such
cases, issues left out of GATT or other international agreements,
it would be difficult for the United States to show how the
measure of another country satisfied either the benefit or
reasonable expectations requirement as interpreted.
No U.S.
tariff concessions would have been made on the reasonable
expectation that these undealt-with non-GATT covered issues
would be resolved in accordance with U.S. desires. Consequently,
the U.S. could not argue that it had a concrete benefit that was
nullified or impaired by another country. The same limitation
would apply with regard to the other two categories of
unreasonable cases discussed earlier. Unless the United States
were to link its tariff concessions to specific promises by other
Member States to adhere to U.S. standards, then it could not
argue that a benefit it expected had been nullified. This type of
negotiating has occurred in the GATT negotiating rounds only
when the countries have agreed that a new area should be
covered by multilateral rules.
It is true that the lack or
inadequacy of laws, such as antitrust laws or laws which stymie
the distribution and sale of goods internally, could affect market
access. If the concept of benefit was expanded to cover market
access in general, rather than just tariff concessions, a nonviolation claim could be maintained. 3 2 There would still have to

350.
GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 206, at 660 (In the Oilseeds case
the panel noted that "the United States may be assumed not to have anticipated
the EC actions in question.") (quoting from paragraph 148 of the Oilseeds panel
report).

351. According to the Oilseeds panel report (the most recent instance in
which a GATT panel finding of a non-violation nullification was adopted):
At issue in the case before it are product-specific subsidies that protect
producers completely from the movement of prices for imports and thereby
prevent tariff concessions from having any impact on the competitive
relationship between domestic and imported oilseeds.
The panel
considered that the main value of a tariff concession is that it provides an
assurance of better market access through improved price competition.
Id. at 559 (quoting Oilseeds panel report at paragraph 147).
352. There have been some suggestions that the lack of adequate antitrust
legislation would constitute the basis for a non-violation claim. See generally
Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Competition, Competition Policy and
the GATT, 17 WORLD ECON. 121 (1994).
With regard to the distribution
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be some alteration of the "reasonable expectation" requirement.
The results of the non-violation cases submitted to the old GATT
dispute resolution process, however, do not necessarily establish
the meaning of this provision. Since GATT panel reports have no
precedential value.
The WTO has the power to reconsider and broaden the scope
of Article XXIII, section l(b) to capture U.S.
Section
301/Unreasonable cases, and thereby limit the possible use of
future aggressive unilateralism. There are two ways in which
such a "redefinition" of Article XXIII, section l(b) could be
achieved. First, the WTO Member States could attempt to reach a
WTO decision about how non-violation nullification cases could be
argued and proved in ways other than those established in the
extremely limited GATT jurisprudence. The only authoritative
interpretation of any GATT provision comes from the WTO
decision-making process. 3 53 Interpretations are taken by Member
States of the WTO by a three-fourths majority. 35 4 The redefinition
of the non-violation theory in such a way would broaden the
potential number of cases that any country's trading partners
could bring against it. It may be difficult to achieve consensus for
a GATT interpretation that would achieve such a result. Whether
the WTO membership would consider such an interpretation if
Member States faced another wave of Section 301/Unreasonable
cases is unclear.
The second way in which the non-violation theory could be
re-examined and more expansively interpreted would come from
the operation of the DSU panel system. According to Article 3.2
of the DSU, "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add
3 55
to or diminish the rights and obligations" set out in GATT.
Nevertheless, since prior panel reports interpreting the breadth of
non-violation claims are not binding precedent, there is the
possibility that a WTO panel might be presented with a non-

arguments, see SYLvIA OSTRY. NEW DIMENSIONS OF MARKET ACCESs: OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. 49, 12 (1995). which states that another way to deal with structural
impediments to effective market access which is now being debated is to bring a
complaint to the WTO under a little-used section of the GATT, Article XXIII: 1(b).
The United States has apparently already framed the first non-violation claim
based on its objections to Japan's structural impediments as part of the Film
complaints before the WTO. See supra note 335.
353. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 3.9. That
article states: "The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the
rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered
agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered
agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement." Id.; see also ASIF H. QURESHI,
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE NORMS 99

(1996).
354.
355.

WTO Agreement, supra note 157, at art. IX.2.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 3.2.
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violation case and a legal argument that would command a
reconsideration of the theory. The substantive content of the
non-violation theory has never been fully explored or applied. If
the theory were given a more textual interpretation, then the
WTO, through the dispute settlement panels, would receive a
much broader lawmaking power than it.currently possesses. This
new power would give it "the power to impose new quasiobligations, by a process of logically extending the sense,3 56purpose,
and policy of the legal obligations already consented to."
Some expansion, or at least re-articulation of non-violation
nullification theory, is inevitable because of the adoption of a new
agreement to GATT-the TRIPs Agreement. Unlike other GATT
agreements, the TRIPs Agreement does not concern itself with
increased market access to be gained through the lowering of
tariffs or the removal of discriminatory regulations. The TRIPs
Agreement requires Member States to offer minimum standards of
intellectual property protection and to enforce these standards.
Thus, the benefits a WTO Member State would expect to receive
from the TRIPs Agreement are not directly linked to increased
market access but to the implementation of the TRIPs standards
themselves.
A non-violation nullification case under TRIPs should involve
the claim that although it had complied with the Agreement's
obligations, a country was nullifying another country's benefits
under TRIPs Agreement because there still was not effective
protection for the patents or copyrights obtained by foreign

citizens. 3 57 Whether this is how the non-violation theory will be
construed as applied to the TRIPs Agreement is impossible to
determine at this point. The WTO Member States agreed to a
moratorium on all non-violation cases under the TRIPs Agreement
for five years after the WTO Agreement entered into force. 35 8 This
five-year period was designed to give Member States time in which

HUDEC, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 191, at 196.
357. See John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and
Unilaterallsmv. Multilateraltsm,21 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 81, 91 (1995).

356.

Innovation:

The portion of the agreement dealing with enforcement provides, for the

first time, binding international obligations for the effective enforcement of
intellectual property both internally and at the border. The importance of
this innovative section of the TRIPs agreement cannot be overstated. It
will make domestic legal procedures subject to international dispute
settlement, not in the context of establishing an appeals procedure for the
domestic courts individual cases but in ensuring the effective operation of
each WTO member's domestic system in enforcing intellectual property
rights.
Id.

358.

TRIPs Agreement, supra note 31, at art. 64.2.

286

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

to negotiate

over what

should

constitute

a

[Vol. 30:209

non-violation

nullification case under the TRIPs Agreement. 35 9 Negotiations
over non-violation theory in the TRIPs context could lead to a
reconsideration of the entire theory, and thereby expand or
narrow the range of potential claims.
Even apart from the TRIPs context, the non-violation
nullification theory faces a fuller elaboration and potential
expansion if the WTO sees the anticipated increase in the number
of dispute settlement cases filed by Member States.
If any
particular GATT obligation under one of the agreements is not
specific or clear enough, a WTO Member State might feel
constrained to fle its complaint as a non-violation rather than a
violation complaint. Early scholarly predictions on whether the
WTO dispute system will spur the filing of more non-violation
36 0
nullification cases differ widely.
Only one other category of GATT-based cases can be brought
in the WTO dispute settlement system. A country can argue that
its benefits are being nullified or impaired by "any other situation"
according to Article XXIII, section 1(c). 3 6 1 There has never been a
GATT panel ruling adopted on this category. 36 2 The lack of a
GATT interpretation of Article XXIII, section 1(c) would appear to
make it the appropriate category for bringing trade complaints
like the Section 301/Unreasonable cases that are not violations or
non-violations, as interpreted.
Unfortunately, even if the
definition of Article XXIII, section 1(c) remains open, the
possibilities for relief under that provision have been limited by
the terms of the DSU. Article XXIII, Section 1(c) cases are not
offered the same enforcement measures available under either of
the other two categories of claims. The DSU process is followed in
an Article XXIII, section 1(c) case only until a panel report has
been circulated to the Member States. After that, the old GATT
system for implementation-which required consensus adoption,
and thus allowed a country to block adoption of a report
36 3
unfavorable to it-takes over.
The United States could pursue a trading partner for Its
failure to have a competition law or adequate labor laws under
Article XXIII, section 1(c), prevail on the legal issue, and still be
unable to obtain WTO relief. Since the defending country could
and probably would in most cases block such a report, there
appears to be little incentive to invoke Article XXIII, section 1(c)

359.

Id. at art. 64.3.

360. Compare INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 211, at 2.27-6
with Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 216, at 137.
361. GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A64-A65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-68.
362. GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 206, at 668-70.
363. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 26.2.
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and use it in the category of Section 301/Unreasonable cases. If
anything, the reversion to the old GATT system underscores all of
its inadequacies for U.S. purposes of forcing open foreign
markets. If the WTO is incapable of policing Article XXIII, section
1(c) cases, then the United States could pursue "any other
situation" on its own.
ii. Procedural Aspects of Non-Violation Nullification Cases
Even if the category of non-violation cases was reinterpreted
in a more expansive form by the WTO, the United States would
probably still prefer to pursue Section 301/Unreasonable cases
on a unilateral basis. This is because of procedural aspects of a
non-violation nullification case under the terms of the DSU. The
DSU requires non-violation cases to be treated the same as GATTviolation cases throughout the dispute settlement process itself.
All of the same panel processes, including the right to appeal,

apply to these cases.

Significant alterations to the process,

however, do exist for non-violation nullification cases in two
areas.
For a party complaining about a non-violation
nullification, there are different expectations with regard to how it
must prove its case and what relief it can expect.
On the burden of proof issue, the complaining party has to do
more than just point out the issues; it must present a "detailed
justification" supporting the non-violation claim.3 6 4 In other
words, substantial legal resources must be devoted by a country
to analyzing how to make the non-violation argument and legally
support it. The burden of proof rests firmly on the country
pursuing such a claim, and it would have to overcome the
presumption against the theory provided in past cases. This
burden of proof requirement means that if the United States were
to pursue a non-violation claim it should pick one which has the
strongest chance for being accepted by a panel.
Even if the complaining party can establish its case and
prevail, however, it will not receive the full relief accorded in a
GATT-violation case. The DSU expressly states that in response
to a non-violation finding by a panel, there is no obligation5
36
incurred by the offending party to withdraw the measure.
Instead, the panel or Appellate Body can only recommend that the
offending Member State make a "mutually satisfactory
adjustment." 36 6 The different remedies available for violation and
non-violation nullification or impairment cases reflect the goals

364.

Id. at art. 26.1(a).

365.
366.

Id. at art. 26.1(b).
Id.
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and realities of the WTO dispute settlement system. If a Member
State is violating a GATT legal rule, then the dispute settlement
system should operate to coerce it into compliance with the
rule. 36 71 Anything less than the withdrawal of the measure or the
removal of its ill effects does not achieve the primary goal of the
dispute settlement system-the preservation of the rights and
obligations of Member States under the GATT agreement at issue.
By contrast, in a non-violation case, the offending country, may
have nullified or impaired the benefits of another country but in
so doing acted consistently with the GATT. There is no GATT
obligation that would be met by forcing the country to abandon
the measure or practice in question. One of the most effective
non-violation remedies would, therefore, be one which eliminates
the consequences (the loss of trade resulting from the measure)
rather than the measure itself. Compensation, which provides
the complaining party with a trade advantage offsetting the loss
from the offending measure, meets that criterion. 3 68 The parties

to the dispute are entitled to an arbitral determination of the level
of benefits that have been nullified or impaired 3 69 and
suggestions for how to reach a negotiated settlement. 3 70 The
arbitral decisions on these issues, however, are not binding on
the parties. Ultimately, it is the disputants who will have to
determine the type of negotiated settlement that each can
371
accept.
iii. Overall Consequences for Section 301 /Unreasonable Cases
Non-violation cases under the DSU are harder to prove and
less amenable to a satisfactory resolution. These characteristics
make non-violation cases much less attractive for the United

367. Under GATT practice there had always been the expectation that if a
case were based on a GATT-violation the proper remedy is withdraval of the
measure.
Compensation is nowhere mentioned in the text of Article XXIII

although the concept does clearly appear in other GATT provisions as a method
for a country to "pay" for its inability to follow its GAIT obligations. For example,
Article II contains an obligation to bind a tariff concession at a negotiated low
level and hold it there. Despite the Article II provision, however, the GATT
provides an exception in cases where party finds It too difficult to comply with the
obligation. After a three year period a party can raise a bound tariff only if it
negotiates with affected trading partners and compensates them for the trade
losses which come from breaking the Article II obligation. See GATT, supra note
1. 61 Stat. at A71-A72, 55 U.N.T.S. at 276-78.
368.

The provision regarding relief in a non-violation case suggests that

compensation can be included as part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 26.1(d).
369.

Id. atart. 26.1(c).

370.
371.

Id.
Id. at art. 26.1(d).
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States. The problem with compensation as the form of relief in a
non-violation case is that it may not satisfy the complainant
country. If the United States were to pursue many of the Section
301/Unreasonable claims it might prefer to bring as a nonviolation case, then it would not always be seeking compensation.
The U.S. concerns about inadequate intellectual property
protection (even after adoption of the TRIPs Agreement) or
inadequate antitrust or labor laws would not really be satisfied bya negotiated settlement that offered the United States increased
market access opportunities in trade of goods or services. The
only relief that would actually satisfy the United States would be
a drafting or redrafting of the offending country's legislation and
enforcement of the new legislation. The other U.S. preferred
option would be a commitment to add the issue to the negotiating
agenda for the next round. 3 7 2 Article 26 of the DSU suggests that
the parties make a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" which
means that the offending country would have to be willing to
accept these types of relief. Even if the country was willing to
accept U.S. demands, the United States would still have to
monitor its compliance.
In its past uses of Section 301, the United States has never
settled a case unless it got some cessation or alteration of the
existing practice or a commitment to pursue the issue in the
negotiating rounds which would ultimately submit the area to
multilateral discipline.3 73 Receiving compensation for its losses,
thus re-balancing the level of concessions the U.S. party believes
it should have been receiving, would only give the United States
increased market access in some area other than the one which
prompted it to begin the Section 301 case.
The non-violation route in the WTO dispute settlement
system fails to address most of the trade concerns the United
States has voiced following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
There is some argument about whether the non-violation theory
should ever be used in WTO dispute settlements. 3 74 If there is no

GATT violation, then what separates the WTO Member States is a
difference over policy issues and the linking of such issues to
trade that should be consigned to future GATT negotiations under

372. The trouble about accepting such a commitment as a satisfactory
adjustment is that a handful of countries could not ensure that the issue would
actually be made part of a future negotiating round. For this option to be a
satisfactory solution for the United States it would need to pursue a series of
similar non-violation claims against many WTO Member States.
373.
See infra Appendix A for the results of the Section 301/Unreasonable
cases; see also ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supranote 3, at 237.
See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 216, at 137 (Non-violation
374.
nullification is "better dealt with by way of negotiations.").
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the auspices of the WTO. Should the WTO membership come to
accept this view, then the United States may feel even more
compelled to set the agenda for future GATT negotiations by
unilateral actions under Section 301.
As long as the United States believes that the lack of
antitrust legislation and inadequate labor laws pose significant
barriers to market access, the WTO system has its limits. The
failure of other countries to have any legislation (as in the case of
antitrust) or legislation matching or approximating U.S.
standards (as in the case of labor law) does not currently create
the basis for a non-violation case. Nothing in the legislative
history or the government reports issued about the Uruguay
Round indicates that all Section 301 cases must go through the
WTO process.3 75 Consequently, there remains a wide arena in
which the United States could choose to pursue Section
301/Unreasonable cases. In the past, the United States pushed
non-GATT cases into the jurisdiction of the multilateral system
376
precisely by bringing Section 301 /Unreasonable cases.
Using Section 301/Unreasonable cases to enlarge the body of
GATT legal obligations is more effective than any unilateral efforts
to obtain new legislation from trading partners on a country-bycountry basis. 3 77 To obtain sufficient coverage of an issue
through bilateral agreements, the United States would have to
pursue even more Section 301/Unreasonable cases than It has in
the past. Moreover, the United States would still face the
intractable problem of how to police the bilateral agreements it
obtains. 3 7 8 Whether the United States has the economic power to
pursue the agenda-setting strategy it used during the Uruguay
Round to push contentious areas into the next negotiating round
remains to be seen. Many of the countries which accepted the
new GATT agreements as well as the need for the more
adjudicative dispute settlement system established by the DSU
did so in order to contain unilateral actions by the United
States. 3 79
The WTO system, as it stands, will capture for
resolution only the Section 301/Unreasonable cases the United
States was pursuing at the time of the Uruguay Round. As long
as the United States continues to expand its list of trade-related

issues that limit U.S. market access and are "unreasonable," the

375.

See GAO Report, supra note 256. at 42.

376.
From 1986 to 1993, the largest number of unreasonable cases fied
involved failures of U.S. trading partners to offer "adequate" Intellectual property
protection and adequate market access for U.S. services.
See supra text
accompanying notes 69-73.
377.
See supra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
378. Id.
379.
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW. supra note 3, at 237.
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WTO system is incapable of completely displacing U.S. unilateral
action. The United States could initiate a barrage of Section
301/Unreasonable cases for each new GATT agenda item it
Although
cannot otherwise bring to the negotiating table.
undoubtedly effective in the Uruguay Round, 38 0 overuse of an
agenda-setting strategy could create a great deal of anger and
raise questions about the viability of the WTO. 3 8 1
The WTO does have some measure of control over U.S.
actions under Section 301 that it lacked before. Although the
United States has placed GATT-illegal sanctions against several

countries,

including

in

one

unreasonable

case,

Brazilian

Pharmaceuticals,it managed to avoid a GATT review of its actions.
It will be impossible for the United States to evade such review
completely under the WTO system. The much vaunted Article

XXIII of the DSU does not provide the mechanism for limiting U.S.
conduct on Section 301/Unreasonable cases. 38 2 By its terms,
Article 23 tracks the scope language of Article XXIII, paragraph 1
of the GATT, and states that when Member States "seek the
redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or
impairment," they are required to use the DSU system. If Section
301/Unreasonable cases do not fall into either Article XXIII,
paragraph 1 category, then Article XXIII of the DSU is
inapplicable. The United States has argued for this reading of
Article XXIII. 3 83 If the non-violation universe of cases remains
narrowly construed and the United States remains aggressive in

380. Id.
381.
See Hart, supranote 325, at 237.
382.
In its report on the Uruguay Round the European Commission
suggested that Article XXIII would stop the United States from acting under
Section 301. GAO Report, supra note 256, at 43. According to Professor Chayes,
"in the late stages of the Uruguay Round negotiations, [other GATT countries]
secured the adoption of a little noticed provision that in effect outlaws Section
301." THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 44. at 101.
Professor Hudec, however, argues that the inclusion of Article XXIII in the
DSU represented a game being played by the United States and the other WTO
countries. Robert E. Hudec, International Economic Law: The Political Theatre
Dimension, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 9, 13 (1996) [hereinafter Political Theatre].
President Clinton (and USTR) was aware of the meaning of Article XXIII and how
other countries viewed it but was also aware that Congress would insist (as the
Id.
implementing legislation suggests) on continued use of Section 301.
According to Hudec, "Congress knew that the understanding was going to be a
binding legal document signed by the United States, and the WTO member
nations knew that Congress was going to insist on continued use of Section 301."
Id. at 14. Hudec goes on to describe Article XXIII of the DSU and the U.S.

response to it as an illustration of "political theatre"-the

tendency of

governments to adopt laws and agreements that create the appearance of legal
solutions when in reality no solution has been achieved. Id.
383. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 4308 (emphasis
added).
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pursing its interests, Section 301/Unreasonable cases may
continue to be filed. 3 84 While the United States retains power to
define its own cause of action and to threaten sanctions if other
WTO members fail to comply with its requests, it will have to
exercise greater restraint in imposing sanctions in Section
3 85
301/Unreasonable cases following the adoption of the DSU.

Failure to do so could find the United States being brought up as
a defendant in the WTO dispute settlement system.
3. United States as a Defending Country in a DSU Proceeding
If the United States continues to pursue Section 301 cases, it
could find itself in the WTO system as a defending country in two

ways. First, if the United States brings a Section 301 case as a
complaining party, loses, refuses to accept the DSB decision,
proceeds to take unilateral action, it would clearly be violating
Article 23(1). The United States would thus be creating the basis
for a violation case to be brought against it. The United States
would lose any such case before a GATT panel, since there would
be no GATT justification for such action; thus, the United States
would have to withdraw the sanctions and compensate the
Section 301 target for its losses due to the sanctions or face
counter-retaliation by the target country.
The second scenario in which the United States could run
afoul of the WTO with Section 301 involves unreasonable cases.
Simply pursuing an Section 301/Unreasonable case would not
involve a violation of the WTO. The Section 301 statute does not
require USTR to initiate such cases or to take retaliatory action
384. Since the adoption of the DSU the United States has only brought two
Section 301/Unreasonable cases-both against Japan. This course of conduct is
interesting for two reasons. First, the United States has usually pursued more
unreasonable cases over the same time frame in the past. This slow down in
Section 301/Unreasonable cases could reflect that the United States is satisfied
since it got the major universe of unreasonable cases included within the
coverage of GATT obligations. Another reason for the slow down, however, could
be that the United States has not yet decided which other kinds of unreasonable
cases (in antitrust or labor rights) it wants to pursue. Second, the United States
has not acted with regard to the Section 301/Unreasonable cases it has filed as it
would have in the past. In the Auto and Auto Parts case, the United States
threatened sanctions but reached a negotiated settlement with Japan after that
country filed a complaint with the WTO. In the Film case, the United States did

not threaten sanctions even when Japan refused for over a year to negotiate over

the dispute. Instead of pursuing unilateral action in this case, the United States
refrained its complaints into two cases for the WTO each Involving one GATT
violation claim and a non-violation claim. See supra note 156.
385. The United States threatened but did not impose sanctions in the Auto
and Auto Parts case. According to Professor Hudec the United States backed

down and settled that case because the existence of the WTO meant that it had
to. Political Theatre, supra note 382, at 13.
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against countries if they fail to respond to U.S. threats in
unreasonable cases. Nevertheless, it is clear that all countries do
not share the view that Section 301/Unreasonable cases are
outside the jurisdiction of the WTO. In the Japanese Auto and
Auto Parts case, Japan filed a VITO complaint about the
threatened U.S. sanctions,3 8 6 but the case was withdrawn when
the parties reached a negotiated settlement. As a result, the WTO
has not yet had the opportunity to review the jurisdictional issue.
If the United States takes retaliatory action in a future
Section 301/Unreasonable case, it stands a strong chance of
coming under WTO scrutiny. The United States has tended to
use traditional methods for achieving trade retaliation in Section
301 cases, such as imposing high tariffs on the offending
countries' goods or placing a quota on such goods coming into the
U.S. market. 38 7 Any U.S. retaliation in either form poses GATT
problems. Imposing high tariffs might violate GATT Article II, and
any use of quotas clearly would violate the Article XI prohibition
on quantitative restrictions.3 8 8 Placing increased tariffs against a
Section 301 target would violate Article II if they were placed on
products which the United States had bound (and thus promised
to keep low) during prior GATT negotiating rounds. The vast
38 9
majority of U.S. tariff categories are bound under GATT rules.
Therefore, to punish a country in any effective way under Section
301, the United States would probably have to commit a violation
of the WTO rules.
The Section 301 target country would then be in a position to
take the United States through the VITO dispute settlement
process, prevail at the panel and appellate levels, and attempt to
compel the United States to withdraw the retaliation. The United
States could refuse to lift its sanctions, but that would subject it
to an argument for temporary compensation and the "mobilization
of shame" by the WTO membership as it attempted to coerce the

386.

See GATT Focus, Dec. 1995 at 2. 6. The United States also avoided a

review of its use of Section 301 sanctions by lifting retaliatory sanctions it had
placed against the EC when that country would not lift a ban on beef fed on
hormones (301-62). The EU had filed a request for consultations and later a
panel on the sanctions arguing violations of GATT Articles I and II as well as
Articles 3. 22 and 23 of the DSU (WT/DS 39). In its request for a panel, the EU
claimed that the United States had failed to "ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations" under the WTO
with respect to the application of Section 301. When the United States lifted the
sanctions, the EU decided not to pursue the panel request. The WTO regards the
case as settled. WTO Cases, supra note 303.
387. The United States used this method against Brazil in 301-61 and
threatened to do so against Japan in 301-93.
388.
GATT, supra note 1, 61 Stat. at A29-A30, 55 U.N.T.S. at 220-22.
389.
GAO Report. supra note 256. at 42.
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United States into lifting the sanctions. 390 Eventually, if the
United States did not settle the case, there would be WTO-

authorized retaliation. Even though the United States has the
market size and strength to blunt retaliation by many smaller
countries, some trading partners, notably Japan and the EU,
could harm the United States.
The consequences of the new WTO process leave the United
States with several options for taking action under Section 301:
(1) threaten retaliation but stop before taking such action, (2)
devise other non-GATT violative forms for retaliation, (3) take
traditional retaliatory action but limit it to non-bound tariffs, or
(4) take necessary retaliatory measures to obtain U.S. goals and
be willing to "pay the price." None of the four options Is without
its difficulties. If the United States simply threatens retaliation in
a series of Section 301 cases but never acts, Section 301 could
lose its credibility as an effective trade action. U.S. trading
partners became concerned about aggressive unflateralism by the
United States only 1after it started using sanctions to resolve
39
Section 301 cases.
Attempting to frame non-GATT violative sanctions may work
in some cases, but will not work against all trading partners. In
the case of developing countries, other methods for trade-based
retaliation, such as eliminating access to the Generalized System
of Preferences, 3 2 already exist. With regard to developed country
targets of Section 301, fewer trade-based methods to sanction
exist. One type of such measure would be to withdraw from or
refuse to table proposals in negotiations for further trade
liberalization. For example, the United States could refuse to
negotiate additional liberalization in some sector of trade in
services to punish Japan or the EU. Similarly, the United States
could hold up negotiations on the creation of new regional trading
arrangements with targets of Section 301 cases. Such retaliatory
action, however, could impair U.S. interests other than the one
being pursued under the Section 301 case. Normally, when it
decides to take action in any Section 301 case, USTR conducts an
extensive review, subject to public comment, about the "costs" to
U.S. producers of any U.S. sanctions against a target country.
Any non-traditional retaliation would also have to be reviewed

390. Pieter Jan Kuijper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System - The
Impact on the European Community. 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1996, at 49, 53-54
[hereinafter New WTO System].
391.

See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 137.

392. GAO Report, supra note 256, at 42; URAA Legislative History, supra
note 37, at 3907 (Section 301 amended to allow USTR to suspend benefits under

the Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative or the
Andean Trade Preference Act).
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just as carefully. Non-traditional retaliation against larger trading

partners could prove too costly for the goal being achieved.
The United States could attempt to fashion its sanctions to
avoid GATT-bound tariffs.
Such retaliation against certain
countries might be effective. Unfortunately, most U.S. tariffs on
manufactured goods and agricultural products are bound, and
raising them only against the target country would pose two clear
GATT violations. 3 9 3

Even with the unbound tariffs that remain,

however, the United States might not be able to make effective
use of them for retaliation purposes. To be effective in coercing
the target country to change its practices, the sanctions would
have to come on products of U.S. export interest to that country.
Unless the unbound tariffs are on products of interest to a
particular target country, this method of retaliation will not work.
The United States could limit access to its services market in any
area not covered by the obligations it has assumed under the
GATS Agreement. 39 4
Such, retaliation would only be useful
against a country with an active services market. In almost all
cases, this would be only developed countries. In many cases, it
would be impossible to frame a strong enough retaliatory measure
using this method.
The fourth option of paying the price might end up being the
most frequently exercised.
The United States cannot be
compelled to withdraw sanctions even if the WTO decision on U.S.
retaliation went against it. 39 5 Congress is consulted upon what
39 6
action to take in response to an adverse WTO ruling.
Moreover, even if the United States does face a WTO dispute over
Section 301 sanctions, it can maintain what might be quite
effective sanctions during the dispute settlement process itself
39 7
(including throughout the panel and implementation stages).
As a result, the Section 301 target country might be willing to

settle the case before the panel report by acceding to whatever
objective the United States had originally sought in the case. If
not, the country might settle for compensation after the panel
report if the United States fails to withdraw the original sanctions.
Finally, even WTO-authorized retaliation may not be a realistic
prospect for smaller countries in no position to harm the United

393. A violation of GATT Article II, tariff binding, and a violation of Article 1.
MFN, if the increased tariffs were applied only against the target country.
394. See GAO Report, supra note 256, at 111-19.
395. Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 30.
396. Id.
397.
GAO Report. supra note 256, at 45.
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The prospect of realistic counter-retaliation by a

developed country Section 301 target, however, would probably
dictate U.S. strategy. For the cases in which it could not procure
a negotiated settlement prior to the WTO proceedings, the United
States might prefer to leave its Section 301 sanctions in place
throughout the panel process in order to gain leverage for an
eventual settlement.
C. InternationalOrganizationsand Dispute Settlement
1. The Creation of an Adjudicative Dispute Settlement System
The United States worked ceaselessly over the years to push
the GATT dispute settlement system into becoming more
legalistic. Later, the United States pushed aggressively for the
creation of a more adjudicative dispute settlement system for the
resolution of GATT disputes. Every legal analysis to date has
concluded that the WTO dispute settlement system exemplifies a
decisive

step

towards

an

adjudicative

system. 3 9 9

These

judgments spring from a comparison of the DSU with the GATT
system.
The GATT dispute settlement system was not
adjudicative. The early focus of the system was not the making of
legal judgments, about whether a Contracting Party had violated
a GATT obligation. Instead, the system was designed to enable
governments to resolve trade disputes through negotiated
settlements.4 0 0 Over time, the panel reports issued by the GATT
system became longer and more legalistic as they were
increasingly devoted to legal analysis of GATT text rather than
political issues. The United States actively participated in this
transformation process by trying GATT cases before panels like
40
traditional law suits. '
Notwithstanding U.S. efforts, however, the GATT dispute
settlement system was not rationalized. For example, it lacked a
written understanding on how the panel process should operate
until the completion of the Tokyo Round in 1979. Even when the

398. ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 135. In the GATT system many
developing countries hesitated to bring disputes under Article XXIII because they
doubted the usefulness of any GATT-authorized retaliation.
399. See generally Hudec, Judicialization, supra note 88; Vermulst &
Driessen, supra note 216; Davey, supra note 197; Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Remedies Along with Rights: InstitutionalReform In the New GATT, 88 Am. J. INT'L
L. 477 (1994).
400.

See generally HUDEC, GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 338, 111-200

(describing the mediation-oriented format used by early GATT panels).
401. Hudec, Judlclalization,supra note 88, at 11-13.
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Tokyo Round Understanding and a later Understanding developed
during the course of the Uruguay Round were adopted by the
Contracting Parties, they stressed the negotiation/mediation
aspects of the process as much as the formal panel process used
for disputes.4 0 2 The GATT Secretariat, which was supposed to
offer the Contracting Parties legal assistance and to aid panelists
in the drafting of panel reports, lacked an Office of Legal Affairs
until 1984. 40 3 The GATT system was operated by ad hoc panels
comprised more often than not by government trade officials, not
trade experts or lawyers. 40 4 Moreover, the panel reports had no
GATT authority unless formally adopted by the Contracting
Parties. Finally, the GATT system was not adjudicative, because
it completely lacked the means to enforce compliance
or conduct
40 5
surveillance of adherence to panel decisions.
By contrast, the WTO dispute settlement system as
established by the DSU does appear to be adjudicative in form
and operation. The DSU provides oversight of all aspects of a
dispute by the Dispute Settlement Body. The DSB is meant to act
solely as a coordinator of disputes for the WTO; its members are
not representing their governments as they were in the GATT
system. The DSU rules for the composition of panels also indicate
an attempt to create a separate legal system through the WTO.
The panelists are no longer to be only or even primarily
government officials. The Member States are prohibited from
seeking to influence them or giving them instructions concerning
a case. 40 6 The automatic establishment of panels and the

required issuance and adoption of panel reports subjects Member
State disputants to a process that more closely resembles a
lawsuit.
The DSU provides for both an initial hearing and
resolution (the trial) as well as appellate review. The DSU also
contains what resembles a series of procedural rules regarding

402. Young, supra note 181, at 397-98.
403. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 137-38.
404. ITC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 20-21.
405. The consensus-driven process of the GATT system allowed a country
participating in the dispute to block the establishment of a panel and ultimately,
the adoption of the panel report itself. The losing party in a GATT dispute could,
if willing to ignore political disapproval of other Contracting Parties, effectively
avoid following any decision with which it disagreed.
406.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 8.9. In
addition, the DSU disallows any ex parte communication with a panel or Appellate
Body panel. Id. at art. 18.1.
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and the

participation by interested third parties.
Despite these features, the DSU does not completely establish
an adjudicative system. Instead, the DSU establishes a dispute
4 10
settlement system without the form or powers of a true court.
With regard to enforcement, the WTO also lacks, as is true of
most other international organizations, power to compel a
Member State to obey its legal determinations. The WTO system
ultimately rests on the willingness of Member States to accept
their legal obligations as defined by the DSB or face WTOauthorized retaliation. 4 1 1 The WTO system is thus limited by the
fact that its potential litigants are governments.
2. The Consequences of a More Adjudicative Dispute Settlement
System
Although the WTO system is not completely adjudicative, it
follows that model more closely than the GATT system. The
cumulative and operative effect of the new DSU provisions may
produce certain consequences for the development of GATT law
and for the trade policy strategy of WTO Member States. There
are three ways in which the settlement of disputes will alter the
operation of the WTO: (1) changes in jurisdiction, (2) development
of GATT law, and (3) enforcement of GATT law. All of these
alterations will have a profound impact on how the United States
operates within the WTO.
a. Jurisdiction
At first glance, it appears that there are no jurisdictional
consequences arising from the adoption of the DSU. The WTO
system still has jurisdiction only over disputes brought by

407. Id. at arts. 7 (stating terms of reference for a panel) & 26.1-.2 (stating
pleading requirements for Art. XXIII: (b) & (c) cases).
408. Id. at art. 20 & app. 3.
409. Id. at art. 10.
410. The DSU does not establish a standing court empowered to pass
binding judgments on Member States, but instead retains the ad hoc panel
system set up in the early years of the GATT. A completely new panel can be
chosen for each new WTO dispute. The Appellate Body does have a standing
group of potential panelists, but there is no creating of law by the entire group.
Instead of an appellate tribunal there is the possibility of a panel of three and no
guarantee of a repeat of the same panel for future cases. As for powers, the WTO
panel reports lack any direct effect for most Member States. A WTO decision will
become part of or be reflected in the law of a Member State (I.e., have the force of
law) only if that Member State implements the WTO decision.
411.
Hudec, Judiclaltzatlon,supra note 88, at 20.
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Member States. The WTO is not empowered to bring a dispute
settlement case for a Member State or in its own capacity.
Nevertheless, the WTO system has already seen an alteration in
its case load both with regard to the number of participating
countries and the type and number of cases. The GATT dispute
settlement system established hundreds of dispute settlement
panels from its beginning in 1948 until 1994.412 By contrast with
other forms of international adjudication, like the operation of the
International Court of Justice, 4 13
the GATT system was
incredibly active and comprehensive in its review of GATT law.
The WTO system will only deepen this phenomenon.
The design of the WTO system clearly aids complaining
countries. If the claim is a dispute involving a GATT violation, the
process operates to secure a judgment for the complaining party.
The WTO system has in, effect, compulsory jurisdiction. A
Member State cannot refuse the DSB a chance to review a trade
dispute once a complaint has been filed. In the past, the vast
majority of all GATT cases were brought by developed
countries. 4 14 The new system encourages the filing of cases by all
Member States. 4 15 This is because the legalization of the WTO
system signals an accompanying depoliticization of the dispute
settlement process.4 1 6 A developing country will no longer refrain

from bringing a4 case
or settle it early because of the market size
17
of its opponent.

412.

See generally ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at

417-585 (encapsulating summaries of filed complaints).
413. See von Bogdandy, supra note 341, at 95.
414.

ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw, supra note 3. at 295-300.

415. There have been 66 different requests for consultations filed with the
WTO DSB from January 1, 1995 through February 15. 1997 comprising 45
distinct legal matters (legal claims). Of these 66 requests for consultation the
developing countries have filed 24. See WTO Cases, supra note 303.
416. Gilbert R. Winham, Comments on The Judiciallzation of GAIT Dispute
Settlement, In IN WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 51-52 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Stegar eds., 1990).
[Jludicialization gives politicians the opportunity to refuse to deal with
certain kinds of issues and, therefore, to avoid constituency pressure. If
one has a judicial-like process, political leaders can simply refer sharp
political issues to a judicial-like process and then be off the hook in terms
of deals with constituents. Thus, a judicial-like system process transfers
the power of decision from the hands of politicians, who have the capacity
to harm each others' interests, to judges or panelists who can only resolve
narrowly-defined issues between parties. This helps to avoid or at least
contain a broader response in the relations between two nations.
Id. at 52.
417. See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation
by Nonstate Partiesin the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 359,

366 (1996).

Shell characterizes the WTO system as a triumph under regime
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The DSU was also designed to ease the approach of
developing countries into the WTO system as plaintiffs and
defendants. A developing country is entitled to an alternative to
the DSU panel process if it is the complaining party in certain
cases.'1 8 If the developing country, however, does not qualify for
or choose the alternative, there are still special provisions made
for it. The developing country will receive access to the normal
panel process, but the process will be fitted out with modifications
designed to make it responsive to the capacities (with regard to
legal resources) of a developing country to function in a dispute
settlement system.
If a developing country prefers, for internal political reasons
or because it requires additional time to frame its case, it may
choose to fie under the regular process. If it does use the regular
process, certain DSU provisions are still designed to aid the
developing country. The WTO Secretariat is required to provide
additional legal advice and assistance to developing countries,
including the appointment of a "qualified legal expert from the
WTO technical cooperation services" if requested by the
developing Member State. 4 19
In any case it files against a
developed country, a developing country can request that the
4 20
panel of three include one developing country panelist.
Developing countries are also entitled to an extension of the
consultation period in any case if the Chairman of the DSB
concurs. 4 2 1 If a developing country is the defending party in a
WTO dispute, it should receives special consideration by the panel
(through the extension of time) to allow it to "prepare and present

theory because it gives the Member States a set of consistent international legal
rules "intended to induce states to negotiate trade relationships 'in the shadow of
law' rather than purely on the basis of power relationships."
418. The alternative process is provided by Article 3.12 of the DSU. Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 5. at art. 3.12. Under the terms of Article
3.12, if a developing country brings a claim against a developed country, it is
entitled to replace the negotiation and panel provisions of the DSU with the
corresponding provisions of the GATT decision of April 5, 1966. ProcedureUnder
Article XXIII, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF THE
LEGAL TEXT 75-77 (1995). The 1966 decision offers a developing country access to
the Director-General of the WTO who can initiate good offices Immediately rather
than waiting for bilateral consultations to take place. Id. at 75. The 1966 decision
also provides a shortened time frame for the developing country complaints
allowing much quicker movement to the panel process and authorized retaliation,
Id. at 75-77. There Is no right for the defending country to argue over what would
be a reasonable time for implementation of a report against it. The 1966 decision
also makes it clear that the panel is supposed to be sensitive to the economic
issues facing developing countries. Id.
419.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at art. 27.2.
420. Id. at art. 8.10.
421. Id. at art. 3.12.
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its argument." 4 22 When one or more developing countries are
parties to a dispute, the panel report is required to include an
analysis of whether the different and more-favorable provision of
(or agreements) subject to the dispute has been
the agreement
4 23
considered.
The final area in which different arrangements are made for
developing and least-developed countries involves implementation
of a panel report. Overall, the DSB is required to give special
consideration to the interests of developing countries during the
implementation phase. The DSB is particularly charged both with
determining the severity of harm the offending measure has
caused to the developing country's trade and economy4 24 and

taking further action if the defending country shows no indication
of implementing the WTO report. 4 25 This further action could
well include the DSB authorization of earlier and more punitive
retaliation. 426
The overall effect of the different and more favorable
provisions for developing and least-developed countries should
assist the participation by these countries in the system. As if to
illustrate this phenomenon, the WTO system did see an increase

in cases being filed by developing countries in its first two years of
operation. 4 27 Developing countries are complainants in twenty of
the fifty cases filed to date. 428 Thirteen of the eighteen cases filed
by the developing countries were against developed Member
States.429 Of these cases, the first panel report issued by the
WTO involved a claim filed by Venezuela (later joined by Brazil)

422. Id. at art. 12.10.
423. Id. at art. 12.11.
424. Id. at art. 21.8.
425. Id. at art. 21.7.
426.
Least-developed countries are entitled to the greatest shelter from the
WTO dispute settlement system. Should consultations fail, unlike other Member

States, such countries can obtain, upon request, the good offices of the WTO
Director-General. If they do so, there is an additional level of negotiating before
the other party is entitled to request a panel. Id. at art. 24.2. Throughout the
entire process, other Member States are counseled to exercise due restraint in
pressing a case against a least-developed country. Id. at art. 24.1. Similar
restraint is required if another Member State prevails at the panel level against a
least developed country. In general, Member States are not to seek concessions
or WTO-authorized retaliation against a least-developed defendant. Id. at art.
24.1. In most cases this will mean that a least-developed country will only be
required to withdraw the GATT-illegal measure.
427. WTO 1st Year, supra note 328, at 6.
428. See WTO Cases, supra note 303. The number of cases reflect separate
legal matters-there are actually 74 complaints made to date. Some of the cases
filed by one or more developing countries were done along with developed country
Member States.
429. Id.; see also WTO Focus, Dec. 1996, at 1-3.
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against the United States. 4 30
The two developing country
complainants prevailed on their claims that the U.S. EPA
standards
for reformulated
and
conventional
gasoline
discriminated against Venezuelan and Brazilian imports in
violation of the GATT obligation of National Treatment at the
panel an Appellate Body level. A similar pattern has developed in
43 1
other early WTO cases that have completed the DSU process.
An expansion of the number and types of parties to the WTO
system should make the organization more relevant to all Member
States. The WTO system will be settling disputes for all of the
Member States rather than just for the larger economies.
Meanwhile, there is no reason to believe that the developed
countries will not continue to file the majority of cases in the new
system. Of the fifty different cases filed from 1995 to the present,
approximately seventy-five percent were fied by developed
countries, most of them by the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and Canada. 4 32 The United States to date has filed
twenty-six complaints with the WTO system, more than any other
country. 4 3 3 In regard to those 27 complaints, five have been
settled by the United States, twelve have gone to the panel level,
one has a panel request pending, and the remainder are still in
43 4
the consultation phase.
430. Venezuela-Brazil/ United States, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS 2/1, Jan. 29,
1996, at 2 [hereinafter Panel Report] Issued its final panel report on January 17,
1996. The case had originally been filed by Venezuela on January 23, 1995.
431. Of the six WTO panel reports issued to date three cases were filed by
developing countries against the United States-WT/DS 2 Reformulated Gas,
WT/DS 24 Textile Imports (Costa Rica-U.S.), and WT/DS 33 Woven Wool Shirts
(India-U.S.). All three of the panel reports were unfavorable to the United States.
The United States appealed both WT/DS 2 and WT/DS 24 and also lost at the
Appellate Body level. See United States Loses Appeal on Costa Rca Underwear
Imports, BNA TRADE DAILY, Feb. 12, 1997.
432. WTO Cases. supra note 303.
433. Id.
434. WTO Cases, supra note 303; see also UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1996); WTO Focus, May 1996, at 10. The

WTO Cases filed by the United States which have reached the panel level are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

EU, Canada, US--Japan: Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS 10).
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and United StatesEU: Banana Regime (WT/DS 27).
U.S.-EU:
Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
Ihormones] (WT/DS 26).
U.S.-Canada: Certain Measures Affecting Periodicals (WT/DS
31).
U.S.-Japan:
Certain Measures Affecting Consumers
Photographic Film and Paper (WT/DS 44).
U.S.-India:
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products (WT/DS 50).

1997]
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The other jurisdictional change that comes along with the
WTO system is a vast expansion of the subject matter for
disputes. The WTO system faces a much larger body of law to
construe than did the GATT system. The Uruguay Round added
three completely new agreements to the GATT-the GATS, the
TRIPs and the TRIMs Agreements. In addition, there were major
revisions to all of the GATT agreements negotiated during the
Tokyo Round. The increase in legal rules should spur an increase

in disputes regarding their effect and operation. Two of the new
agreements, in particular, the GATS and TRIPs Agreements,
should produce different types and larger numbers of disputes for
the WTO to resolve.
The GATS and TRIPs Agreements were procured through the
efforts of the developed countries. As the world's largest exporter
of services, the United States was anxious to obtain greater
market access for this form of trade.4 3 5 Similarly, the United
States along with Japan and the European Union account for a
large majority of intellectual property. 43 6 For the WTO to be a
viable organization for these countries, it had to guarantee greater
access to trade liberalization in services and protection for
intellectual property rights. The Uruguay Round provided this
liberalization through the imposition of new legal, and thus
actionable, rules governing these areas.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

U.S. and others-Hungary: Export Subsidies (WT/DS35).
U.S.-Turkey: Taxation of Foreign Film Revenues (WT/DS 43).
U.S.-EC:
Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment (WT/DS 62).
U.S.-U.K.:
Customs Classifciation of Certain Computer
Equipment (WT/DS 67).
U.S.-Ireland: Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment (WT/DS 68).
U.S.-Argentina:
Certain Measures Affecting Importers of
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel (WT/DS 56).

WTO Cases, supranote 303.

The United States has also requested one panel-which have not yet
been established: US-EU: Duties on Imports of Grains (WT/DS 13).
435. URUGUAY ROUND ASSESSMENT, supra note 256, at 99.
The United States is the leading exporter of commercial services: in 1992
U.S. firms exported services worth more than $162 billion. On the import
side the United States ranked second after Germany, with 1992 imports
reaching almost $108 billion. These data explain in large measure why
the United States was the demandeur of the services negotiations in the
GATT and why the US private sector placed a high priority on their
successful conclusion.

Id.
436.

See GAO Report, supra note 256, at 85-86.
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Both the GATS and the TRIPs Agreements should be dispute43 7
generating, because each contains new types of obligations.
GATS is a comprehensive framework agreement that stands apart
from the framework of all of the other GATT agreements. GATS
required such a separate framework because it brought a whole
new area of trade-trade in services-into the realm of

international

law.

GATS,

therefore,

had

to

define what

constitutes trade in services, how Member States were to meet in
the future to negotiate for greater liberalization in the services
area, and how to integrate core GATT concepts into this area of
trade. The Uruguay Round negotiators broke the service trade
into twelve different sectors (and some sub-sectors) which include
business
services,
communications,
construction
and
engineering, distribution, education, environmental, financial,
health and social services, tourism and travel, recreation and
cultural, transportation, and others. 4 38 Once the sectors were
agreed to, the negotiators decided that liberalization would come
from each WTO member submitting a schedule of the service
sectors it was willing to liberalize and any restrictions placed on
such liberalization.
Unlike trade in goods, which is governed largely by border
measures, trade in services is governed by internal legislation. A
government influences whether a foreign company will own,
operate, or invest in business within its country (the type of trade
in service that comes when a foreign company establishes itself In
a country) by adopting legislation, on foreign direct investment,
financial and banking legislation and corporation laws.
If
discriminatory barriers to trade in services are to be eliminated,
there must be the revision or elimination of discriminatory
legislation. The schedules a country submits under the terms of
GATS reflect its commitments to such liberalization. GATS also
applies the core concepts of MFN-non-discrimination with regard

to trading partners-and National Treatment-non-discrimination
to foreign service suppliers as compared to domestic suppliers-to
43 9
the framework agreement.
GATS should generate disputes because Member States will
disagree over how to interpret the scheduled commitments to
liberalize and over the MFN and National Treatment concepts

437. The United States has already filed a case involving GATS against
Japan-as part of the Film Section 301. See supra note 320. The United States
has also filed three WTO cases that involve claims of TRIPs violations. See supra
text accompanying notes 80-86 and note 264.
438. GATS, supra note 261, at art. 1.2; see URUGUAY ROUND ASSESSMENT,
supra note 256, at 106-09 (describing the specific commitments of several of the
service sectors).
439. GATS. supra note 261, at arts. II & XVII.
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applied to this area. As a relatively open services market, the
United States will generally not be a defending country in GATS
disputes. As a country seeking greater access for its service
suppliers, however, the United States has every incentive to seek
44 °
a true lowering of barriers to service trade in other countries.
In order to reap the benefit of GATS, the United States will not
only have to negotiate further liberalization, but also actively
litigate against countries which fail to follow the GATS disciplines.
Similarly, in the area of trade-related intellectual property
rights, the United States will often be required to turn to WTO
dispute settlements to achieve its goals. The TRIPs Agreement
not only requires WTO Member States to pass legislation
providing for minimum standards of protection, but also requires
them to enforce these new international standards. As discussed
in Section I.C., the United States receives no real benefits from
the adoption of better intellectual property legislation by other
countries. Patent, copyright, and trademark holders in any
country will receive benefits only if that country enforces those
rights against infringers. Once the phase-in periods pass for
developing countries, the United States must be prepared, as it
has already indicated it will be, by filing early WTO cases4 4 1 to
police the TRIPs Agreement actively. If it fails to do so, the
multilateral system will not provide better results than the
unilateral pressure achieved under Section 301.
b. Development of GATT Law: The Creation of Precedent
2

44
GATT panel decisions have never had precedential value.
Like most international law, GATT law follows no theory of stare

decisis.4 4 3 The DSU does not by its terms change this aspect of

GATT jurisprudence. Nothing in the DSU says that the panel
reports are binding. Nevertheless, the effect of the WTO's more
adjudicative dispute settlement system should be to develop the
body of GATT law. The system will, in other words, create
"operative precedent."

The DSU process places preeminent value on panel decisions
themselves rather than to the DSB adoption of those decisions.
Since the political adoption of the reports by Member States will
be the reality in almost every case, the important part of the
dispute settlement process will be the handing down of the panel
440. The United States has already filed its first WTO complaint regarding
GATS in the Film Section 301 case; see supra text accompanying notes 80-86 and
264.
441. See id.
442. Davey, supra note 197. at 20.
443. Jackson Testimony, supra note 204, at 132-33.
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report. The weight of the WTO system, in other words, rests on
the panel reports rather than the political process. The system
should, therefore, see a concomitant pressure on the panel

reports to be more legalistic, to interpret GATT law more carefully,
444
and to lend it greater clarity whenever possible.
This development of the WTO system only reinforces what
has already been happening in the GATT system. Over time,
GATT panel reports have become more legalistic, 44 5 and panel
reports have regularly begun to cite previous reports for the legal
propositions they presented. 4 46
The first WTO panel and
Appellate Body reports, on U.S. Reformulated Gas Standards,
continues this trend. 44 7 If panels continue to operate in this
fashion, there should be the creation of a fairly stable body of
"operative precedent" 4 48 that will probably be increasingly used as
such.
The creation of the Appellate Body should also accelerate this
tendency towards a more comprehensive body of GATT law. The
Appellate Body panel reports were designed to provide the final
word on the legal issues raised in any WTO dispute. Although the
appeals process was set up to eliminate the "bad law" that could
come from automatic adoption of panel reports, appellate review
by recognized trade experts will mean that GATT law and the legal
arguments made by parties to a dispute will receive even more
extensive consideration.
Once the Appellate 'Body produces

444. See Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tarffs and
Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 555, 561 (1996). Professor Reitz argues that the
panel decisions represent the secondary law of the WTO (the primary sources of
law being the GATT and Uruguay Round Agreements).
Now that the DSU has been adopted, the corpus of this body of GATT law will
also be more stable. There will be no more problems about whether some or all of
the panel reports are legitimate-since there does not have to be political
adoption of the reports as there was under the old GATT system. See td. at 58488.
445. See Hudec, Judlclaltzaton.supra note 88, at 19-20.
446. Davey, supra note 197, at 79. "While the notion of precedent does not
mean that the panel never reached conclusions differing from those of prior
panels, they generally do follow past panel decisions as long as they are well
reasoned and were accepted in the GATT system as correct." Id. at 79.
447. In the panel findings for that report the panel cited ten different GATT
reports in a total of 19 citations of authority. Panel Report, supra note 430. In
the Appellate Body panel report the panel cited seven different GATT reports and
a total of 20 citations of authority. United States- Standardsfor Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R. Apr. 22, 1996 [hereinafter Appellate Body
Panel Report].
448. Davey, supra note 197, at 79 (Davey already describes the GATT
dispute settlement as "the creation of a legal system of relatively stable precedent
interpreting the clarifying GATT obligations.").
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exist an
will
enough reports to constitute a body of law, there 44
9
additional and "higher" level of "operative precedent.
There is one other aspect of the WTO system that should
increase its legitimacy. The DSU makes express provisions for
450
Although
the participation by third parties to the disputes.
third party participation is limited to other Member States (and
not extended to individuals or non-governmental organizations),
the participation of other players in a dispute will more actively
engage the entire WTO membership in the dispute settlement
process. The resolution of any dispute will, therefore, reflect the
views of not only the parties to the dispute, but any WTO Member
The DSU allows third party
State that might be affected.
participation during the panel process itself, and panel reports
to reflect a consideration of their concerns and
are required
451
comments.
There is no guarantee that the development of a GATT body
of "operative precedent" will proceed smoothly. The operation of a
dispute settlement system is often controlled by the quality of the

law it is construing. In GATT history, there were periods where
the panel system operated successfully because there was a
general consensus about the nature and extent of GATT
obligations. 4 52 The GATT panel system exhibited problems when

more of the disputes it received involved issues left unaddressed

or unresolved by GATT negotiators. 4 5 3 Each of the Uruguay
Round agreements contain some deliberately ambiguous or vague

449. Whether or not the Appellate Body reports achieve this status will have
much to do with the quality of the panelists and the reports they produce. If the
Appellate Body reports are faulty or perceived as such they may be ignored by
later panels. Given the weight of the reports in the system, however, the WTO
cannot afford too many that will be ignored. If the Appellate Body review is
deemed by Member States to be thorough, comprehensive and correct, it could
add substantially to both the credibility and legitimacy of the WTO dispute
settlement system.
450. Third parties can intervene in a WTO dispute and- offer views in the
consultation phase (art. 4.11). panel deliberations (art. 10.2) and appellate
proceedings (art. 17.4). Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5.
451. Id. at arts. 10.1 & 10.2. Many Member States have already used these
options. In the Gas case (WT/DS 2), the EU participated as a third party
interrogatory in the dispute between Venezuela (and Brazil) and the United
States.
452. See Homer E. Moyer. Jr., How Will the Uruguay Round Change the
Practiceof Trade Law In the United States?, 30 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1996, at 63,
83. Moyer's advice for the United States in approaching the WTO is that it should
choose to follow a sensible assertive litigation strategy. "The first cases brought
should be narrowly focused cases of clear violations of WTO Agreements. They
should assert moderate positions, firmly and effectively argued. The objective
should be to present WTO panels with opportunities to enforce new WTO
Agreements responsibly and responsively." Id.
Hudec, Judlicaltzatlon,supra note 88, at 18.
453.
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obligations. 45 4
The greatest challenge of the WTO dispute
settlement system will be for the panels to resolve these legal
ambiguities without somehow adding to the body of legal
obligations that the Member States agreed to when joining the
WTO. 45 5

If this challenge is not met successfully, the dispute

settlement system could bring down the WTO. Unlike with the
GATT system, the Member States will be unable to argue that
reform of the process would eliminate their dissatisfaction. The
WTO system is as highly evolved along the adjudicative system as
it can be unless the sovereign nations are willing to accept a
supranational court which produces binding decisions.
c. Enforcement/Compliance
The success of the WTO dispute settlement system will be
gauged by whether or not it extracts compliance from its
participants. The complaining party to a WTO dispute has every
incentive to fle a claim because it stands a strong chance of
prevailing. 456 By contrast, the defending party to a WTO dispute
must either have a strong legal argument or be prepared to
submit to a decision against it. A defending party can avoid a

legal determination against itself only by curtailing the process
through a negotiated settlement. GATT history reveals that most
disputes between contracting parties were settled or were resolved
with acceptance of the panel report. 45 7 There were enough
failures of the system, 45 8 however, to create, particularly for the
United States, the impression that the system did not work.
The DSU was designed to allay concerns about the true
effectiveness of dispute settlement. The WTO system has a true
enforcement mechanism. Under the GATT system, the defending
party could avoid a panel report, and in most cases, feel confident
that the avoidance would not produce any adverse trade
454.
See generally GAO Report, supra note 256, at 67, 77-78, 119.
455. According to Professor Reitz, "Iclontroversy is bound to arise over the
opposing concepts involved in interpreting textual provisions. The distinction
between clarification and enlargement of a provision will inevitably be a source of
disagreement." See Reitz, supra note 444, at 587.
456.
The success rate for complaints to the old GATT system was always
relatively high. Over the history of those cases plaintiff countries prevailed in
77% of the cases. In the cases filed in the 1980s plaintiff countries received
favorable panel reports in 85 of the cases. ENFORCING INT'L TRADE LAW, supra note
3, at 289.
In the first six cases to work through the WTO system the
complainants prevailed in five of them Gasoline Case (WT/DS 2); Japanese
Alcohol Taxes (WT/DS 10); Costa Rican Underwear Case (WT/DS 24); India Textile
Case (WT/DS 33), Canadian Periodical Case (WT/DS 31). WTO Cases, supranote
303.
457.
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 3, at 277-78.
458. Id. at 278-87.
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consequences-the General Council was not going to authorize
retaliation, and conducted no surveillance to determine whether
or not a defending party actually implemented a panel report.
While the WTO system lacks any outside source of power to give
it authority, it does muster as much authority as it can over
sovereign nations by inserting DSB oversight into every aspect of
the enforcement process. The DSB must adopt all panel reports
and be notified of all plans for the preferred form of
implementation of panel report recommendations 4 5 9 or any
recognized alternative. 4 60 The DSU puts the collective pressure of

the WTO membership behind the resolution of each dispute. A
losing party in the WTO system cannot simply avoid a report

issued against it.
The WTO system does ultimately rest on the willingness of
the Member States to follow the rule of law. A rule of law regime,
however, does not place its burdens evenly. The smaller and
weaker economies stand to gain from the operation of a rule of
law system. 46 1 By contrast, the larger countries carry a heavy
burden in a rule of law regime. The multilateral system is not the
only option for a larger economy. As the U.S. experience with
Section 301 illustrates, unilateral economic power can be used
somewhat effectively to pursue certain types of trade goals. The
crucial question thus becomes: why should larger countries
submit to a rule of law regime? There are three reasons why a
large country might comply with such a system: (1) It approves of
the results reached by the dispute settlement system; (2) It finds
avoidance of the system too costly; or (3) It wants to support the
system. A large country is more likely to approve of a system's
results, even if they are adverse to it, if it finds them to be
legitimate. 4 6 2 The WTO results through the panel reports will be
viewed as legitimate if consistent both with regard to past rulings
4 63
and future expectations regarding the organization's powers.
The panel reports will also be perceived as legitimate if they are
persuasive, Le., well-reasoned, and transparent, i.e., all reasoning
is disclosed and understandable. The WTO system then will be
as good as the results produced by the individual panels. While
GATr panel reports apparently improved over time, becoming

459. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 5, at arts. 16 & 21.
460. Id. at art. 22.
461. Small or developing countries can neither easily negotiate with nor defy
larger trading partners. By taking their disputes to the WTO system, such
countries can rely on the pressure of the system for protection and vindication. A

WTO dispute for such countries will be about the GATr legal issue at stake rather

than economic power.
462.

Young, supra note 181, at 408-09.

463.

Id. at 409.
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more analytical and precise, it is too early to tell about the WTO
system.
A large country will also be more likely to comply with a rule
of law system if avoidance of that system costs too much. The
WTO system is designed to provide this type of incentive to
comply. The automatic adoption of panel reports in the WTO
system means that a losing country cannot avoid being identified
as a malefactor.
If it is important for that country's self
perception or world image to be seen as a supporter of the rule of
law, then such labeling could be a heavy cost. The other cost of
the wTO system is that it makes it impossible to avoid
participation by potentially every WTO Member State. 4 64 Smaller
countries traditionally could achieve no leverage over larger
countries by threatening retaliation. Retaliation often proves
4 65
more costly to the country taking the action than to the target.
Some aspects of the WTO system, however, change this scenario.
Since the WTO does authorize the extreme remedy of cross
agreement retaliation, 4 66 a smaller country might be able to
4 67
remove a trade concession highly valued by a large country.
The final reason a large country would be willing to comply
with an adverse WTO decision is that it supports the system. To
a large extent, a Member State that actively participates in the
multilateral system must accept one or even a series of adverse
decisions if it wants to pursue its own cases. The WTO as an
organization will not survive too much asymmetry. 4 68 A powerful

464. The DSU gives the losing party only three options: withdrawal of the
offending measure, compensation or acceptance of retaliation, If the offending
trade practice or legislation is too important domestically a country may refuse to
withdraw it. As a sovereign nation it can only be bound by international law if it
so chooses. Taking such a path, however, will, under the WTO system, virtually
compel it to compensate the complaining party by offering it another trade
advantage for the losses it has imposed. A country might be willing to refuse
either to correct its offense or compensate, but only if it believes WTO-authorized
retaliation cannot harm it.
465. See generally Gary Horlick, Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Will the
United States Play by the Rules. 29 J. WORLD TRAD, Apr. 1995, at 163, 167
(explaining why countries often accept U.S. non-compliance with WTO dispute
resolution rules rather than retaliate).
466. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supranote 5, at art. 22.3.
467. For example, cross agreement retaliation would allow a country to
suspend its market opening for a valuable section of services trade or its

adequate enforcement of intellectual property rights. Id. at art. 22.3(e)-(g; see
also Horlick, supra note 465, at 168. The greater threat of retaliation, therefore,
reinforces compensation as the default position for a country that cannot or will
not end the GATT-violation practice. A smaller country may be willing to accept
such compensation and settle a dispute if it does not believe cross agreement
retaliation will be authorized and normal same sector retaliation would prove
counterproductive.
468. Davey, supra note 197, at 80.
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country or group of countries wanting to use the system'against
others while avoiding potentially adverse consequences will break
the organization. With regard to this factor, U.S. commitment to
the WTO system will prove crucial. As long as the United States
continues to make frequent use of the system, it will be compelled
to accept its adverse decisions.
3. Consequences of the Adjudicative System for the United States
There are both procedural and substantive consequences for
the United States arising from the creation of the WTO system.
With regard to procedure, now that the WTO system is in place
and operating, the United States must play by the rules. If it
brings a Section 301 case against another country for a GATT
violation, it must also request consultation with the target
country under the terms of the DSU. 4 6 9 Similarly, if it is faced
with an adverse ruling, the United States must either implement,
or appeal and later implement, the panel recommendations. In
its most recent trade actions, the United States has played by the
rules. In its latest Section 301 actions involving GATT violation
claims, the United States has filed a WTO complaint
simultaneously with the Section 301 notice4 70 and acknowledged
that it will take no action until the DSU process has issued a
determination. 4 7 1 The United States also accepted the DSU
process as it has worked its way through the first WTO panel and
Appellate Body reports issued against it. The United States has
accepted the adverse WTO ruling.4 72 The U.S. response to a final
WTO determination against it offered the first glimpse of the
substantive consequences of the WTO system. 4 73 As a sovereign
nation, the United States was under no legal obligation to accept
an adverse WTO ruling.

469.

URAA Legislative History, supra note 37, at 3906-07.

470. See generally Kantor Asks for Consultations on CanadianSplit-Run Tax
Dispute, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 12. 1996); Paul Blustein, U.S. Files Action
Over CanadianMagazine Tax, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1996, at C3.
The United States did delay in seeking WTO involvement in the Film case
because it originally viewed that case as a Section 301/Unreasonable case.
471. URAA Legislative History, supra note 37.
472. John Perry & Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Plans to Comply with Ruling in Gas
Case, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1051 (June 26, 1996); Options to Meet Clean Air,
WTO Goals Sought by EPA After Gas DecisionRule, 13 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1143
(July 10, 1996).
473. The WTO system is designed to receive complaints by any WTO
member about acts, practices or legislation of another Member State which
violates GATT obligations or causes nullification or Impairment of GATT benefits.
The WTO system, therefore, will potentially receive many complaints challenging
the form or operation of federal laws and regulations, as well as state law GATT
violations.
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4 74
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 (URAA)

provided the implementing legislation for the DSU as it applies to
U.S. law.475 According to the legislative history of the URAA, the

United States simply agreed to the creation of the WTO system
and its power to hear all relevant GATT cases. Any adverse WTO
ruling on a U.S. law or regulation has no direct effect. Congress
will make any determination about whether to withdraw or amend
47 6
If
a federal law found to be GATT-violative by a WTO panel.
Congress refuses to authorize such a change, then the United
States will have to respond to an adverse WTO ruling by offering
compensation or accepting retaliation. If a federal regulation Is
found to have violated the GATT by a WTO panel, the process is
different. The President is authorized by the URAA to propose
4 77
and implement changes to federal regulations.

474.
URAA, supra note 18, at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512, 3532(c), 3533(0.
475. All of the GATT agreements accepted by the United States following the
Uruguay Round negotiations were adopted by the President as executive
agreements. The President lacks authority under the Constitution to negotiate or
sign international trade agreements. Congress has constitutional power over
foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3. The President gets authority to
negotiate and sign trade agreements from fast track legislation passed by
Congress. The President received authorization to complete the Uruguay Round
negotiations in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. That fast track
authority was later extended in 1991 and again in 1993 to allow for the finish of
the Uruguay Round. See Senate Approves Fast Track Bill; Kantor Pledges Avert
Amendments. 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1110 (July 7, 1993). Under U.S. law,
therefore, executive agreements or trade do not have the direct effect on treaty
obligations. As a result, GATT obligations become part of U.S. law only if
Congress adopts them by passing implementing legislation.
Statement of
Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 4040. The Statement of Administrative

Action describes the Uruguay Round implementing legislation, which the United
States Trade Representative signed on April 15, 1994, on behalf of the United
States under the authority of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. See
OTCA, supra note 17, § 1102. Congress approves the Statement of Administrative
Action when it passes the implementing legislation. Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 30, at 656.
476. URAA, supra note 18, at 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a).
Statement of
Administrative Action, supra note 30, at 1020-21.
477. URAA, supra note 18, at § 3533(f), (g); Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 30, at 1021.
Before the President proposes such an alteration or amendment to a federal
regulation, however, he must consult with the relevant Congressional Committees
and take public and private sector views on the proposed changes. URAA, supra
note 18, § 3533(g).
The House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committees-the congressional committees with oversight over trade issues-are
allowed a 60-day period to express their views on any proposal the Administration
may make to amend most federal regulations.
Statement of Administrative
Action, supra note 30, at 1021. The Congressional expression of views will take
the form of a non-binding resolution. Id. The final rule or regulation proposed by
the Administration will normally not go into effect before the end of the
Congressional consultation period. Id. at 4310. The EPA regulations that are the
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One question that remains unanswered is whether the United
States will take steps to oversee how the WTO system affects the
President Clinton was unable to procure
United States.

Republican support for the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,

largely because of concerns about WTO ruling and U.S.

sovereignty, 478 until he agreed to accept the idea of a WTO
Dispute Settlement Review Body. 4 79 The purpose of the Dispute

Settlement Review Body is to review all final WTO reports which

are adverse to the United States in order to determine whether or
not the panel exceeded its authority or acted outside the scope of
the relevant GATT Agreement. 48 0 Former Senate Majority Leader
Robert Dole was responsible for the idea of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Body, and he developed legislation (S.16) to
Although the Clinton Administration
create the organization.
committed itself to support the Review Body legislation in 1995,
neither S.16 nor a variation on it that would create the Dispute
Settlement Review Body has been submitted to the full
Congress. 48 1
Election 'year politics stalled S.16, 48 2 and
consequently, it is unclear whether Congress will ultimately adopt
version of the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
some
4 83
Act.

The U.S. proposal for a Dispute Settlement Review
Commission was regarded with general dismay by other WTO
Member States. Undoubtedly, these countries felt that the United
States' desire for such review flew in the face of its loud and often
expressed preference for a more adjudicative dispute settlement

subject of the current WTO process were reviewed and considered under this
process.
478. David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pactto Ease Trade Curbs, N.Y. TIMES.
Dec. 2, 1994, at Al; David E. Sanger, Dole and Clinton Strike a Deal on World
Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at Al.
479. Gary N. Horlick. WTO Dispute Settlement and the Dole Commission, 29
J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1995, at 45-46 [hereinafter WTOIDole Commission].
480. Id. at 47.
481. The Dole version of the WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
Act (S. 16) was referred by Senator Dole to the Senate Finance Committee in the
First Session of the 104th Congress but has never been sent to the full Senate.
482. WTO/Dole Commission, supra note 479, at 48.
483. The proposed Dispute Settlement Review Commission will operate as a
monitoring body for U.S. involvement with the WTO dispute settlement system.
Id. at 47. The Dole legislation for the Dispute Settlement Review Commission
would appoint five federal appellate judges to form the Commission to review all
rulings adverse to the United States to determine whether the WTO panel
exceeded its authority, engaged in misconduct, departed from panel procedures
or deviated from the applicable standard of review. If the Dispute Settlement
Review Commission found such improper action, it would report to Congress.
Should there be three such reports during a five year period, Congress could
introduce legislation subject to a Presidential veto, proposing the withdrawal of
the United States from the WTO. Id.
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system.
The possible U.S. review scheme does not mean,
however, that the United States does not support the WTO
system. Despite the fact that S.16 has not been passed, the
United States has proceeded to file more cases than any other
country with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body.
If a Dispute Settlement Review Commission is set up, it may
serve an important function for the United States. Rather than
having U.S. responses to adverse WTO rulings become subject to
political review and posturing, WTO reports will be reviewed by
experienced and neutral judges 48 4 who are likely to appreciate the
nature and quality of the panel decisions. It will take time for the
Dispute Settlement Review Commission to be set up and have
enough adverse rulings to review before it is clear that such
neutral review will enhance the credibility of the WTO system in
the United States. International law scholars have long agreed
with the view that the United States has a "distrust of
international supervision [that] is deeply embedded in our
political tradition."48 5 The United States long desired and fought
for an effective dispute settlement system for GATT cases. The
WTO system will answer whether this new settlement system
actually satisfies the United States when it is the defendant.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States now stands at a turning point in Its
economic history. In the past decade, the United States sought to
realign a world trading system that appeared stacked against it by
taking unilateral action to enforce its understanding of GATT law
and to set the agenda for an expansion of GATT law at the
negotiating table. The result of these efforts was a Uruguay
Round that produced a greatly expanded GATT, including for the
first time coverage of areas of great trade importance to the United
States: services and intellectual property rights protection. The United

States pressure on the system was also responsible for the form and
content of the new dispute settlement system established to resolve

trade disputes.
Having obtained its trade priorities under the Uruguay
Round, the United States needs to resume multilateralism as the
primary way in which it will pursue trade liberalization. This Is
because many of the trade problems (See Figure C) the United
States confronts can now be dealt with effectively by the WTO. If

484. Id. at 48.
485. Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law". 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1026 (1985).
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a U.S. complaint against another country involves a violation of
international trade law, the WTO dispute settlement system is
both more legitimate and equitable than the self-help of
unflateralism. Although not all potential cases can be pursued
immediately under the WTO system, the GATT now does contain
obligations that will ultimately give the United States multilateral
assistance in making sure that foreign markets do not remain
closed to U.S. products and services because of restrictive, nonexistent, or unenforceable legislation on services and intellectual
property. If there is a WTO reexamination of the non-violation
theory, then the WTO system will cover even more of the U.S.
concerns. If it works as designed, the DSU should create an
adjudicative dispute settlement system that will operate to protect
Member States' rights under GATT and clarify the meaning of
GATT law.
Unilateralism, as exemplified by Section 301, has limitations
which keep it from being the complete answer for U.S. trade
problems. When it acts unilaterally, the United States greatest
power comes only when threatening or actually taking action of
the type it most desires-market closing. Actions like this, if not
always GATT illegal, do violate the spirit of GATT law. Self-help
can be justified only when the international system cannot or will
not act to vindicate international law. An improved international
system capable of doing both, if accepted by its Member States,
now exists. Unfortunately, so does the lure of unilateralism. The
United States shows an inclination towards pursuit of all of the
unfair actions it finds in the trade policies of other countries, even
if the world trading system does not yet share its sense of
unfairness or urgency (See Figure C).
If the United States continues to make use of Section 301 to
force these issues, it will only re-experience the immediate past.
Unilateral trade actions will obtain de Jure relief but not de facto
compliance with the new international rule being sought by the
United States.
Unilateralism might be more effective in
attempting to set the agenda for and bring about more quickly the
next round of multilateral trade negotiations. Nevertheless, the
multilateral system can only withstand so much pressure from
the outside. If the United States persists in taking unilateral
action, it will find itself defending such actions in the WTO. For
issues of great concern, becoming a GATT violation may be worth
the price. Whether that price is an acceptable one for all U.S.
trade problems is unlikely. U.S. efforts to reform the GATT have
left it with a new dispute settlement system designed to extract
compliance from wayward nations, multilaterally not unilaterally.
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